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The United Nations Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) Standards have been 
developed to fill a gap in the technical guidance required to respond to the expanding 
and increasingly complex problem of IEDs.  
 
IEDs impede humanitarian access as well as other UN operations and impact on 
civilians, United Nations personnel and clearance organizations. In all areas of its IED 
response, the United Nations requires a safe, cost-effective and coherent approach to 
IED disposal. The United Nations has a duty of care to ensure that those entrusted with 
the task of IED disposal have a competent and practical standard to reference to protect 
their own lives and ensure operational and cost effectiveness. 
 
The United Nations IEDD Standards are of a technical nature; they are for use by IED 
disposal operators and for the organizations and units that employ them under the 
auspices of the United Nations. For Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Units deployed 
in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, the IEDD Standards outline the 
competencies required by individuals to meet the collective unit requirements set forth in 
the United Nations EOD Unit Manual. For commercial and non-governmental 
organizations contracted by the United Nations, these Standards provide the basis for 
evaluation of the contractors Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for IED disposal 
operations where the context or mandate objective is not humanitarian. 
 
In today’s asymmetric environment, and the multi-dimensional nature of Mission 
activities, the United Nations must be prepared to respond safely and in a timely, cost-
effective manner to IED threats before well-defined humanitarian space emerges. The 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) provide the framework for humanitarian 
response of all explosive devices cleared under humanitarian conditions in strict 
compliance with humanitarian principles.  
 
The elaboration of these IEDD Standards has been coordinated by the United Nations 
Mine Action Service, supported by the Office of Military Affairs of the United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and with the technical advice of national 
experts having specific expertise in IED threat mitigation. This process also involved 
extensive outreach and consultations with experts from the mine action sector to 
incorporate best and most current practices, wherever applicable. 
 
The IEDD Standards have been developed without prejudice to the scope and 
definitions provided in the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons. 
 
These IEDD Standards are intended for use by the United Nations. Member States may 
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United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)  





Introduction to Improvised Explosive Device Disposal 
1.1 Context of the IED Threat 
An Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is “a device placed or fabricated in an improvised 
manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals 
and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military 
stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components.”1 
 
Those who manufacture IEDs continuously alter the characteristics, the functioning or the 
delivery method of the device. IEDs generally consist of a switch, power source, initiator, 
container and explosives. All IEDs can be classified as either timed, command, and 
victim-operated2. There are, by definition, no manufacturing standards for IED 
construction although trends may appear and there may be attempts to achieve 
commonality between IED components. The safe conduct of IED disposal therefore, 
relies upon appropriately trained and qualified IEDD operators having a thorough 
knowledge in this area and of the increasing complexity of these devices. 
 
IEDs are among the world’s oldest types of weapons. The use of IEDs as a weapon of 
choice by non-state armed groups is a clear trend over the last decades. IED attacks3 do 
not target only armed forces, security forces or parties engaged in conflict but also 
civilians, government and local officials, and members of humanitarian organizations. IED 
attacks take a toll both in terms of human casualties and psychological impact as well as 
cause materiel damage to vehicles, infrastructure and resources / supplies. IEDs are 
often indiscriminate killers hampering reconstruction efforts, stabilization tasks and the 
delivery of the humanitarian aid in conflict and post conflict environments. The clearance 
of IEDs, along with explosive remnants of war (ERW), which can be used as explosive 
precursor materiel to manufacture IEDs, are essential prerequisite for the safe and 
unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance and the return of life to normal in a post 
conflict environment. 
 
IED attacks occur in urban, semi-urban and rural locations against static and mobile 
targets. Casualties of IED attacks are typically and overwhelmingly civilians.4 Such 
attacks have a destabilizing effect, leading to widespread fear, political instability, 
                                            
1 UNMAS Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Lexicon 
2 A detailed description of the IEDs can be found in the UNMAS IED Lexicon. The specifics of IEDs found in various 
areas are not covered. IEDs may have enhancements, including Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) 
and range from simple to complex. The threat from improvised CBRN devices must be considered when undertaking 
the area threat assessment. However, the capabilities to respond to these threats are not covered in this document. 
3 An aggressive and violent action by an IED aggressor designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract an intended 
target. 
4 Action on Armed Violence, Improvised Explosive Device Monitor, 2017,  
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diminishing the legitimacy of the ruling government as well as impeding socioeconomic 
life. The impact can also be felt beyond immediate borders and on a regional level as 
well. Media and political attention given to the actions of IED aggressors5 can reach far 
beyond the borders of the country in which an attack occurs. 
 
IED manufacturers continually adapt their design to circumvent effective IED threat 
mitigation6 measures and spread/share their knowledge by using numerous 
communication technologies available. Therefore, addressing the issue of IEDs requires 
appropriately informed, trained, equipped and supported personnel from responding 
organizations who would be tasked to dispose of these devices.  
 
In-depth knowledge of the IED threat picture7 enables efficient identification of the 
resources, training, equipment and capabilities required to effectively mitigate the threat. 
Considering the safety of the IED Disposal (IEDD) operator (and any tasks involving these 
devices) as a priority, these improvised devices must be studied to determine their 
components, their functioning, and their methods of employment within a context of local 
factors. This technical and operational information must be recorded and shared at 
national level by all actors engaged in IED disposal8 to allow as accurate an IED threat 
picture as possible to be developed and to adapt the most appropriate IEDD tactics and 
methods. An IEDD Organization9 must take into account “the need to share” principle and 
the sensitivity of the information. 
 
In IEDD, the “need to share” principle refers to the requirement for all IEDD Organizations 
in a given locality to share information on IEDs they find with other IEDD Organizations 
operating in the same area or region. This exchange of information can be through the 
designated IEDD authority10 or an appropriate mechanism agreed with the designated 
authority. Information sharing is essential in IEDD to maintain an accurate IED threat 
picture which is a basic requirement for safe, effective, and efficient IEDD operations in 
any threat environment.  The "need to share" principle supports maintaining the safe, 
effective and efficient capabilities of personnel, and the safety and security of other 
humanitarian organizations and the general population in the area or region.     
                                            
5 An IED aggressor is any person or group of persons or organization that has the intent and / or capacity to inflict or 
threaten physical violence through the use or threatened use of IEDs. 
6 A whole of United Nations approach which focuses on the application of physical, procedural and training responses 
which can collectively be applied to mitigate the threats posed and consequences of IED attacks. 
7 An assessment of the potential use of IEDs in a defined geographical area by a stated IED aggressor or aggressor(s) 
against a stated entity in terms of the technical complexity and tactical sophistication along with the aggressor(s) intent, 
capabilities and opportunities along with local factors. 
8 IEDD Operators may be generated either from government, military, police, commercial or NGO entities.  
9 The entity that is permitted by the designated IEDD authority to undertake IEDD in line with agreed terms of reference 
drafted in line with the contents of the IEDD standards. 
10 The entity with responsibility for the conduct and standards by which IEDD is conducted in a defined geographical 
area, within a defined UN Mandate or an agreed SOFA or SOMA. The mechanism by which a designated authority is 
identified is a national legislative responsible who should designate a suitable entity to fulfil this role. In the case that 





Due to the fact that IEDs are used as an asymmetric or hybrid tool of conflict, all 
assessments of the threats and hazards that they pose must involve consideration of the 
technical explosive hazards and the tactical security hazards. Tactical security hazards 
require consideration of how IEDs are employed and the context of the wider security in 
the local area of employment. Due to the improvised nature of IEDs and the typical 
manner of employment, IEDD activities must be threat assessment centric.  
 
It is the responsibility of each organization considering to undertake IEDD to assess and 
identify any aspect of the proposed IEDD operations that may conflict with their 
organization’s operating principles as part of the process of assessing Statements of 
Requirements (SOR). IEDD organizations must address the issue(s) encouraging them 
to accept and partake in the sharing of technical and tactical IED information in both the 
SOR for IEDD activities and the Terms of Reference (TOR) under which they will operate. 
 
It is the responsibility of the designated IEDD authority11  overseeing IEDD organizations 
to ensure that those involved in IED disposal are correctly informed, educated, trained, 
equipped and supported with the appropriate capabilities according to the IED threat 
picture and the wider explosive ordnance threat and fulfill their mandate safely, effectively 
and efficiently. 
 
The IEDD Standards set out the IEDD capability requirements for IEDD Organizations 
tasked to undertake IED disposal in support of United Nations Missions and United 
Nations peace operations in which the operating environment is not permissive to purely 
humanitarian clearance. The Standards provides the means by which the IED threat 
picture can be developed for a given threat environment and from which the appropriate 
safe, effective and efficient IEDD capabilities can be determined. The IEDD capabilities, 
in turn, will inform the training that IEDD Organizations and its operators will be required 
to undertake to develop the necessary Knowledge, Skills and Attitude12 (KSA) and to 
determine the associated IEDD equipment requirements. See figure 1.1 below. 
 
 
Figure 1-1 – Knowledge, skills and attitude components of competent IEDD 
personnel 
 
                                            
11 The entity with responsibility for the conduct and standards by which IEDD is conducted in a defined geographical 
area, within a defined UN Mandate or an agreed SOFA or SOMA. The mechanism by which a designated authority is 
identified is a national responsibility. This does not presuppose the creation of a new governmental entity, 
wherever possible, existing structures should be used. In the case that no suitable functioning national mechanism 
exists, the United Nation may advise / propose a suitable entity to act as the designated authority.  
12 In an IED threat environment attitude refers to a person’s confidence, determination and robustness to operate safely, 
effectively and efficiently in an IED threat environment. 
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Additionally, the IEDD Standards provide guidance on IED clearance based on best 
practices within the IEDD philosophy and principles. Finally, these Standards also 
provide guidance on IED risk education. 
 
1.2 Roles and Actors 
The construction and emplacement of IEDs outside of conflict or post-conflict 
environments is considered a criminal act and in such cases, IED disposal is normally 
under the jurisdiction of the national state security forces and emergency services. Within 
conflict areas the status of the national security services may vary between fully 
operational to partially operational, or totally non-existent. Nonetheless, these national 
institutions may retain primacy and/or they may share responsibilities with the United 
Nations, and other international organizations.  
United Nations IED threat mitigation efforts in mission settings may vary depending on 
whether there is a permissive, semi-permissive or non-permissive operating environment. 
Humanitarian IED disposal only takes place in a permissive operating environment, and 
is elaborated by the International Mine Action Standards. In urgent or emergency 
humanitarian crises, the need will likely exist for IED disposal to take place in a semi- or 
non-permissive environments for the protection of civilians, United Nations personnel and 
humanitarian actors; it is for these semi and non-permissive environments that the IEDD 
Standards are written. 
The organization responsible for the personnel undertaking IED disposal should maintain 
situational awareness by conducting regular threat assessments. These assessments will 
inform the necessary risk mitigation measures and competency standards required, 
permitting IED disposal personnel to operate in such environments safely, effectively and 
efficiently. This process is elaborated in Chapter 2.  
The designated IEDD authority is the principal entity responsible for policy making, 
management, oversight and coordination of IED disposal activities in an affected country. 
The United Nations may fulfill this role for an interim period if conditions do not exist for 
such an authority to be established or to function. As soon as conditions are present, the 
United Nations shall encourage and assist the national government in the establishment 
of such an entity and provide technical advice and support to a designated IEDD authority, 
as requested. 
The IEDD policy13 of the designated IEDD authority or the United Nations, acting in that 
capacity on an interim basis, should include detail on the primacy of action within national 
security frameworks, the authority to act, organizational structures and priorities and 
principles. The designated IEDD authority or the United Nations should therefore decide 
on the roles the different IEDD Organizations may have. These roles will have to be 
                                            
13 The strategic plan of the designated IEDD authority or in their absence the United Nations for a given country in 
relation to how IEDD activities are to be conducted by IEDD organizations. This policy will also outline the roles the 
different IEDD organizations may have. 
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coordinated with the relevant governmental authorities. The possible but not exclusive list 
roles of IEDD organizations can be engaged in are: 
• IED Clearance 
• Protection 
• IED Awareness and Risk Education 
• Capacity Building 
• Information Management  
 
Chapter 3 provides more details on IED disposal capabilities required by IEDD 
organizations. IED Search competencies are beyond the scope of these Standards. 
Reference to international best practice is recommended when information on this 
enabler to IEDD is required. 
 
1.2.1 IED Clearance 
Clearance of IEDs refers to tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or destruction of 
all IED hazards from a specified area to an agreed standard. The agreed standard is set 
out in the terms of reference between the designated IEDD authority and the IEDD 
organization undertaking the clearance. The agreed standard may include clearance to a 
specified depth when the threat of sub-surface IEDs exists.  
 
IED clearance for the purpose of these Standards can take place in rural, semi-urban and 
urban locations and is divided into open area IED clearance and infrastructure and urban 
space clearance. The breakdown of the nine potential procedures used in IED clearance 
is provided in figure 1-2. How an IEDD organization undertakes these phases of IED 
clearance is a matter between the designated IEDD authority and the IEDD organization 
and should be outlined in the Terms of Reference (TOR) under which the IEDD 
organization operates. 
 
Figure 1-2 – Range of procedures within IED clearance 
 
1.2.1.1 Open Area IED Clearance 
IEDs can be designed for use to counter mobility and to deny access to certain open 
areas, typically on approaches to an area, resource, or facility that is being protected. 
Special attention needs to be paid to such situations which involve the use of IEDs with 
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specificity on the technical complexity and tactical sophistication of the IEDs being of 
utmost importance. These Standards define open area IED clearance as procedures to 
ensure the removal and / or destruction of all IEDs and associated hazards from a 
specified area to an agreed standard. Open area IED clearance is conducted in open 
uninhabited areas without any infrastructure or buildings present and is usually conducted 
in permissive operating environments. It is undertaken by basic, intermediate or advanced 
IEDD teams most often in support of developmental initiatives rather than in emergency 
contexts. 
1.2.1.2 Infrastructure and Urban Space IED Clearance 
IEDs are often used to deny access to infrastructure in both rural and urban environments 
making the return of local inhabitants more difficult. IEDs inside buildings present a 
different technical challenge and require a separate set of skills, equipment and 
procedures than those needed for open area IED clearance. Infrastructure and urban 
space IED clearance refers to procedures to ensure the removal and / or destruction of 
all IEDs and associated hazards from buildings, structures, facilities and their immediate 
surrounding spaces. Building and infrastructure IED clearance is conducted in permissive 
and semi-permissive operating environments. Building and infrastructure IED clearance 
should only be undertaken by intermediate or advanced IEDD teams. It should be noted 
that the presence of rubble may make the clearance of urban areas extremely difficult 
and hazardous.  In addition, the presence of buried human remains may also pose a 
health risk to IED Search and IEDD personnel. 
1.2.1.3. Protection - Mobility Protection and IED Incident Response 
Protection is understood as all measures and means employed to minimize the 
vulnerability of personnel, facilities and equipment against IED threats, and in all 
situations, to preserve freedom of movement for operational effectiveness. The nature 
and complexity of the risk associated with these activities differs from the ones associated 
with area or infrastructure clearance. In a United Nations mission context, where the 
mission mandate is to protect civilians, United Nations personnel and humanitarian 
actors, there is a necessity to allow the delivery of critical mandate activities and 
humanitarian aid, usually through the protection of convoys. This can be referred to as 
Mobility Protection.  
Mobility Protection refers to procedures to ensure the clearance of all IEDs and 
associated hazards obstructing the movement to, through or past a given location or area 
and is designed to facilitate the removal of an IED to allow a specific temporary purpose 
(e.g. movement of a convoy with humanitarian assistance). Mobility Protection can only 
be undertaken by advanced IEDD teams and may be required to be conducted in all types 
of operating environment, including non-permissive environments.   
At times, it may also be necessary for IEDD organizations to undertake a timely response 
to an unplanned IED task, referred to as IED Incident Response. IED Incident Response 
refers to procedures to ensure the removal and / or destruction of all IEDs and associated 
hazards which are located or detected separately from an ongoing planned IEDD 
operation and is reported or turned-in by another party after being found. IED incident 
response can only be undertaken by advanced IEDD teams and may be conducted in all 
types of operating environment including non-permissive environments. As directed by 
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the appropriate tasking authority in line with the procedures set out in the terms of 
reference under which the IEDD organization operates, IEDD personnel may undertake 
IED incident response tasks in the absence of national or other available IEDD 
capabilities, within their certified competency standard and available specialized 
equipment. 
1.2.1.4. IED Awareness and Risk Education 
IEDD organizations may be involved in the delivery of IED awareness to troop contributing 
country (TCC) or police contributing country (PCC) personnel and others involved in the 
provision of security in the country they are operating. IED awareness refers to a 
comprehensive set of IED theory presentations and practical lessons, which may include 
written and / or practical assessments, with the intent to provide or increase the 
knowledge and awareness of recipients in relation to IEDs, their threat and basic threat 
mitigation measures. Further information on IED awareness is provided in chapter 4 
Training.  
IED risk education refers to activities which seek to reduce the risk of death and injuries 
from IED by raising awareness of men, women, boys and girlsin accordance with their 
different vulnerabilities, roles and needs, and promoting safe behaviour. Efforts include 
public information dissemination, education and training, and community IEDD liaison. 
Further information on IED risk education is provided in Chapter 8. 
1.2.1.5. Capacity Building  
Where the local security forces do not possess adequate IEDD capabilities for the IED 
threat, the United Nations may be called to build capacity as part of national security 
forces development. Capacity building includes various types of support, ranging from 
strategic advice on IEDD capability development and institution building to training and 
educating local IEDD teams and the development of doctrine. TCCs/PCCs or IEDD 
organizations may be tasked to train, accompany, advise and assist local security 
services in the development of IEDD capabilities. Such mentorship will require the 
capability to train IEDD teams and provide them with the necessary KSA to develop 
competent IEDD operators. Mentors may also accompany newly trained IEDD teams on 
IEDD operations to advise and assist as they develop their competencies and confidence 
and gain experience. It is important that mentoring be for a limited time with an end state 
and that the local IEDD teams are competent and confident to operate safely, effectively 
and efficiently without the need for mentor assistance. 
1.2.1.6. Information Management 
Information management is a crucial activity within IEDD that enables maintaining as 
accurate an IED threat picture as possible, which in turn helps to maintain the most 
appropriate capabilities in terms of IEDD operator competencies, equipment and support 
to IEDD teams. IEDD Information management encompasses the collection, the 
reporting, the analysis, the sharing and the dissemination of information related to the 
IEDD tasks (IED reporting and recovering of components), between the community of 
actors involved in IEDD in the area or region. This is essential to assess the evolution of 
the wider explosive ordnance threat, and the IED threat, and to maintain the situational 
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awareness of all actual and potential IED aggressors. IEDD organizations and their 
operators must at all times maintain security over IEDD tactics and methods to prevent 
the publication, broadcast, observation or monitoring IEDD tactics and methods by 
entities who are not authorized to do so and to prevent their dissemination beyond those 
who need to have knowledge of IEDD tactics and methods. 
Further information on IEDD information management is provided in Chapter 7. 
 
1.3 IEDD Fundamentals 
IEDD fundamentals refer to the IEDD philosophy and associated IEDD principles on 
which these standards are based. 
 
1.3.1 IEDD Philosophy  
Every IEDD task is unique and it is therefore not possible to enforce definitive IEDD rules; 
however an IEDD philosophy and principles can be applied to empower safe, effective 
and efficient IEDD capabilities. For example, examining trends in the semi-industrial 
production of IEDs could indicate similarities in the construction and use of the IEDs. The 
improvised character of the devices, however, distinguishes them from conventional 
munitions. It is therefore imperative to gain an in-depth knowledge of the IED threat 
(construction, emplacement and environment) prior to establishing standard clearance 
procedures and to frequently reassess the IED threat in order to facilitate the amendment 
of standard clearance procedures when the threat is assessed to have changed. IEDD 
organizations are encouraged to develop best practices to be used to oversee IEDD 
activities. Such best practices should not be templated drills but safe, effective and 
efficient operating procedures that are appropriate for the assessed IED threat and the 
IEDD capabilities. Such operating procedures should not be prescriptive but should 
facilitate and encourage critical thinking by the IEDD operators implementing them, taking 
into account the context of the tactical setting.14 
Those involved in planning the generation of IEDD capability and the conduct of IEDD 
operations should be aware of the IEDD philosophy that guides IEDD operators in the 
planning and execution of IEDD tasks and plans. The United Nations IEDD philosophy is 
based on the following (the priority of each can vary depending on the operational 
context)15:  
a. Preservation of life: The safeguarding of human life takes precedence over all else.  
                                            
14 These standard or technical operating procedures should be issued by the designated IEDD authority and should 
determine how IEDD operations are to be conducted within the designated area of operations.  These SOPs or TOPs 
should be issued to all entities engaged in IEDD operations on a 'need to know basis' but should not be published 
openly. 
15 In the specific case of UN PK Operations, EOD units may be directed to add the removal of the threat as 
part of the philosophy. Please refer to the UN DPKO EOD Unit Manual, p.13, para. 1.4 
 
18 
b. Preservation of property: Property preservation is in keeping with the aim of 
preventing an IED from causing damage. 
c. Returning the situation to normal or restoring freedom of movement as soon as 
possible: The removal of the threat posed by an IED is central to the raison d’être of 
IEDD.   
d. Preservation and collection of components and information: Activities done without 
compromising personal safety. IED components are recorded and recovered, in 
support of improving the situational awareness as to the threat in the area of 
operations, in line with designated IEDD authority agreements, and consistent with 
this philosophy. 
 
1.3.2 IEDD Principles  
The guiding principles of IEDD are as follows: 
a. Remote means are to be used whenever possible within the tactical situation of the 
task. Where remote means are not possible, semi-remote means are to be used 
whenever feasible. 
b. Manual render safe action is only to be carried out as a last resort, where all other 
possible means have been exhausted. 
c. One-person risk16.  
d. The operator is to spend the minimum amount of time in the target area and is to 
return to the use of remote means whenever practicable. 
e. Prior to making a manual approach, safe waiting periods are observed. Waiting 
periods are times which an IEDD operator must allow to elapse; the times are 
mandatory and cover both the primary and secondary safe waiting periods17, 18 19. In 
extremis situations, where time is a crucial factor, the waiting periods could be 
shortened. 
f. Operations shall be properly planned,20 but operators must at all times remain 
situationally aware and be prepared to undertake dynamic risk assessment as the 
situation changes. 
                                            
16 A principle which requires that only one operator be within the assessed danger area of an IED during any part of a 
render safe procedure.  
17 The term ‘soak time’ is used in some EOD communities to refer to safe waiting periods. 
18 Exceptions can be made to safe waiting periods if operational priorities dictate or if by following the IEDD philosophy 
(above) is contravened. 
19 The policy on safe waiting periods to be used are to be provided to IEDD teams by their parent IEDD organization, 
which should be threat driven and may be determined in consultation with the designated IEDD authority 
20The EOD Operator’s knowledge, including knowledge of IED construction techniques, must allow him/her to:  
1. Make a full assessment of the threat; 
2. Have an awareness of any special hazard associated with a component, particularly explosives, other than the 
obvious explosive hazard, so that appropriate precautions can be taken; 




g. Neutralization through disruption of an IED is the primary option. 
h. No positive EOD action is to be undertaken until the cordon and evacuation is in place. 
In cases that an evacuation is not possible, the IEDD team will adopt protective 
measures. 
1.4 Planning IEDD Capability Requirements 
The decision to establish IEDD capabilities is determined by available contamination 
information received from the national government, designated IEDD authority or the 
United Nations. The planning of the requirements must ensure that a process of 
information gathering and analysis is implemented as soon as possible so that a 
comprehensive assessment of the IED threat and its impact on communities and the 
humanitarian / developmental activities can be made. The true extent of the IED problem 
may be difficult to assess, therefore the Information Management and the lessons learned 
processes are required throughout the whole life of a programme, as depicted in Figure 
1-3.The information gained through this approach will also assist in establishing a national 
IEDD policy and strategy linked to development priorities.  
 
Figure 1-3 – IEDD Cycle 
 
The responsibility for managing all IEDD related issues, mentioned in this standard, 
remains in the hands of appropriate IEDD qualified experts. Due to the specific 
characteristics of the IED threat and its mitigation, there is a need to establish a proper 
management structure staffed with qualified IEDD personnel both at operational level, to 
plan and carry out IEDD activities, and at the level of the designated IEDD authority / 
                                            
4. Identify the components of an IED so that after completion of a RSP the operator can identify how the device was 
intended to function and to assist in the collection of components and information; 
5. Provide technical advice. 
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IEDD organization / United Nations to manage and support national IEDD activities. 
Further information on management structures involved is provided in Chapter 2. 
Certain factors will determine the required IEDD capabilities and the necessary 
configuration to carry out the assessed IEDD tasks. Further information on the 
development of IEDD capabilities is provided in Chapter 3.  
IEDD capabilities and their tasks will be largely shaped by the following factors: 
a. IED threat: 
IEDD requires a thorough understanding of IED construction and their methods of use in 
a given area of operations. Some information may be classified; however, in keeping with 
the principle of “need to share” and the maintenance of an accurate IED threat picture, 
appropriate mechanisms for the transfer of information from, between and to IEDD 
organizations must be established and coordinated. Issues surrounding the sharing of 
data between partners/IEDD organizations at all levels should be resolved at the earliest 
opportunity. Understanding the threat is key in preparing the appropriate IEDD 
capabilities. 
 
b. Aggressor intent, capability and opportunity: 
An IED aggressor refers to any person or group of persons or organization that has the 
intent and capacity to inflict or threaten physical violence through the use or threatened 
use of IEDs. Aggressor intent refers to the desired aim or purpose that any person or 
group of persons or organization are trying to achieve through the use or threatened use 
of physical violence. Aggressor capability refers to the classification of the ability or 
potential ability of an aggressor to achieve their desired aims when assessed under their 
doctrine, equipment, competencies and structure. Opportunity refers to the assessment 
of the chances of a set of circumstances that makes it possible for an aggressor to carry 
out an attack. Assessment of an aggressor intent, capability and opportunity collectively 
make up the three pillars of a threat assessment. 
 
c. Operating environment: 
The environment in which the IEDD capability will be deployed must be considered from 
a physical environmental perspective and a social perspective. Physical environment 
perspective refers to consideration of the terrain, access, altitude, vital infrastructure, and 
weather factors. Social environment factors include demographics, population details, 
economy, history of the conflict, historical and contemporary political situation and 
displaced persons. The operating environment can be categorized from benign or 
permissive to hostile or non-permissive with everything in between referred to as semi-
permissive. 
 
d. Available resources: 
All resources that are required, directly or in support of an IEDD capability, need to be 
considered in relation to the constraints associated with the maintenance or lack of 
equipment. Some resources that need to be considered in relation to an IEDD capability 
include: 




• Equipment – critical equipment and all sundry materiel and personnel needed to 
maintain and sustain it. 
• Funds to maintain and sustain the IEDD capability from either national sources or from 
external donors or loans. 
 
 
e. Legal considerations: 
Legal considerations to be incorporated can have a major influence on the ability of an 
IEDD organization to develop, maintain and sustain a stated IEDD capability. Such legal 
considerations may include: 
• Legal requirement on an IEDD organization imposed by the designated IEDD authority 
or the host country law; 
• The production of IED reports generated by the IEDD organization for use by the 
national authority or other host nation government agency; 
• The procurement, handling, transport and storage of energetic material for use in 
IEDD; 
• Liability for harm or damage caused due to IEDD operations; 
• Mechanism for the enforcement of cordon and evacuation, and the removal of persons 
from within the assessed danger area of an IED; 
• Implications from the mandate under which a United Nations mission is operating. 
 
Expert legal advice should be sought by the designated IEDD authority from the most 
appropriate means and sources when drafting the terms of reference under which IEDD 
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The nature of IEDD operations is inherently more complex than traditional mine action.  
The introduction of human aggressors, and their unlimited inventiveness, into the 
equation results in a considerably more complex, dynamic and evolving threat.  
Organizations conducting IEDD must understand that the threat, both from the IEDs and 
the way they are employed, can and will change rapidly and that their personnel could 
themselves become the direct target of the IEDs they encounter.  In developing an 
understanding of current, and likely future aggressors it is likely that IEDD organizations 
will be considered a valuable target.  It is inevitable that IEDD personnel will be observed 
by aggressor networks who are attempting to identify patterns, capability gaps, and 
weaknesses that can be exploited.  
The IED threat, both the technical and tactical aspects, can change quickly in response 
to the countermeasures, tactics and methods employed by IEDD organizations.  This shift 
requires those organizations undertaking IEDD operations to constantly evaluate the 
appropriateness of their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).  In order to stay 
ahead of the threat and mitigate the risk to the greatest extent possible, the designated 
IEDD authority and IEDD organizations must work together to collect, assess and 
disseminate tactical and technical observations. Organizations such as the UN 
Department of Safety and Security (DSS) and UNMAS may serve a focal point for the 
coordination of this information.  
This chapter aims to identify the planning process(es), which must be driven at every level 
by robust and detailed threat assessments, required to identify the complete spectrum of 
capability that will be required to counter the IED threat.  IEDD planning is a multi-
disciplinary activity but at its very heart must have suitably qualified and experienced 
IEDD operators to properly interpret the threat and inform the technical requirement at 
every level.   
The threat from IEDs can be broken down into “technical” and “tactical” which, when 
combined, will give the overarching threat picture to IEDD operators and organizations. 
The “technical” threat refers to the analysis of the aggressors’ likely ability to use complex 
components and switches, particularly Radio Command, along with their ability to source 
those components. The “tactical” threat refers to the tactics, techniques, and procedures 
as well as a myriad of subjective factors, based on the aggressor’s intent and history, to 
understand the likely method of employment of a device. 
 
2.1 Planning and Threat Assessment 






In military jargon, the National level may be considered to be strategic, Area level to be 
operational and Scene level may be considered to be tactical. The relationship between 
the three is explained graphically in Figure 2-1.  This chart further shows the relationships 
between planning activity, the development of Terms of Reference (TORs) and delivery 
of reporting as capability is planned for, contracted and deployed. 
 
 
Figure 2-1 IEDD Planning 
 
2.1.1 National Level  
National level planning and threat assessment relates to higher level planning to assess 
the present and potential future explosive hazard threats in a wider geographical region 
or country.  National level planning and threat assessment is the essential first step in 
determining the safe, effective and efficient IEDD capabilities to be deployed to the IED 
threat environment and will be instrumental in determining the detail of the statement of 
requirements (SOR) to be communicated to prospective capability providers.   
It is impossible to be completely prescriptive about who, exactly, will be involved in this 
National level planning and threat assessment but it will typically be led by the designated 
IEDD authority and include other organizations as required and appropriate.  It is unlikely 
that prospective capability providers, other than national civil or military teams, will be 
included in this stage of planning and threat assessment.  Once complete the National 
planning and threat assessment process will be the basis against which capability 
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requirements are put forward for tender and against which detailed terms of reference are 
agreed.  The process is however never complete and is a continual cycle informed by a 
constant flow and exchange of information described graphically in Figure 2-2 below: 
 
Figure 2-2 Information Flow 
The requirement to share operational and tactical information relating to both technical 
and tactical threat will likely be a key tenet of any TOR. This flow of information facilitates 
the essential process of dynamic threat assessment at every level and ensures that an 
accurate picture of developing threats is maintained and communicated to generate 
mitigation measures and any changes to posture, capability and capacity are managed 
upstream.  Planning at the national level will encompass the spectrum of EO threat and 
cover the complete requirement from traditional Mine Action activity through to those 
additional measures required to mitigate the specific IED threat – from enhanced 
technical capability to developed Risk Education. 
 
2.1.2 Area Level 
Area level planning and threat assessment will be conducted by an IEDD organization 
looking to respond to an SOR developed at the National level.  It will need to involve a 
specialized IEDD operator at the heart of the threat assessment and draw on the expertise 
of the IEDD organization in determining threat through both technical and non-technical 
surveys.  Informed by the National threat assessment, the process should aim to draw 
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down the threat to an operational picture which will further refine the threat for a more 
defined geographical location. 
The completion and submission of an area level threat assessment must be a 
requirement within the statement of work and without which IEDD clearance operations 
should not commence.   
The impact of geography, local population analysis and local political situations amongst 
many other factors will all help build a picture of the likely existing threat and potential 
developments once clearance operations commence. The area level threat assessment 
must describe, in full technical detail, the known or established threats by device type. 
During an Area analysis, strong community relationships are essential to building the 
necessary trust required for a thorough understanding of the IED threat. The use of 
community liaisons should be stongly considered by IEDD organizations.   
The area level planning and threat assessment should prioritize clearance operations 
within the designated area of operations and allocate adequate and appropriate 
resources.  The threat assessment should also detail the freedoms and constraints that 
will be placed on the clearance teams by detailing the reporting requirements and 
understanding what situational changes21 will result in re-evaluation of the IED threat 
assessment. 
The area threat assessment should be subject to frequent review based on the 
developing understanding of threat which will come from information from the national 
level IED threat assessment as well as from ongoing clearance operations.  A robust 
Information Knowledge Management system, described in Figure 2-2 above, into which 
IEDD teams submit reports and from which the IEDD Organization collates data for 
analysis and trends prior to dissemination to IEDD teams and to the designated IEDD 
authority, will underpin the threat assessment and allow managers to react appropriately 
to a changing threat picture. 
 
2.1.3 Scene Level 
Scene level planning and threat assessment commences once the national and area level 
threat assessments have been completed and clearance teams have been allocated to 
tasks.  These clearance teams will include personnel trained to the appropriate level as 
determined by the planning and threat assessments and risk analysis. It is the direct 
responsibility of the supervising IEDD operator to draw down the national and area threat 
assessments and then conduct a threat assessment for the specific site where they are 
operating.  This scene level threat assessment will be an incident appreciation22 of the 
                                            
21 Situational changes refer to changes in any of the following: IED technical complexity; IED tactical 
sophistication; aggressor intent; aggressor capability; aggressor opportunity. 
22 An assessment of an EOD/IED incident from information gathered through observation, map analysis, 
witnesses, surveys and all other means allowing an area evaluation in support of a threat assessment 
leading to threat integration from which possible courses of action are identified as part of a safe, effective 
and efficient EOD plan 
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immediate site and must be used to confirm the accuracy and validity of the area threat 
assessment and that the personnel allocated to the task are adequately trained for the 
assessed threat.  This is the most dynamic threat assessment and it is essential that 
anything at the scene level which changes the assumptions of the area or national threat 
assessments is immediately communicated across the organization, and up to the 
designated IEDD authority where appropriate. 
The individual IEDD operators should be given specific freedoms and limitations to the 
actions that they are permitted to carry out commensurate with their level of training and 
experience. An example of how limitations can be effectively implemented on individual 
IEDD operators is the use of IEDD recommended actions stated by the designated IEDD 
authority or the IEDD organization in their tactical operating procedures (TOPs). They 
provide the final level of threat assessment which they will conduct for every action that 
they take.  They must have been fully briefed on the national, area and scene 
assessments. 
 
2.1.4 Flow of Tasks 
 
The IEDD planning and threat assessment process is a logical flow of task appreciation 
from the highest to the lowest level.  It represents an “all informed” cyclical process of 
information management and must include suitably qualified and experienced persons at 
every point.   
   
 




Figure 2-3 which starts with the determination of a Scope of Requirements (SOR) 
derived from the National level planning and threat assessment describes how this 
process should be used to deliver capability. It is impossible to be prescriptive about the 
exact manner in which this process must be conducted because it relates to what is and 
always will be a dynamic problem to which there is no “templated” solution.  Conducted 
properly, the flow of tasks should ensure that the most appropriate resources are 
allocated to every task and that capabilities are matched to the threat. It is not a finite 
process and must, through the proper use of reporting and information management, 
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Chapter 3  
IEDD Capabilities 
3.1 Background 
IEDD capabilities are generated from a combination of the following four elements: 
• Management structures (Chapter 3); 
• External support to the IEDD team (Chapter 3); 
• Competencies of IEDD personnel (Chapter 4); 
• IEDD equipment available (Chapter 5); 
The management structures of an IEDD capability refers to both the management 
methods, mechanisms and processes in place to exercise authority over the personnel 
involved in IEDD activities and control of the assets. IEDD team competencies refer to 
the IEDD Knowledge, Skills, Attitude (KSA) and task appreciation that team members are 
certified as being qualified with. IEDD equipment available to an IEDD team will determine 
what procedures and techniques can be performed. External support to IEDD from 
elements outside of an IEDD team includes communications, medical, security, transport, 
search assets (e.g. ADS, Drones) and ECM23 assets. Management structures are to also 
include Information Knowledge Management (IKM) systems to support the information 
management that is crucial in support of maintenance of effective and efficient IEDD 
capabilities. Further information on information management is provided in chapter 8. 
IEDD trained staff will be required, to support the designated IEDD authority (and United 
Nations, as appropriate) to plan and assess IEDD activities. This will require personnel 
with appropriate technical experience24 and competencies coupled with the appropriate 
managerial skills to advise or lead United Nations entity, designated IEDD authority and 
IEDD organizations involved in IEDD. In addition to being IEDD qualified, IEDD staff will 
be required also to be certified IMAS 09.30 level 1, 2 or 3, depending on their function.  
 
An assessment of the prevailing and potential IED threat in a given area is necessary to 
determine the most appropriate IEDD capability required. Therefore, it is pre-requisite that 
an accurate and in-depth understanding of the current and potential IED threat picture25 
is established through appropriate planning and assessment. This is achieved through an 
analysis of a national threat assessment by the designated IEDD authority in preparation 
of clearance priorities and taskings.  
                                            
23 See note on ECM in “External Support to IEDD” section. ECM is also known as Counter RCIED Electronic Warfare 
or CREW. 
24 What is a suitable and accepted as an experience is the responsibility of the designated IEDD authority. 
25 An assessment of the potential use of IEDs in a defined geographical area by a stated IED aggressor or aggressor(s) 
against a stated entity in terms of the technical complexity and tactical sophistication along with the aggressor(s) intent, 
capabilities and opportunities along with local factors. 
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First and foremost, any IEDD operation must be as safe as operationally practical for  
members of the IEDD team, those supporting the IEDD team and all other persons in the 
vicinity of the IED task location. IEDD capabilities must also always be effective in 
eliminating the threat of an IED and all associated explosive hazards. Thirdly IEDD 
capabilities must be efficient in the safe elimination of an IED and all associated 
explosive hazards within acceptable time, financial, personnel and other resource 
constraints. For these reasons, it is essential to ensure that all IEDD capabilities and 
operations are safe, effective and efficient.  
Where the designated IEDD authority or United Nations determines that there is the 
requirement for an IEDD capability to be delivered by a IEDD Organization, it is essential 
that the appropriate capabilities are identified and communicated through the statement 
of requirements (SOR) to inform potential IEDD Organizations26 so that safe, effective 
and efficient IEDD capabilities are generated and deployed to the IED threat environment. 
To generate the desired capability, SOR must clearly articulate the explosive mitigation 
requirements needed. For planning purposes and to provide a framework within which 
these standards can be based, generic IEDD roles are identified in Chapter 1.  
Under Section 3.2 of this Chapter, three generic team structures are presented. These 
IEDD teams are designed to provide a platform around which these Standards are based 
and are not intended to restrict IEDD Organizations; rather the generic team structures 
provide a minimum standard which will allow three IEDD capabilities to be achieved. 
Should an IEDD Organization, following an internal threat assessment, decide to provide 
an alternative IEDD team structure that has greater capability than those presented 
herein, they are free to do so. 
 
3.2 IEDD Structures 
The three team structures are referred to as basic, intermediate and advanced. If an IEDD 
Organization is undertaking area clearance with basic IEDD teams and the need for a 
higher-level capability is identified (e.g. the presence of Radio Controlled IEDs (RCIEDs) 
are confirmed during clearance using basic teams), an intermediate level IEDD team is 
needed to undertake such activities. This is to be stated clearly in the terms of reference 
under which they operate.  
The competency standards for IEDD specialist functions is provided in Annex A of these 
IEDD Standards, while equipment requirements are provided in Chapter 5 (IEDD 
Equipment).  Issues related to IEDD support are covered at the end of this Chapter. 
 
 
3.2.1 IEDD Team Structures 
This section presents the three IEDD team structures: basic, intermediate and advanced. 
                                            
26 Potential IEDD organizations are entities interested to undertake IEDD on behalf of a designated IEDD authority. 
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Four IEDD personnel levels as Basic IEDD operator, IEDD assistant, Intermediate IEDD 
operator and Advanced IEDD operator / IEDD supervisor employed in various roles have 
been identified as necessary to populate these IEDD team structures.  
These team structures are used to provide the framework around which these Standards 
are based. The overall competency of an IEDD team is based upon the qualification of 
the competency and qualification of the IEDD team leader. Further information on the 
competencies of IEDD team members is provided in Chapter 4 – Training. IEDD team 
structures should have capabilities that reflect the following considerations: 
• Required Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD) competencies; 
• IED roles (see chapter 1); 
• IED technical complexity and tactical sophistication (see chapter 2); 
• Prevailing operating security environment (see chapter 2); 
• Aggressor intent, capability and opportunity; 
• Local factors; 
• IEDD competencies (see chapter 4); 
• IEDD equipment (see chapter 5); 
• Task information management (see chapter 8). 
An IEDD team is comprised minimum of two persons, consisting of a Team Leader (TL) 
and other team members, all of whom are appropriately certified and equipped to 
undertake IEDD operations. This refers to appropriately CMD certified operators who 
have successfully completed an IEDD course.  
All IEDD teams must have an IEDD operator as the designated TL, with all IEDD teams 
under the control of and reporting to an IEDD supervisor, who is contactable and located 
nearby for deployment to the scene of an IED task as required. The proximity and ability 
of the supervisor to deploy will vary according to the level of capability of the IEDD teams 
under their control.  In general, the more qualified and capable the team leader, the less 
direct supervision is acceptable. For basic IED teams the supervisor should be on scene 
whereas with an intermediate team the supervisor should be contactable at all times and 
be able to deploy to the scene by the quickest means possible.  
These IEDD teams are designed to provide a platform around which these Standards are 
based and are not intended to restrict the IEDD organization from undertaking IEDD but 
provide minimum standards that will allow three IEDD capabilities to be achieved. Should 
an IEDD Organization decide to provide an alternative IEDD team structure and capability 
that is greater than those presented herein, they are free to do so as long as the 
alternative meets or exceeds the minimum standards set by these Standards. IEDD 
Organization may decide to have more members and / or higher capability in a team as 




3.2.2 IEDD Team Functional Roles 
For the three IEDD team structures of basic, intermediate and advanced, a total of four 
IEDD trained personnel are required to fill the positions therein. These four positions are 
referred to as basic IEDD operator, IEDD assistant, intermediate IEDD operator and 




Figure 3-1 IEDD team functional roles 
 
3.2.2.1 Basic IEDD Operator 
The following are the prerequisite competencies, main tasks and employment role of 
basic IEDD operators: 
• Prerequisites: 
o Be certified IMAS 09.30 EOD level 1; 
o Completed an IEDD level 1 course. 
• Main tasks: 
o Detect, locate and destroy in situ items of EO, on which the individual has been 
trained; 
o Maintenance, preparation and deployment of equipment and explosives in use; 
o Assist the other basic team member in all phases of the IED task as required in 
line with safe, effective and efficient practices; 
o Refer to the on scene IEDD supervisor upon detecting or locating an item of EO 




o Basic IEDD team. 
o Will NOT operate in isolation from an IEDD Supervisor. 
 
3.2.2.2 IEDD Assistant 
The following are the prerequisite competencies, main tasks and employment roles of 
IEDD assistants: 
• Prerequisites: 
o Possess IEDD Level 1 certification; 
o Be certified IMAS 09.30 EOD level 2;  
o Completed an IEDD assistant’s course. 
• Main tasks: 
o Maintain, prepare and deploy all IEDD equipment and explosive tools in use; 
o Assist Intermediate or advanced team leader in all phases of IED task as directed. 
• Employment: 
o Intermediate Team member; 
o Advanced Team member – assist IEDD supervisor in IED incident responses & 
mobility protection; 
o Will NOT operate in isolation from an IEDD Supervisor. 
 
3.2.2.3 Intermediate IEDD Operator 
The following are the prerequisite competencies, main tasks and employment roles of 
Intermediate IEDD operators: 
• Prerequisites: 
o Possess IEDD Level 2 certification;  
o Be certified IMAS 09.30 EOD level 3;  
o Completed an intermediate IEDD course. 
• Main tasks: 
o IED task management IED task appreciation, IEDD plan development and 
execution; 
o Supervise and direct the actions of the other intermediate team members; 
o Refer to the IEDD supervisor upon detecting or locating an item of EO that they 




o Intermediate Team leader NOT operating in isolation from an IEDD Supervisor; 
o Advanced Team member – assist IEDD supervisor in IED incident responses 
& mobility protection. 
 
3.2.2.4 Advanced IEDD Operator 
The following are the competencies and main tasks of advanced IEDD operators: 
• Prerequisites: 
o Possess IEDD Level 3 certification;  
o Be certified IMAS 09.30 EOD level 3; 
o Have demonstrated suitable knowledge, skill, competency and attitude along with 
associated experience27 to be considered suitable in line with the terms of 
reference under which the IEDD organization is operating to undertake the stated 
tasks and be employed as stated. 
• Main tasks: 
o Conduct remote, semi-remote and manual IEDD render safe procedures on all 
types of IED; 
o Persons with responsibility for the tasking and coordination of several IEDD 
teams ensuring safe, effective and efficient IEDD practices; 
o Provide timely advice and supervision to IEDD teams as required; 
o Undertake IEDD tasks, assisted by an IEDD level 2 or level 3 qualified person 
in support of IED Incident Responses and Mobility Protection. 
o Support and/or undertake area level IEDD planning, producing IED briefing 
packs and local threat picture products for IEDD teams as well as undertaking 
analysis of IED reports from IEDD teams to make analysis products to be fed 
into regional level IEDD planning; 
• Employment: 
o Basic IEDD team(s) on scene supervisor; 
o Intermediate IEDD team(s) supervisor being contactable at all times and 
deployable to the scene by the quickest means possible; 
o Advanced Team leader – IED incident responses & mobility protection. 
Note: employment of an IEDD supervisor is explained further in chapter 6.  
                                            




3.2.3  IEDD Team Categories and Roles 
This section outlines the composition, roles and tasking parameters of the three IEDD 
team structures. The recommended minimum composition of the three team structures is 
presented in figure 3.2. 
 
 
Figure 3-2 - IEDD team structures and composition 
*Note: An IEDD assistant is a certified basic IEDD operator with additional qualification 
and skills 
 
3.2.3.1 Basic IEDD Team 
A basic IEDD team will at a minimum consist of two basic IEDD operators with one 
designated as the team leader. A basic IEDD team will be certified to undertake the 
following roles: 
• Open area IED clearance; 
• IED awareness delivery and support to risk education; 
• Capacity building (in line with their qualifications); 
• Information management.28 
This team will not operate in isolation but with the required external support such as 
communications, transport, medical, search, and security provided as required. They will 
always be under the direction of an IEDD supervisor on scene and will only undertake 
disposal of IEDs on which members have been qualified for. If the IED exceeds the 
qualification of the team members, the IEDD supervisor should take over or task an 
intermediate IEDD team, if appropriate. The basic IEDD team may only operate in IED 
threat environments that have been assessed as being permissive in line with the 
designated IEDD authority terms of reference in relation to security threat assessments. 
                                            
28 The on-going specification of information requirements, its collection and analysis followed by the 
dissemination of relevant information to relevant stakeholders in a timely manner.   
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3.2.3.2 Intermediate IEDD Team 
An intermediate IEDD team will at a minimum consist of two persons - one an IEDD 
assistant and one an intermediate IEDD operator. An intermediate IEDD team will be 
certified to undertake all roles of a basic IEDD Team plus: 
• Infrastructure and urban space clearance 
• Perform IEDD on devices that exceed Basic Team capabilities 
This team will not operate in isolation but with the required external support such as 
communications, transport, medical, search, security and ECM29 as required by the IED 
threat assessment. An Intermediate IEDD team will generally require additional diagnostic 
and remote capabilities over and above that required by a Basic IEDD team, including: 
radiographic equipment, remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) and counter-RCIED ECM 
equipment.30 The team will always be under the direction and of an IEDD supervisor who 
is contactable and located nearby for deployment to the scene of an IED task as required.. 
They will be certified to undertake IEDD on all IEDs types with the IEDD supervisor to be 
on call for technical support, advice and assistance as required. They may operate in IED 
threat environments that have been assessed as being permissive or semi-permissive in 
line with the designated IEDD authority terms of reference in relation to security threat 
assessments. 
 
3.2.3.3 Advanced IEDD Team 
In most, if not all, cases – military and TCC capability will be based on the advanced team 
construct. An advanced IEDD team will at a minimum consist of two persons – one an 
IEDD assistant and one an advanced IEDD operator. An advanced IEDD team will be 
certified to undertake all roles of an intermediate IEDD Team plus: 
• Mobility protection 
• IED incident response 
• Perform IEDD on devices that exceed Intermediate Team capabilities 
This team may operate as an IEDD team in isolation and with the required external 
support such as communications, transport, medical, search, security and ECM31 
provided as required. They may operate in IED threat environments that have been 
assessed as being up to and including non-permissive, in line with the designated IEDD 
authority terms of reference in relation to security threat assessments. 
  
                                            
29 See note on ECM in “External Support to IEDD” section. 
30 See note on ECM in “External Support to IEDD” section. 
31 See note on ECM in “External Support to IEDD” section. 
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3.2.4 External Support to IEDD 
External IEDD support refers to that support which is non-organic to the IEDD team and 
needs to be provided from other elements. This support typically includes 
communications, medical, security, transport, search, ECM assets and situational 
awareness support, but it can also refer to additional capabilities such as explosive 
detection dogs (EDD). Internal support refers to support which is organic to the IEDD 
team and is covered in the IEDD equipment chapter. Internal IEDD support includes IEDD 
equipment life cycle management which is required for IEDD equipment to remain 
serviceable and safe for use from the time of purchase to disposal or end of life.  
When an IED threat assessment has identified an RCIED threat, there will be a need for 
the IEDD Organization undertaking IEDD to consider the deployment of an appropriate 
ECM capability or an acceptable threat mitigation alternative as agreed with the 
designated IEDD authority, taking into account the prevailing and potential pending RC 
threat. UNMAS may be referred to for technical advice on this matter.  
ECM requirements should be initially provided in the statement of user requirements and 
updated to the IEDD Organization from the designated IEDD authority as the threat 
evolves. It is the responsibility of the IEDD Organization to fulfil the ECM requirements in 
line with the contract in whatever manner they choose to do so e.g. through an organic 
capability or through a third-party contractor. In the case of ECM support32, this may be 
organic to the IEDD team and deployed by the team without additional support or it may 
be a specialist asset requiring specialist support personnel to deploy it. In all cases the 
complete life cycle management and ensuring the ECM assets remains capable of 
mitigating the assessed RCIED threat specialist support is required outside the 
capabilities of an IEDD team.  
It is essential for the United Nations entity, designated IEDD authority or IEDD 
Organization undertaking an initial IEDD planning process that all IEDD support 
requirements are assessed and clearly identified and incorporated into the statement of 
requirements (SOR), including the levels, standards and type of such support. It is also 
important during on-going IEDD activities that changes in the IED threat are monitored to 
identify impact on required IEDD support and that this is then communicated and 
coordinated with the respective IEDD Organization. 
  
                                            
32 See paragraph 5.6 Counter RCIED Equipment 
 
39 






























United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)  







The nature and risks associated with IEDD demand high training standards, 
maintenance of competencies, and specific safety considerations for all operators.  As 
a basic requirement, all personnel involved in IEDD should receive formal training, 
including on IED awareness. The onus to ensure that this takes place is on the IEDD 
organization authorized by a designated IEDD authority to undertake IEDD activities and 
applies to all IEDD operators deployed under its control. Part of this process is to ensure 
that all operators are competent through initial validation and subsequent revalidation in 
maintaining safe, effective and efficient IEDD capabilities in line with the assessed IED 
threat. An IEDD organization may be subject to quality assurance (QA) checks and 
formal inspections by the designated IEDD authority to ensure compliance with agreed 
terms of reference and national standards, if relevant, under which they are required to 
operate.  
IEDD operators deployed by an IEDD Organization must meet IEDD training 
requirements as individual specialized skills. Implementation of minimum training 
standards ensures that all deployed personnel possess the basic knowledge, skills and 
attitude necessary to safely, effectively and efficiently conduct IEDD operations within 
their defined roles. This will include an ability to undertake effective and efficient IED 
information management. An IEDD organization may also be required to undertake 
IEDD capacity building and to support IED risk education being delivered to local 
populations.  
It is the responsibility of an IEDD Organization to ensure that all relevant personnel are 
appropriately trained in the required capabilities related to the tasks they will be asked 
to undertake and deliver. It is also essential that during operational deployments, 
continuation training and updated IED threat briefs to maintain personal situational 
awareness on the IED threat are planned for and undertaken by the IEDD Organization.   
IEDD Organizations must maintain an accurate IED threat picture and ensure that their 
operators are well prepared and competent to dispose of all types of IEDs in an effective, 
efficient and safe manner. This should also involve adapting capabilities to take into 
account evolving tactics and methods by IED aggressors.  
The subsequent sections of this chapter describes in-depth the minimum training 
standards for IEDD operators required to achieve and maintain high proficiency prior to, 
and during their deployment into an IED threat environment. Chapter 7 covers IED risk 
education to local populations. 
 
4.2 Management of Training 
The designated IEDD authority should establish procedures for the management of 
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training within its programmes, to include training design and preparation, training needs 
analysis (TNA), training management packages (TMP), qualifications and experience of 
training staff, monitoring of training, and training administration procedures.  Training 
management procedures should be laid out in the designated IEDD authority’s IEDD 
policy and cover the following general requirements: 
• Training should be based on a TNA that incorporates lessons identified; 
• Training should be included in strategic and annual planning as part of the 
development of national capacity; 
• Training should be properly designed and developed and guided by comprehensive 
Training Management Packages (TMP); 
• Unless training is carried out centrally under the control of the designated IEDD 
authority, IEDD organizations should be required to submit their TMPs to the 
designated IEDD authority for approval; 
• Training should only be delivered by suitably qualified and experienced personnel 
who possess a recognised IEDD or IED search qualification.  The designated IEDD 
authority should specify how it will verify qualifications; 
• Evaluation and testing of training should be carried out; 
• Training should be subject to internal and external monitoring; 
• Training administration procedures should be developed. 
IMAS 06.10 Management of Training is used to provide guidelines for the management 
of training for Mine Action personnel and can be used by designated IEDD authorities 
to provide a basis for IEDD training management procedure concepts when drafting 
IEDD policy for training management procedures. 
4.3 Training Audience 
When a designated IEDD authority is drafting IEDD policy on IEDD training management 
procedures, they must remain aware of their target audiences. Primarily, IEDD 
organizations will be required to train their IEDD operators and those directly supporting 
them.33 Secondly, they may also be involved in the delivery of IED awareness to Troop 
Contributing Country (TCC) / Police Contributing Country (PCC) personnel, other UN 
personnel, persons involved in the provision of security and humanitarian personnel in 
the country they are operating within. Thirdly, they may be involved in supporting IED risk 
education being delivered the local populace. Broadly there are three target audiences 
for IED related training and education: 
• Local populace IED risk education – see chapter 7 of these standards; 
• IED awareness training – personnel required to operate in an IED threat environment; 
• IEDD specialist training 
                                            
33 Examples of personnel directly supporting an IEDD team include search personnel and ECM operators. 
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4.3.1 IED Awareness Training 
All personnel working in an IED threat environment should receive basic IED awareness 
training from an accredited organization.34  
 
IED awareness refers to a comprehensive set of IED theory presentations and practical 
lessons, which may include a written and or practical assessments, with the intent to 
provide or increase the knowledge of recipients in relation to IEDs, their threat and basic 
threat mitigation measures.  This low-level training helps mitigate the IED threat and the 
consequences of IED attacks by enhancing personnel safety, and improves the 
survivability of personnel required to operate in such IED threat environments. At the 
minimum, and tailored to the local environment, these skills include the ability to: 
• Understand the technical characteristics and make up of an IED and what to lookout 
for. This may include ground sign awareness and understanding the need to be 
aware of typical local atmospherics and how react when a change in normal 
atmospherics is noted; 
• Under the tactics and methods of IED emplacement and deployment; 
• Understand the importance of not setting patterns in their activities; 
• Understand where and when IED are likely to be emplaced; 
• Effectively plan for deployments into, to and through IED threat environments; 
• React effectively when an IED is identified understanding what initial evacuation 
requirements entail; 
• React effectively to an IED attack; 
• Report an IED find and / or attack to appropriate authority and record event details. 
 
Such training should be included in all initial, pre-deployment, refresher and continuation 
training.  No live or inert explosive ordnance shall be handled during awareness training 
to avoid any unsafe behavior or action by non IEDD qualified personnel. Failure to 
properly train personnel could cause injuries or death. 
 
4.3.2 IEDD Specialist Training 
IEDD specialist training refers to training delivered to IEDD team members and others 
who may support their activities e.g. search personnel and ECM operators.  
 
IEDD specialist training enables selected personnel to receive the necessary 
                                            
34 An accredited organization being one approved by the designated IEDD authority 
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qualifications to safely, efficiently and effectively undertake IEDD tasks. These tasks can 
only be performed by qualified team members, leaders and supervisors, and are subject 
to the limitations of their relevant associated skillsets. IEDD Organizations may be 
generated from government, military, police, commercial or NGO entities. IEDD trainees 
are required to have prerequisite knowledge and skills necessary before undertaking a 
specialized training, as set out by the designated IEDD authority in the IEDD policy. 
Training selection criteria should encourage gender balance and diversity.  
Only qualified trainers from an accredited IEDD organization35 should deliver IEDD 
Specialist training. 
 
4.4 Training Principles 
The application of the following principles assists an IEDD Organization to make 
adequate preparations and resource allocations prior to operating in an IED threat 
environment, i.e. factoring in adequate timelines and resources, such as: 
• Maintaining readiness. IEDD teams who adopt an agile and adaptive approach, 
optimize their effectiveness while operating in a demanding IED threat environment 
and facing evolving aggressor capabilities. Anticipation of emerging threats and 
taking advantage of learning opportunities are key to being better prepared, both on 
an organizational level in terms of capabilities and on an operator level both in terms 
of physical and mental preparation.  
 
• Education and training.  Education should reinforce a holistic inter-agency, whole-of-
government and multinational integrated approach to IED threat mitigation and 
associated level IEDD tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). 
 
• Balance of preparation.  Individual, collective and environment-specific preparation is 
required for effective IEDD training. Three broad areas of preparation are applicable: 
o Establishing an appropriate culture and mindset within the organization for 
operating within the IED threat environment. Personnel need to be 
knowledgeable and skilled as well as possessing the appropriate attitude36 to 
operate safely, effectively and efficiently. 
o Developing appropriate mechanisms to plan and execute comprehensive IED 
threat mitigation training and education is essential, ideally within a wider IED-TM 
approach.  
o Developing robust but flexible TTPs required to operate in the assessed IED 
threat environment is one of the most effective methods of preparation in 
supporting the development of appropriate IED threat mitigation measures.   
 
• Appropriate instructional methods. Methods best suited to achieve the standards 
                                            
35 Designated IEDD authorities should specify how it will verify qualifications.  
36 In an IED threat environment attitude refers to a person’s confidence, determination and robustness to operate safely, 
effectively and efficiently in an IED threat environment. 
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defined in this document are to be utilized in the training of personnel to operate in 
an IED threat environment. 
 
• Realistic operational-focused training. Every effort should be made to train personnel 
as they are intended to operate, developing the teambuilding, understanding and 
procedures that will be needed for success when deployed. Three broad areas are 
required for realistic operational-focused training: 
o Appropriate training environments. IED related training should be conducted in 
similar conditions to those expected on deployments, to reflect the environment’s 
complexity, intensity and challenges.  
o Habitual association of personnel. Operating as a team, inter-operability and 
integration of capabilities are required starting at the lowest levels. Ideally 
personnel who are to operate together in an IED threat environment, should be 
habitually associated from as early as possibly in their training. Training should 
develop familiarity and proficiency in operating with other partners and 
organizations, including local and foreign military forces, promoting cultural and 
gender considerations and procedural alignment to develop cohesion and 
information sharing.  This also enables better appreciation of capabilities and 
limitations. 
o Use of operational equipment during training. Training should incorporate all 
equipment that personnel are expected to use during deployment.  Any identified 
shortfall, operational or inter-operability issue must be adequately addressed, as 
much as possible prior to the deployment. 
 
• Utilise technology as appropriate. Technology and networked capabilities should be 
exploited to simulate the complexity and interaction required during the deployment.  
When possible, systems and data used in simulations and synthetic training should 
replicate those used on deployments. 
 
• Safety and protection. Appropriate consideration for the safety of personnel, the local 
population and for the protection of the environment must always be taken during 
training, particularly when manipulating explosive ordnance. 
 
• SMART evaluation of all training. Application of SMART (Specific, Measurable, 
Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound in nature) evaluation criteria should be 
integrated in all training. 
 
4.5 Mentored Supervision 
One of the roles that an IEDD Organization may be called upon to undertake is capacity 
building through mentorship. Mentorship involves activities undertaken by appropriately 
trained and qualified IED instructors to train, accompany, advise and assist personnel 
operating in an IED threat environment.  
Such capacity building may be part of national security forces capacity development or 
as part of a United Nations Mission’s capability development. Capacity building includes 
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distinct types of support, ranging from strategic advice on IEDD capability development 
and institution building to the development of local IEDD teams through training and 
education and the development of doctrine.  
 
An IEDD organization may be tasked to train, accompany, advise and assist national 
security services or a United Nations peacekeeping TCC/PCC in the development of 
IEDD capabilities. Mentorship requires an organization to have the capability to train 
IEDD teams providing them with the necessary KSA to develop into competent IEDD 
operators. They may also accompany newly trained IEDD teams on IEDD operations to 
advise and assist them as they develop their competencies and confidence and gain 
experience. It is important that mentoring be for a limited time with an end state that the 
local IEDD teams are competent and confident to operate safely, effectively and 
efficiently without the need for mentor assistance. 
In certain industries, disciplines or contexts, on-the-job training (OJT) is utilised as part 
of the training and education process and is normally ongoing and facilitated while 
personnel are carrying out duties and responsibilities commensurate with their current 
level of KSA.  However, OJT does not correspond with IEDD training due to the nature 
and risks associated with the IED threat. Mentored supervision is not the same as OJT, 
due to the greater levels of controlled accompanied supervision, assistance and advice 
during operational deployments. 
 
4.6 IEDD Training Responsibilities 
An IEDD Organization is responsible to confirm that IEDD teams have the level of IEDD 
training required before they are deployed operationally. Generally, the IEDD 
Organization shall:  
• Gain validation for IEDD training from the designated IEDD authority. 
• Ensure IEDD instructors and teams are competent, suitably trained and qualified. 
• Maintain appropriate training records in line with the requirements set out by the 
designated IEDD authority, to include: 
o Establishing and maintaining training plans which comply with standards required 
by the designated IEDD authority as well as other relevant standards and 
regulations that reflect local conditions and circumstances. 
o Establish and maintain validation procedures so that training completion 
certificates explicitly list the disciplines on which the individual has been trained 
and has qualified as competent. 
• Instruct IEDD teams to maintain logs of their operational experience. 
• Apply lessons learned for IEDD operations in an effective, efficient and safe manner 
which include procedures to protect the environment. 
 
The designated IEDD authority should: 
• Establish and maintain national standards for IEDD to include all details of how IEDD 
training should be conducted, monitored, evaluated and accredited. Where 
necessary, seek assistance from other national governments in accordance with 
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bilateral and international arrangements to obtain the specialist expertise and 
information necessary to establish safe, efficient and effective national standards for 
IEDD training, procedures and operations. 
• Establish and maintain performance criteria and tools for auditing of IEDD teams. 
• Establish and maintain the capability to accredit IEDD training and monitor the training 
and validation process. 
• Establish and maintain the capability to accredit organizations involved in IEDD. 
• Establish the required periodicity for IEDD revalidation. 
• Where possible, allocate appropriate disposal sites for organizations and approve 
guidelines and procedures for their safe and efficient use. 
• Establish and maintain the capability to monitor measures to protect the environment. 
• Establish national systems for IEDD task reporting and inform IEDD organizations so 
that appropriate training and education may be based on accurate scenarios. 
• Define the technical operating procedures (TOPs) which shall govern the conduct of 
IEDD and IED Search teams within the area of operations. 
 
The IEDD Organization shall ensure their IEDD personnel: 
• Provide proof of their qualifications/ validation from an IEDD organization and 
demonstrate that they possess the appropriate knowledge, skills and attitudes of a 
competent IEDD operator. 
• Maintain their training validation up to date during operational employment. 
• Provide and facilitate refresher and continuation training programmes. 
• Maintain the situational awareness of the area of operational deployment. 
• Perform only those IEDD tasks for which they are suitably qualified. 
• Report and share new IED tactics and methods. 
 
4.7 Training Levels 
Training will take different forms depending on the requirements and starting level of 
competency. In general, formal training is delivered in the form of a training course or a 
workshop to a group of trainees for a finite period, often in a location away from an 
operational worksite.  Four levels of formal training are discussed below.  All types of 
formal training must include an evaluation to confirm the trainee possesses the required 
knowledge, skills and attitude to be accredited as competent at a level. 
Informal training refers to both planned and spontaneous training that is intended to 
refresh competencies, mitigate skill-fade37 and introduce new tactics and methods to 
previously trained IEDD operators. The decision to introduce new tactics and methods 
as part of informal training needs to be assessed in consultation with the designated 
IEDD authority with a view to what new tactics and methods need to be recorded as a 
formal qualification. Informal training can take place at any location that can facilitate 
such training in a safe manner. 
                                            
37 Signs of regressing KSA may be identified / observed through routine monitoring, inspections, or as a 
result of a task while performing tasks. 
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4.7.1 IEDD Initial Training 
IEDD initial training aims to give trainees the KSA to make them competent to conduct 
IEDD (to the level the training was designed for) in a safe, effective and efficient manner. 
This type of training is applicable for newly recruited staff. 
 
4.7.2 IEDD Pre-deployment Training  
IEDD pre-deployment training aims to provide additional specific training associated with 
the area of operations. In particular such training should cover detecting and identifying 
specific types of IEDs expected to be encountered in the area of operations as well as 
understanding the IED aggressor’s commonly used tactics and methods.  It is important 
to understand the roles, capabilities and limitations of relevant partner organizations.  
IEDD teams should also familiarize themselves with the geography, culture, working 
conditions, political situation, gender considerations and other local factors that may 
affect their operations. This training should take place as close as possible prior to 
deploying to the area of operations.   
 
4.7.3 IEDD Refresher Training  
IEDD refresher training aims to update and/or maintain KSA levels over time.  KSA 
levels naturally tend to decrease with time. As the name indicates, refresher training 
assists qualified personnel with maintaining and/or bringing back their KSA to 
acceptable levels of competency. While IEDD operators must be properly qualified for 
the task when deployed to an area of operations, periodic refresher training will become 
essential during operational deployment.  This type of training can be scheduled on a 
regular basis and integrated into a projected training calendar. 
 
Periods of absence, low IED activity level, and noticeable signs that KSA levels have 
dropped or skill-fade may necessitate this type of training.  Refresher training aims to: 
• Minimize individual or team KSA fading; 
• Maintain/increase self-confidence; 
• Maintain adequate force protection;  
• Remain aware of the evolving IED threat in terms of aggressor tactics and methods 
and technical developments; 
• Adapt IEDD team tactics and methods in line with lessons identified; 
• Prevent routine and complacency; 
• Conduct rehearsals before performing tasks; 
• Test and implement new tactics, methods and lessons learned; 
• Integrate new partners, personnel and capabilities into existing structures and 
processes which in many cases can be part of facilitating habitual association of 
personnel required to operate together; 
• Assess operators and teams’ efficiency; 




Refresher training should be shaped to address identified capability deficiencies or KSA 
that provide challenges to IEDD teams. Their identification is enabled through close 
monitoring of KSA levels and performance assessments.  When conducted outside of 
the area of deployment, this training should replicate operational conditions as close as 
possible. 
 
4.7.4 IEDD Continuation Training  
IEDD continuation training aims to build on previous training and provides additional KSA.  
This type of training is applicable when there are changes to threat, work methods, 
procedures and equipment or when staff are being given additional skills to advance their 
skillsets or careers.  Additional KSA allow personnel to undertake increasingly challenging 
tasks and assume higher level responsibilities within the IEDD team, progressing from 
team member to leader to supervisor. 
 
Both IEDD continuation and refresher training encompasses individual and organization-
specific education, training and exercises, and integrates with the elements that will be 
required to interact during operations.  Such training may become a continuing 
requirement, especially with a high personnel replacement rate or during a phased 
operation. In many instances, training requirements may stem from lessons identified 
from current or previous deployments in the area of operations. 
 
4.8 Training Frequency 
The senior management within an IEDD Organization is responsible to define the 
appropriate frequency of refresher and continuation IEDD training and the specific 
matters to be covered in line with the requirements set out by the designated IEDD 
authority. This may take different forms and vary in duration related to maintaining 
competencies.  
 
The following factors should be considered to determine the appropriate frequency and 
method of training conducted during a deployment: 
• Significant change of threat in terms of IED aggressor’s tactics and methods or in 
terms of the technical complexity of the IEDs in use; 
• Increase of IEDs and casualties; 
• Rotation of personnel; 
• Integration of new equipment or IEDD tactics and methods; 
• Implementation of new lessons identified. 
 
The IEDD Organization shall provide the designated IEDD authority their refresher / 
continuation IEDD training plan, and maintain a record of all training conducted, with the 




4.9 Minimum Training for IEDD Teams 
IEDD is a complex and dangerous task and requires the teams to maintain and progress 
in their KSA.  The development of a safe, effective and efficient IEDD capability requires 
the establishment of levels of expertise to cope with a range of deployment requirements.  
As a rule, IEDD teams shall only be tasked to incidents and tasks appropriate for their 
level of training and competence.  All other cases should be referred to a higher level of 
expertise.  
 
Given that IEDs often incorporate conventional munitions as the main charge, the ability 
to face both types of devices (improvised and conventional) is inherent to IEDD teams, 
thus requiring them to be appropriately Conventional Munition Disposal (CMD)38 qualified.  
 
These standards recognize that the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) are the 
best practice applicable for CMD activities. Under IMAS 09.30 Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal, three levels of CMD competency are set out, which are elaborated on in terms 
of KSA requirements in Test & Evaluation Protocol (T&EP) 09.30/01/2014 EOD 
Competency Standards under EOD level 1, level 2 and level 3. Prior to becoming member 
of an IEDD Team, personnel must first possess an appropriate CMD validation in line with 
the IMAS level39 1, 2 or 3 as explained in the following subsections.  
 
It is recommended that training start with generic IEDD skills prior to conducting 
deployment specific training (or pre-deployment training), giving the IEDD team a broad 
knowledge base, thereby enabling it to respond to a variety of tasks, and have the KSA 
to adapt to evolving threats.  Additionally, the required deployment specific IEDD training 
should concentrate on the most likely threats to be encountered. Members of IEDD teams 
are qualified to carry out these IEDD functional roles, each one building on previous 
knowledge, with an IEDD assistant qualified to assist either an intermediate or advanced 
IEDD operator, as illustrated by Figure 4-1: The qualifications of all IEDD team members 
shall satisfy the requirements and regulations of the designated IEDD authority, who may 
request proof of capability in addition to the qualification. 
 
4.9.1 Basic IEDD Operator 
This initial IEDD Level enables the trained holder of the qualification to conduct activities 
as described in Chapter 3. The prerequisites for an IEDD Basic operators are IMAS EOD 
level 1 and the mandatory completion of an additional IEDD Basic operator course. 
                                            
38 The term CMD is used here to refer to any EOD operation conducted on conventional munitions. It is acknowledged 
that the term CMD and EOD are used in certain cases interchangeably. CMD is used here to clearly indicate EOD 
activities that exclude IEDD activities. 
39 Also referred to IMAS EOD levels. 
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4.9.2 IEDD Assistant 
An IEDD assistant is accredited to conduct activities as described in Chapter 3. The 
prerequisites for an IEDD assistant are IMAS EOD level 2, to be an accredited basic IEDD 
operator and the mandatory completion of an additional IEDD Assistant course. Training 
of an IEDD assistant must include specific training on the recovery of an IEDD Team 
Leader with basic first aid. 
4.9.3 Intermediate IEDD Operator 
An intermediate IEDD operator is accredited to conduct activities as described in Chapter 
3. The prerequisites for intermediate IEDD operators are IMAS EOD level 3, to be an 
accredited assistant IEDD operator and the mandatory completion of an additional IEDD 
Intermediate Operator course. This qualification extends only to those IEDs on which the 
individual has been trained; when a new type of device is encountered, the operator is to 
refer the issue to their supervisor for guidance and direction. 
4.9.4 Advanced IEDD Operator 
An advanced IEDD operator is accredited to conduct activities as described in Chapter 3. 
The prerequisites for advanced IEDD operators are IMAS EOD level 3, to be an 
accredited intermediate IEDD operator and the mandatory completion of an additional 
IEDD Advanced Operator course. 
 
 
Figure 4-1 IEDD team functional roles 
 
4.10 Validation and Revalidation 
IEDD organizations need to be able to validate and revalidate all IEDD operators operating 
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under their control and maintain the appropriate training records to reflect this in line with 
the TOR under which they operate. 
 
4.10.1 Validation 
A validation process is required to confirm and validate that personnel have acquired KSA 
necessary to be competent IEDD operators for the qualification they have been trained in 
accordance with these training standards. Validation of IEDD teams is achieved by 
qualified instructors from an accredited IEDD organization, through formal training and 
evaluation as set out by the designated IEDD authority. The exact IEDD validation 
process required by the designated IEDD authority will be set out in their IEDD policy. 
4.10.2 Revalidation 
Periodic revalidation of IEDD teams to the required level, as determined by the IEDD 
Organization, maintain the requisite competencies up to date and allow the IEDD 
Organization to remain abreast of evolving IED tactics and methods. The revalidation 
process shall be performed by an IEDD organization accredited by the designated IEDD 
authority, within the frame of specified QA guidelines defined in the Designated IEDD 
Authority’s IEDD policy.  Revalidation date and authority is recorded to demonstrate the 
currency of employed IEDD personnel, prior to performing IEDD tasks in an area of 
operations. 
4.11 IEDD Training Resources 
An IEDD Organization must thoroughly plan the resources required to provide safe, 
effective and efficient IEDD training to match the operational capabilities they are 
intended to deploy with and as much as possible the IED threat environment they are 
expected to deploy into. The designated IEDD authority should specify any specialist 
training resource requirements or specific training requirements they expect an IEDD 
Organization to have. Broadly the training resources to be considered include: 
 
• Equipment and material; 
• Replica, inert, training, instructional and live items of explosive ordnance; 
• Training facilities and areas; 
• Training staff, supervisors and instructors. 
• Standardized Administrative Evaluation Documentation 
 
All training should be fit for purpose and due cognisance should be taken of the differing 
requirements for both genders if mixed gender training is to be delivered.  
 
The procurement, importation, transport, storage, handling use and disposal of all items 
of explosive ordnance must be in line with national legislation, existing mandates and any 
prevailing arms embargoes. The use of inert, training and live explosive ordnance shall 
be maintained separately and strictly controlled to avoid accidents / incidents. EO are 
inherently dangerous and it is essential that everyone involved in their handling and 
movement should exercise extreme care as the consequences of live explosive ordnance 
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being inadvertently used during training could result in fatalities or injuries. It is therefore 
a fundamental principle of ammunition and explosive safety that live EO are never mixed 
with inert, training, instructional or replica explosive ordnance and that they shall always 
be maintained separately and strictly controlled. It is safer to use inert explosive ordnance 
for training or display purposes, but this requirement also carries its own specific risks. 
This is a proven principle designed to ensure that the risk of accidents / incidents during 
training and instruction is reduced to the minimum. There is no specific international 
legislation that refers to the use of inert, training, instructional and replica explosive 
ordnance, therefore this is considered “best practice”. Except for the specific training of 
explosive detection dogs, under no circumstances shall live high explosive components 
be incorporated into IEDs used for training.  Where necessary, low-hazard pyrotechnic 
components may be used to simulate the functioning of an IED.  Where employed, such 
systems should be closely supervised by training personnel. 
 
Training organizations shall establish and maintain operating procedures for the storage 
and handling of inert, training, instructional or replica explosive ordnance. Training shall 
be conducted safely without risk of harm to the trainees, trainers or local population.  If 
initial training is conducted in the field, it should be in areas known or proven to be safe.  
After initial training is complete, and a satisfactory level of competence has been 
confirmed through formal assessment, it may be permissible to continue further training 
in hazardous areas (e.g. demolition range).   Such training should only be conducted 
under close supervision. Consideration shall always be given to the safety of the local 
population and the environment when conducting training, especially when live EO is 
used.  See IMAS 10.70 S&OH protection of the environment. Training resources 
requirements depend of many factors such as the number and gender of trainees, the 
training environment, and the type of training provided.  As a rule, training should 
incorporate realistic training aids and the same equipment as required to conduct 
operations on deployment.  The specific amount of equipment required to conduct training 
should be based on a determined ratio of instructors to students, e.g. 1:4. Training 
equipment holdings should be modified according to the number of students being 
instructed and type of training. Considerations must be taken to support all pre-
deployment, refresher, and continuation training activities. 
 
4.12 IEDD Training Assessments 
4.12.1 Objective of Training Assessment 
Assessment of IEDD training confirms that the applicable KSA have been learned and 
assimilated by students.  Undertaking a formal assessment is an essential step for 
accrediting IEDD personnel and confirming that they posses the competencies required 
to safely, effectively and efficiently perform IEDD tasks in an IED threat environment.   
Since personnel are required to perform IEDD tasks within an IED team, it essential to 
assess KSA at both individual and team levels.  Assessment should be continuous during 
a training activity to ensure smooth progression and resolve any learning issue that may 
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rise. It may also be necessary for an IEDD organization to assess personnel to confirm 
that they possess the pre-requisite KSA before undertaking higher level training or 
operational deployment. 
 
4.12.2 Conducting Assessments 
Assessing KSA is achieved through the application of oral, written and practical tests, 
exercises and simulations. Training should allow enough time and practice for candidates 
to assimilate KSA before being formally assessed.  Practical exercises shall require 
trainees to apply their knowledge, use the range of IEDD equipment, tools and training 
aids available and display their aptitude.  Training assessments are only conducted by 
qualified instructors from an accredited IEDD organization. To ensure impartiality and 
quality assurance, best practice is for assessments not to be performed by the same 
instructors who deliver the training where possible.   
The assessment method shall drive candidates to apply KSA in realistic simulated 
operational scenarios.  All competencies required at the applicable level of IEDD 
expertise must be evaluated for each candidate.  All formal assessments shall be 
documented in the course report and maintained by the IEDD organization.  Assessed 
candidates should receive results of their assessments as part of a course report, in a 
timely manner, and be debriefed on areas of improvement. 
 
4.12.3 Assessment Standards 
Assessments must be conducted against a defined standard, which must be achieved by 
trainees to receive their validation.  It is important that IEDD operator courses are 
assessed as a pass-fail course.  If trainees are unable to meet the course criteria then 
they should not be considered qualified to these IEDD standards nor be employed within 
an IEDD team on operations operating under these standards.   
In cases where the individual fails to attain the standard, remedial training with 
reassessment may be considered and should only be considered by the IEDD 
organization if the successful achievement of training standards by the individual is 
assessed with high confidence. 
 
4.13 Lessons Learned Process 
The term Lessons Learned is broadly used to describe the act of learning from experience 
to achieve future improvements.  The idea of lessons learned in an organization is that 
through a formal approach to learning, individuals and the organization can reduce the 
risk of repeating mistakes and increase the chance that successes are repeated.  In the 
IEDD context, this means reduced operational risk, increased cost efficiency, and 
improved operational effectiveness. The lessons learned process is an essential element 
in maintaining an accurate IED threat picture for the IED environment in which an IEDD 




As an IED threat is typically continuously evolving, it is essential that those who operate 
in such an environment maintain an accurate situational awareness at all times.  This 
requires that an accurate IED threat picture is developed, maintained and sustained. This 
is best achieved through a “lessons learned culture” in which all activities are undertaken 
with an emphasis on capturing best practice through a robust information management 
system, which is covered in Chapter 8. 
Lessons learned refer to more than just learning from experience.  Learning must be used 
to justify changes that will lead to reduced risk, improved efficiencies, reduced costs, 
improved performance, enhanced capabilities, and updated training curriculum. The 
typical steps for any lessons learned process are identification, action, and 
institutionalization.  IEDD teams play a critical role in the analysis, dissemination, and 
implementation of lessons learned.  Specifically, for IEDD, the process can be described 
as follows: 
• Step 1 - Identification: After every IED task a report is generated that identifies what 
can be learned from the task.  It includes all aspects of environment, the IEDD team 
and aggressor tactics and methods, the target of the attack, the IED construction and 
emplacement, the IEDD tools used, and the items recovered.  The report should 
include detailed pictures along with the written descriptions.  The IEDD team’s 
observations and analysis contained in the report are then reviewed by a higher-level 
group who can identify trends across a larger area and make recommendations action 
to be taken.  After the identification step, you have “lessons identified”. 
• Step 2 - Action: The recommendations are reviewed for feasibility by the IEDD 
organization’s leadership and actions are tasked out to specific bodies.  Usually this 
is an update to or creation of operating procedures, tactics and methods, modification 
of IEDD tools, or an update on aggressor tactics, methods or devices i.e. an update 
to the IED threat picture. 
• Step 3 - Institutionalization: The new operating procedures, tactics and methods, 
tools or amended IED threat picture are incorporated into training for new IEDD 
operators and communicated to current IEDD operators through advisories and 
bulletins.  The result of the institutionalization of the solution is a “lesson learned” that 
must be disseminated to all relevant bodies. 
 
The lessons learned process is a non-stop, cyclical one that every organization 
undertaking IEDD activities must have ingrained in their culture.  Figure 4-2 illustrates 





Figure 4-2 Lessons Learned Process 
A critical aspect any lessons learned process is information sharing through the 
establishment of a widely used and effective information management system (see 
Chapter 8 Information Management).  This enables an organization to have a level of 
confidence in the IED trends, identify and quickly disseminate any changes in the IED 
threat picture, and ensure that the appropriate competence and protection levels are 
available for the assessed threat. 
 
4.14 Safety During IEDD Training 
All personnel involved in IEDD operations must adopt fundamental safety 
considerations, apply mandatory IEDD actions and use best practices in order to 
mitigate risks entailed by the presence of IEDs.  These measures equally apply during 
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This chapter serves to inform those involved in developing, maintaining and sustaining 
IEDD capabilities on the IEDD equipment required as part of such capabilities.  
IEDD equipment requirements listed herein are included as critical equipment 
requirements for the three IEDD team structures and outline the support needed to secure 
and sustain them. The equipment listed is deemed the minimum equipment needed to 
safely, efficiently and effectively undertake the tasks that the stated team is expected to 
be able to complete40.  
The designated IEDD authority retains the right to insist on equipment in addition to or to 
a higher specification than those listed herein. Similarly, an IEDD organization may 
choose to provide equipment in addition to or at a higher specific than those listed herein, 
in line with the agreement between the IEDD organization and the designated IEDD 
authority.  
Only specialist IEDD equipment is mentioned in Annex B.  Generic administrative and 
communications and information technology support equipment required by the IEDD 
Organization and IEDD support elements is not listed..  
Lists of critical IEDD equipment are provided in appendices of Annex B covering the 
following equipment requirements: 
• Basic IEDD team – Annex B, Appendix 1 
• Intermediate IEDD team – Annex B, Appendix 2 
• Advanced IEDD team -  Annex B, Appendix 3 
• Support team – Annex B, Appendix 4 
 
5.2 Lifecycle Management of IEDD Equipment 
In the development of appropriate safe, effective, and efficient IEDD capabilities for the 
assessed IED threat faced, appropriate IEDD equipment must be available to the IEDD 
operator when it is required. Such equipment must be maintained and sustained for the 
life span of the capability requirement. This anticipates a complete life cycle management 
approach with appropriate equipment support being in place from acquisition to 
retirement.  
Such equipment support refers to appropriate technical support, storage facilities, spare 
parts and associated workshop facilities as well as preventative maintenance regime. 
                                            
40 In line with the IEDD team categories and roles provided in Chapter 3 of these Standards. 
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This approach should account for the natural wear and tear of IEDD materiel requiring 
maintenance, repair and replacement during both normal and high tempo operational 
periods. 
The scale of equipment holdings, spare parts and ancillaries must be managed so that a 
sufficient scale of holdings is maintained to facilitate breakages and equipment being 
non—operational due to preventative maintenance or upgrade works. 
In terms of technical maintenance of IEDD equipment it will be required to plan for and 
have available the necessary technicians, equipment support and materiel to maintain, 
sustain, repair and upgrade if necessary all IEDD equipment required to sustain the IEDD 
capability. Broadly this can be broken down into the following areas: 
• General IEDD equipment support; 
• EOD ROV support to the electronics, hydraulics, mechatronics, weapons, optical 
systems and software along with all other technical aspects of the ROV in service; 
• Counter RCIED equipment. 
 
5.3 Training Equipment 
The IEDD organization must ensure that all IEDD teams to be deployed are trained, 
practiced and competent on the full equipment scales that they are to deploy with into an 
IED operational environment. For this reason, training equipment in line with that set out 
in the appendices outlined in section 5.1 are to be available for all team members, at all 
levels.  
Inert training aides should reflect the explosive ordnance hazard in the area of operations 
the team is expected to operate within, along with inert training aides for the explosive 
stores they will operate with.  
Strict rules and procedures are to be set out by the designated IEDD authority and 
implemented by the IEDD organization in relation to safe storage, handling, use and 
disposal of all live and inert EO natures. 
 
5.4 Protective Equipment 
It is the responsibility of the IEDD organization undertaking IEDD to ensure that its 
personnel utilize the appropriate level of IEDD protective equipment in line with the 
requirements set out by the designated IEDD authority and these Standards.  
The designated IEDD authority should state the level of IEDD PPE to be worn by IEDD 
operators when undertaking certain IEDD tasks. This may, for example, state the 
protection levels outlined in IMAS 10.30 and the associated references therein or in 
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relevant national standards41. PPE requirements should be threat driven in line with the 
threat assessment for the area of operations considering also the wider security 
requirements for the mission area.  
The designated IEDD authority should always consider the protection provided by PPE 
to IEDD operators to be a “last resort” protective measure against the blast, fragmentation 
and thermal effects of IEDs. Such last resort protective measures should be in place after 
all training, procedural and threat assessment hazard control measures have been 
implemented to mitigate the risk to an acceptable level.  
The greatest control measure against the hazardous effects of IEDs is stand-off and for 
this reason remote neutralization42 action against IEDs is always the preferred Render 
Safe Procedure (RSP). In most cases, such remote neutralization actions are best 
achieved through IEDD ROV technologies. 
. 
 
5.5 External Support IEDD Equipment 
External IEDD support refers to that support which is non-organic to the IEDD team and 
needs to be provided from other elements. This support typically includes 
communications, medical, security, transport, and specialist search assets and situational 
awareness support. External support needs to have all the equipment, tools, spares and 
ancillary consumable items that are required to maintain, sustain, upgrade and repair all 
the items of equipment that are deployed with in support of the IEDD team(s).  
During the initial IEDD planning process, it is essential that the United Nations entity, 
designated IEDD authority or IEDD organization undertaking it,  assess and identify all 
IEDD support requirements and include them into the statement of requirements, 
including the levels, standards and type of such support.  
It is also important during on-going IEDD activities that changes in the IED threat are 
monitored to identify impact on required IEDD support and this is then communicated and 
coordinated with the respective IEDD Organization. 
 
                                            
41 For example, in line with US National Institute of Justice (NIJ) standards or other relevant internationally defined 
standard.. 
42 Rendering safe of IEDs through the application of special EOD methods and tools to provide for the interruption of 
functions or separation of essential components to prevent an unacceptable functioning of the device, with an emphasis 
on preventing the device functioning. 
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5.6 Counter RCIED Equipment 
5.6.1 RCIED Mitigation Responsibilities 
When the IED threat assessment has identified a Radio Controlled (RC) threat, there will 
be a need for the IEDD Organization undertaking IEDD activities to consider the 
deployment of an appropriate electronic counter measure (ECM) capability or an 
acceptable threat mitigation alternative as agreed with the designated IEDD authority. 
This capability will be informed by the designated IEDD authority or other suitable 
organization or agency with an understanding of the prevailing and potential pending 
RCIED threat.  
ECM requirements will initially be provided in the statement of user requirements and 
updated by the IEDD Organization from the designated IEDD authority as the threat 
evolves. It is the responsibility of the IEDD Organization to fulfil the ECM requirements in 
line with the contract in whatever manner they choose to do so e.g. through an organic 
capability or through a third-party contractor.  
 
In the case of ECM support, this may be organic to the IEDD team and deployed by the 
team without additional support or it may be a specialist asset requiring specialist support 
personnel to deploy it. Specialist support may be required outside the capabilities of an 
IEDD team to ensure the ECM assets remains capable of mitigating the assessed RCIED 
threat.  
 
5.6.2 Counter RCIED Equipment Maintenance and Sustainment 
When the designated IEDD authority has assessed the requirement for ECM capability 
to be necessary for an IEDD organization operating in a given area of operations, a 
number of issues need to be considered and accounted for to sustain this capability.  
Such capabilities go far beyond the physical hardware and the type of counter RCIED 
assets to be deployed. Deconfliction between other IEDD operations and security / 
military elements operating ECM assets and communications systems is necessary to 
ensure harmonization operation of all such assets and avoid communications and ECM 
asset ‘fratricide’.  
Depending on the type of ECM assets deployed, RCIED support will require the 
necessary technical expertise in terms of personnel along with the equipment support 
materiel to maintain and sustain the capability, such as: 
• Hardware spares; 
• Test equipment; 
• Workshop and tools; 
• IT support of hardware, firmware and software to load, repair, maintain and upgrade 
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IED clearance refers to tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of 
all IED hazards from a specified area to an agreed standard. IED disposal is the collective 
term referring to the following EOD procedures, intended to result in the final elimination 
of an IED; detection, location, access, identification, evaluation, hazard mitigation, 
rendering safe, component recording and recovery, and final disposal.  
Depending on the priorities and required land use specified by the designated IEDD 
authority, these operations may involve surface and sub-surface clearance. Aspects of 
site organization used for Battle Area Clearance (BAC)43 and landmine clearance may be 
applied during IED clearance operations with appropriate amendments for the differences 
and complexities of the IED hazards. This decision shall be taken based on a field risk 
assessment and a complete Explosive Ordnance (EO) threat assessment of the area of 
operations. It is expected that when IEDs are encountered, all types of EO can be 
expected to be found during IEDD clearance operations.  
The boundaries of the area to be cleared and the expected IED contamination shall be 
determined by the designated IEDD authority. This should be conducted in accordance 
with the procedures described in Chapter 2. The IEDD organization is responsible for 
conducting a continuous IED threat assessment to determine the types of IEDs, the 
tactics and methods of their users as well as all EO threats in the area of operations. This 
assessment is essential to establish trends and emerging threats and to inform all IEDD 
organizations accordingly. 
The priorities provided by the designated IEDD authority for clearance operations in 
support of development / stabilization projects (e.g. road construction etc.) may specify 
an exact area to be cleared. Different depths of clearance may be specified for different 
sub-areas depending on the IED threat assessment and the future land use. The area 
outside of these boundaries may still be contaminated. However, for area clearance 
tasks, the extent of the area to be cleared may not be possible to be established at the 
start of the task but may be identified as the task progresses. As such, the priorities for 
clearance should be determined by the impact on the local community and its needs, 
balanced against national priorities set by the designated IEDD authority. Finally, this 
chapter intends to highlight considerations for and to provide guidance and a common 
framework for the planning and conduct of IEDD operations. The specifics of IEDs found 
in various theatres will not be covered. 
 
 
                                            
43 IMAS 9.11 
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6.2 Quality Assurance in IED Clearance. 
6.2.1 Quality Assurance 
The quality assurance requirements for IED clearance depend on threat assessment for 
the IED clearance being undertaken and is related to the level of assurance that is 
required. Mine action QA practices may be used when appropriate as in the case of open 
area clearance operations. The quality requirements for infrastructure and urban space 
clearance tasks are considerably more challenging owing to the complex nature of the 
terrain and environment being cleared. Such quality requirements expected of an IEDD 
organization need to be clarified with the designated IEDD authority. The quality 
requirements expected with mobility protection and IED incident response tasks will 
typically involve the clearance of an identified IED hazard or clearance of a specified point 
or bounded geographical location to a set standard making the task somewhat clearer. In 
any case that the quality assessment requirements for IED clearance is unclear, liaison 
with the designated IEDD authority must be sought to clarify the issue. A scene threat 
assessment, factoring humanitarian concerns and clearance resources shall be 
performed to decide on concurrent or sequential surface and subsurface clearance. 
Broadly speaking there is a difference between the requirements for IEDs which are 
surface laid or emplaced without concealment and those which are concealed by being 
buried or secreted within urban and infrastructure locations44.  The key difference 
between IEDs which are unconcealed and concealed is that concealed IEDs are not 
visible and typically require detection procedures to determine their location, while 
unconcealed typically do not. 
• Unconcealed IED Clearance usually relies on visual search to locate them, although 
there may be instances where detectors or other means such as explosive detection 
dogs (EDD) may be used to aid in the investigation of areas, earth mounds or other 
suspected areas with limited access. Recording of searches, EO types and locations 
of items found is important and may assist in determining the details of any following 
sub-surface search. 
• Concealed IED Clearance can use various detection methods to locate them 
followed by access techniques to allow their disposal. All located EO and their 
hazardous components are removed in accordance with the requirements of the 
tasking authority.45 The clearance of all EO and more particularly IEDs in the 
concerned area to the specified standard should be achieved ensuring: 
                                            
44 This concept is similar to the clearance of surface and subsurface ERW and mines. 
45 A designated entity which provides operational control, planning, and administrative services related to 
a IEDD organization that is undertaking IEDD operations in a designated geographical area of 
responsibility. These cells receive notification of IEDD incidents, provide scheduling and control of IEDD 




o Use of IEDD organizations accredited for IED clearance with material, technical 
capabilities, support and staff having appropriate levels of IEDD qualification and 
competencies (see chapter 3); 
o Monitoring the clearance organization and its sub-units; 
o Conducting a process of post-clearance inspection of cleared land. 
 
6.2.2 Clearance Standard 
The clearance standard to be achieved shall be specified by the designated IEDD 
authority. This standard should be developed through threat assessments, or from other 
reliable information which establishes the assessed depth of IED hazards or other 
information in relation to where and how IEDs may be concealed in the area. This should 
then be coupled with post clearance use requirements.  
In the absence of reliable information on IED concealment, a default standard for 
clearance should be established by the tasking authority in agreement with the 
designated IEDD authority. Specifying clearance standards will depend on intended post 
clearance use, the likely IED hazards in the area to be cleared and other environmental 
factors. 
IEDs may be on the surface of the ground, in which case, the standard specified may call 
for the removal and or destruction only of surface IED hazards. While concealed IEDs 
often have complicating factors that need to be considered, such as:  
• Clearance in urban areas may require the removal of large quantities of debris before 
the start of the clearance process. IEDs originally placed or concealed within urban 
structures which subsequently collapse as well as the deliberate emplacement of 
IEDs in the rubble of collapsed buildings should both be considered. 
• In situations where large bombs and missiles or heavy caliber projectiles have been 
used, deep penetrations may have resulted which also may have been used to 
emplace IEDs or simply contribute to the mixed contamination of the area being 
cleared. 
• Shifting sands in desert areas or coastal areas as well as IEDs being moved along 
river banks and wash plains through erosion may require clearance to a depth of 
several meters to clear IEDs which were originally on or close to the surface. 
The required clearance standards should be adjusted as clearance work progresses. Any 
change shall be agreed between the designated IEDD authority and the IEDD 
organization conducting, and shall be formally recorded. 
 
6.3 Planning Considerations for IED Clearance Operations 
The generation of IEDD capabilities at national, area and scene level is described in 
Chapter 2. The minimum standards of competencies for IEDD personnel are described 
in Chapter 3. The training of IEDD operators with the required KSA to qualify them as 
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competent must be completed with an accurate IED threat picture related to the IED threat 
environment where they will operate in. The IEDD operators KSA must allow them to: 
• Make a full threat assessment of the area in which they are to operate; 
• Be aware of both standard and special hazards46 on scene both associated with the 
IED and other secondary hazards47 present on scene, so appropriate precautions can 
be taken; 
• Determine the most appropriate Render Safe Procedure (RSP) considering the type 
of explosives and construction encountered; 
• Identify the components of an IED so that after completion of a RSP the operator can 
identify how the device was intended to function and to assist in the collection of 
components and information; 
• Provide technical advice. 
 
6.4 Safety Considerations during IED Clearance 
IEDD is an inherently dangerous activity. Safety during IEDD tasks shall be the principal 
consideration to an IEDD Operator. The risks are to be minimized by applying IEDD 
philosophy and principles at all times in conjunction with the application of IEDD best 
practices which must include IEDD mandatory actions48 required of IEDD operators. The 
IEDD supervisor and / or operator is responsible for advising the incident commander or 
clearance site manager on all aspects of explosive safety during the conduct of an IEDD 
task. 
 
6.4.1 General Safety Considerations 
The IEDD philosophy and principles are always applicable during IED clearance.49 The 
following areas of safety demand constant consideration and review:  
• Public Safety: While it should be the responsibility of law enforcement / security 
forces to evacuate danger areas and initiate cordons50, the IEDD operator shall 
advise on any necessary modification to protective measures taken. Positive IEDD 
action shall not be carried out until cordoning and evacuation is complete and IEDD 
action is to stop if any person enters the danger area. The following should be 
considered: 
                                            
46 Special hazards refer to non-standard hazards associated with an IED in terms of blast, fragmentation, thermal, 
ground shock or bubble pulse effects. 
47 Secondary hazards are other hazards present at the scene of an EOD task which are not directly a consequence of 
the EO item but a hazard due to its proximity to the EO item within the danger area of the EO item. Examples of 
secondary hazards include fuel sources, dangerous chemical or radiological substances, electrical supplies, glass 
fronted buildings, unstable buildings, rubble or other ground as well as biological hazards. 
48 As determined by the designated IEDD authority. 
49 See Chapter 1. 
50 Clarity in relation to responsibilities for cordon and evacuation of IED task sites must be captured in the IEDD policy 
of the designated IEDD authority for use and reference by the IEDD organizations.  
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o Evacuation routes should not bring evacuees into the assessed danger area of an 
IED; see IED safety distances for more information; 
o Building exits near to the IED should be blocked and evacuation should be by 
alternative exits if practicable. 
• Cordon Safety: A cordon should be established, in line with the assessed IED danger 
area, and placed under the responsibility of the incident commander or clearance site 
manager. Cordon personnel are to be positioned at appropriate distances outside of 
the assessed IED danger area, around the IED to ensure that personnel cannot 
inadvertently stray into the IED danger area. The cordon should remain in place until 
the IED task is completed and all components have been collected. As the task 
progresses and the IEDD operator completes their render safe procedure, more 
information may come to light on the specific construction of an IED. An IEDD 
operator may require the cordon to be increased or advise the incident commander 
or clearance site manager on how the cordon size can be progressively reduced as 
such information comes to light. Before any positive IEDD action is carried out, the 
IEDD Operator shall ensure that cordon personnel are warned to stay under cover. 
This will normally be achieved through direct briefing and communication with the 
incident commander or clearance site manager. 
• IEDD Team Safety: The Clearance Command Post or Incident Control Point (ICP) 
shall be located, wherever possible, outside the danger area of a suspect IED. Factors 
to consider when applying minimum IED safety distances are provided in the next 
paragraph. IEDD intervention vehicles should be positioned in such a way as to afford 
the maximum protective cover to the IEDD team. All team personnel shall be behind 
or under protective hard cover during positive IEDD actions. For surface clearance 
investigation and for sub-surface clearance involving excavation of IEDs, a safety 
distance between adjacent clearance teams must be determined and applied, the 
principle of the minimum personnel exposed to risk is paramount. 
6.4.2 IED Safety Distances 
It is the IEDD operator’s responsibility to advise the incident commander or clearance 
site manager on the level of evacuation required for the task to be completed safely.  
There will often be a degree of uncertainty in the initial stages of a task on the exact 
makeup of the IED. General factors that an IEDD operator should consider include: 
 
• Estimated Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ) of the IED, for assessing blast and 
fragmentation safety distances; 
• Type of EO/IED and its main charge e.g. military munitions which are designed to 
fragment pose a greater fragmentation hazard compared to uncased explosives; 
• Proximity of items of EO or other IED to assess possibility of sympathetic detonation; 
• Presence of secondary hazards not directly a consequence of the IED but a hazard 
due to its proximity within the danger area of the IED. Examples include fuel sources, 
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dangerous chemical or radiological substances, electrical supplies, glass fronted 
buildings, unstable buildings, rubble or other ground as well as biological hazards. 
• Local environmental factors such as the nature of the soil, nature of the surroundings 
where the IED is located, weather conditions (cloud ceiling height), and other relevant 
factors. 
 
6.4.2.1 IED Task Cordons 
Overall safety at IEDD tasks is ensured by the creation of a cordon where personnel, 
under the oversight of an incident commander or clearance site manager, are positioned 
at appropriate intervals around the IED to ensure that no persons can inadvertently stray 
into the danger area. The cordon should remain in place until the IEDD task is 
completed, all components have been recorded and/or recovered and declared safe by 
the IEDD team leader. Cordon personnel should be aware that they are sometimes 
vulnerable to attacks by aggressors with direct and indirect fire weapons as well as by 
suicide IEDs. All cordon personnel should therefore maintain continual situational 
awareness. All cordon and evacuation distances need to be based on the tactical 
situation and the decision of the IEDD operator, grounded on thorough risk assessment. 
6.4.2.2 Projected IED Safety Distances 
Special considerations are required for IED safety distances involving improvised 
projected mortars, rocket assisted mortars and free flight rockets. The priority for 
evacuation in tasks involving projected IEDs is: impact zone, flight path area, and then 
baseplate. Some improvised free flight rockets have been based on air-to-ground and 
surface-to-air military munitions which have a theoretical maximum range of many 
kilometers. In these circumstances, the appropriate authority should be informed of the 
general direction of the hazard in order that security forces in the affected area may be 
warned.  It is unlikely that evacuation will take place over such large areas and personnel 
should be advised to remain within buildings until the hazard is removed. The general 
procedure for cordoning and evacuation due to a projected IED hazard are to be based 
on the technical assessment of the IEDD operator who shall consider the following 
hazard areas in determining cordon safety distances:  
• Hazard area around the baseplate or launch vehicle; 
• Fight path hazard area; 
• Assessed impact zone hazard area. 
 
6.5 Recommended IEDD Actions 
All IEDD actions must be in line with IEDD philosophy and principles as provided in 
Chapter 1 of these Standards. There are certain IEDD actions which are best practice in 
supporting safe, effective and efficient IEDD activity and in reducing the hazards 
associated with IEDD. In many cases the designated IEDD authority will insist on the use 
of these IEDD actions by all IEDD personnel and refer to them as “mandatory IEDD 
actions”. Mandatory IEDD actions are different from but support IEDD fundamentals in 
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terms of IEDD philosophy and principles. These Standards consider the practices and 
actions discussed in IEDD fundamentals to be mandatory during IED clearance. 
These Standards will not provide specific mandatory IEDD actions as these are 
determined by the prevailing IED threat picture, and the capabilities deployed. However, 
the designated IEDD authority shall set out any mandatory IEDD actions it requires IEDD 
organizations to observe.  
 
The following are recommended IEDD actions to be carried out by all IEDD operators. 
The IED Team leader/supervisor has the authority to decide not to apply these actions if 
the risk of not doing these action is deemed acceptable based on an assessment:  
 
• The most appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) should be worn on all 
manual approaches; 
• If required by the IED threat assessment, ECM equipment should cover all manual 
approaches; 
• Positive IEDD action should not be carried out until cordon and evacuation measures 
have been completed. 
Since IEDD tactics and methods are of a sensitive security classification, the details of 
such tactics and methods are not provided in these standards. Such information can be 
utilized by IED aggressors to counter these tactics and methods and exploit this 
knowledge to design IEDs that will target IEDD organizations and operator personnel. 
Exact IEDD tactics and methods are at the discretion of the IEDD organization and must 
be in line with IEDD principles and philosophy. These IEDD methods must be, at 
minimum: 
 
• Safe, effective and efficient leading to the disposal of an IED; 
• In line with the mission mandate and or the SOFA or SOMA, where applicable in 
United Nations mission settings51; 
• In line with the terms of reference from the designated IEDD authority under which 
the IEDD organization operates. 
Under the principle of “need to share” IEDD organizations are encouraged to share best 
practices and lessons learned related to IEDD tactics and methods to the benefit of all 
operating actors within an IED threat environment, bearing in mind the sensitive nature 
of this information. 
 
                                            
51 Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) and Status Of Mission Agreements (SOMAs) are bilateral or 
multilateral treaties that define the legal position of military forces and civilian personnel deployed by one 
or more states or by an international organization in the territory of another state with the latter's consent. 
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6.6 Open Area, Infrastructure and Urban Space Clearance 
6.6.1 Composition of IEDD Operations 
The composition of the IEDD operations will be in accordance with the IEDD team 
structures set in Chapter 3. 
 
• For IED area clearance tasks the operation should be composed of basic IEDD 
team(s) and at least one intermediate IEDD team equipment set (with remote means, 
full disruptor and digital x-ray capabilities) available on short notice, placed under the 
command and control of an IEDD Supervisor.. All positive actions performed on IEDs 
are to be approved by the IEDD supervisor in charge or if otherwise stated, in the 
prevailing operating procedures.  
• For IED infrastructure and urban space clearance task the operation should be 
composed of intermediate IEDD team(s), placed under the command and control of 
an IEDD Supervisor. The IEDD supervisor will have no more than an agreed number 
of IEDD teams under their control. All positive actions performed on IEDs are to be 
approved by the IEDD supervisor in charge or if otherwise stated so in the prevailing 
operating procedures 
• An IEDD operation must always include medical support and at least two means of 
external communication along with appropriate internal communication means. 
Additional IEDD support may include as required search, security, transport and 
ECM52 support. 
 
6.6.2 Considerations for Open Area, Infrastructure and Urban Space Clearance 
• IED open area, infrastructure and urban space clearance tasks shall involve the 
planning, systematic location and disposal of all IEDs found in a given area. It involves 
the clearance of all IEDs and their component parts which would otherwise pose a 
significant threat to personnel. 
 
• The order in which locations and sites within an area are to be cleared must be 
established and / or agreed between the designated IEDD authority and the 
conducting IEDD organization. In this context, the agreement should specify the limits 
of the area (including the infrastructure and urban spaces) to be cleared, the IED threat 
picture, the clearance standard, the environment and the requirements for monitoring 
and inspection. 
 
• An IED clearance plan is required for each area to be cleared which shall include the 
purpose and clearance methodology to facilitate an effective and efficient response to 
the threat. The clearance plan shall be prepared by the IEDD organization based on 
the IED threat assessment and the clearance requirements provided by the 
                                            
52 See paragraph 5.6 of this chapter for ECM considerations. 
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designated IEDD authority and after conducting a site reconnaissance which shall 
involve a ground appreciation and IED threat assessment. Any subsequent 
amendments to the clearance plan shall be approved by designated IEDD authority. 
 
• In some circumstances, an IEDD organization may be tasked to operate in an area 
with a mandate to identify its own clearance tasks based on general priorities provided 
by the designated IEDD authority. The IEDD organization should in this case produce 
a clearance plan that indicates the area to be cleared and the intended clearance 
depth. 
 
• During the area level planning, determining the season of the year that the IEDs were 
emplaced can be important as it may affect the depth of IED contamination. For 
example, wet season with soft soil may have been emplaced at a greater depth 
compared to winter with frozen soils, etc. 
 
• Worksite preparation may allow careful vegetation cutting and removal, and 
movement over a site following surface clearance to enable marking and preparation 
of clearance ‘lanes’ or ‘boxes’ for subsequent sub-surface clearance. Sub-surface 
checks should be made before driving stakes or markers in to the ground. 
 
• Clearance search patterns need to be carefully planned and coordinated to ensure 
complete coverage of an area. Lane marking, may be used but the speed of the IED 
clearance operations should be balanced against productivity. For example:  
o During IED area clearance, areas may be divided for sub-surface clearance into 
boxes (for example 25m x 25m, or 50m x 50m), and different basic IEDD teams 
allocated each box with adequate spacing between teams.  
o Infrastructure and urban space clearance can delineate a clearance box using 
buildings and / or streets as boundaries.  
o The boundaries of the ‘box’ might be marked by stakes and/or tape/string, then the 
internal lanes would be marked and moved quickly using tight strings, with an aim 
of maintaining control and ensuring full area coverage but also minimizing the time 
spent on marking53. 
 
• According to the IED threat assessment, all unoccupied buildings/infrastructure may 
be considered as possibly contaminated with IEDs. Attention should be given to the 
following non-exhaustive list of considerations: 
o Debris may need to be checked and removed; 
o Searching of water sewage systems and culverts running under roads; 
o Examination of electrical circuits inside buildings; 
o Clearance of land with thick and / or high vegetation; 
o Corpses in various states of decomposition possibly booby-trapped; 
                                            
53 Reference to IMAS 08.40 Marking of hazards as an example. 
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o Finds of IED components, parts thereof and association equipment including HME 
laboratories. 
 
• The construction of protective works to contain the effects of an (accidental) initiation, 
should be considered balanced against the likelihood, consequences and benefit as 
hazard control measure in the local environment. 
 
• Clearance operations conducted in populated areas require thorough liaison with the 
local authorities to ensure the safety of the local populace and prevent the population 
from entering the IED danger area. Procedures shall be developed for avoiding or 
controlling the entry personnel and traffic into hazardous area. 
 
• A communication / information campaign coordinated with the local authorities should 
be considered, coordinated at the level of the designated IEDD authority and possibly 
implemented by the IEDD Organization in cooperation with relevant local entities. 
 
• Safety Brief. Personnel participating in IED clearance tasks, including support 
personnel, must be briefed daily on essential safety and hazard information related 
to the ongoing activities. Details covered in such safety briefs may include command 
authority, relevant locations, emergency response in the event of an accident, 
medical support, hazard area, emergency radio communication and prohibitions. 
Prior to the start of the working day, the IEDD supervisor in charge of a working area 
shall give a daily brief to the IEDD teams which shall include the daily clearance plan 
and associated safety measures. 
 
• Reporting. The location of all detected IEDs are to be recorded appropriately, e.g. in 
a daily work sheet for future reference, which shall ensure a more accurate and 
defined representation of IED contamination and work progress. Reporting will also 
assist in maintaining an accurate IED threat picture. The reporting system will be in 
accordance with directives from the designated IEDD authority found in the IEDD 





6.6.3 IED Clearance Site Organization. 
The following outlines a practical and beneficial way to organize a clearance site in 
support of safe, effective and efficient IEDD, in accordance with best practice. Designated 
areas shall be cleared of EO hazards in accordance with the clearance plan, which 
include details of the clearance site being worked within. A clearance site is composed of 
working areas and logistic areas. It is paramount that the location of all designated areas 
at the site is appropriately marked and is known by all personnel operating there. As an 
aide to illustrate the generic set-up of an IED clearance site figure 6-1 is provided as an 
example. 
 
Figure 6-1: Generic IED clearance site organization 
• Logistic Area: Logistic Areas are normally located outside the Hazardous Area 
(Fragmentation hazard zone) in support of clearance operations. Logistics Areas may 
be composed of: Operation room with the clearance site manager and his staff, field 
accommodation for the personnel, Explosive Detection Dog (EDD) kennel, parking for 
vehicles, communications shelter, equipment and inert items removed during 
clearance at the Site, etc. 
• Working Area: A Working Area is where IEDD activities are conducted at the site and 
is within the Hazardous Area. A clearance site may have one or more Working Areas 
divided into clearance boxes or/and clearance lanes. The distance between the IEDD 
teams at work should be determined by the IEDD supervisor based on a risk 
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assessment (normally not less than 25 meters). All positive actions performed on IEDs 
are to be approved by the IEDD supervisor in charge or if otherwise stated so in the 
prevailing operating procedures. Prior to positive IEDD action, an adjustment of the 
safety perimeter must be considered and suspension of other activities on the site 
must be considered, with non-essential personnel having frontal and overhead 
protection. 
• Control Points: We define a site control point (CP) and an EOD CP as: 
o Site CP is the place located normally in the logistic area from where the incident 
commander or site manager manages the overall operations, ongoing and 
planned. The site CP also acts as an administration and briefing area and is the 
point at which all visitors should arrive. 
o EOD CP is a control point from which the IEDD supervisor can control the 
operation. There is a CP per working area from which the IEDD supervisor can 
control the teams at work in clearance boxes or lanes under their responsibility. 
EOD CP will be situated at least 100 meters away from IEDD operators in the 
working area and will have vehicle access. This distance can be adapted in 
function of the environment, e.g. protection from natural cover, and the hazardous 
safety distance related to the EO nature(s) encountered. 
• Vehicle Park: This should be close to the site CP and large enough to accommodate 
the IEDD teams’ vehicles, ambulance, security vehicles and visitors’ vehicles. All 
vehicles should be positioned in the park so they do not have to maneuver to depart 
in the event of an emergency. 
• Explosives Area: When not in use all explosives for the clearance activities will be 
stored in their logistic cases in the intervention vehicles or in a secure and marked 
area at a safe distance determined based on the national regulations (At least 50 m 
away from all other areas). 
• Rest Areas: These are to be established at least one hundred meters away from the 
working area. Rest areas are to be used by clearance personnel during their breaks. 
Sufficient space should be foreseen for this. This rest area will be collocated with the 
vehicle park.   
• Demolition Area: A location cleared for the disposal, by explosive demolition, of 
unexploded ordnance. The demolition area shall be designated at a set distance from 
the working area to avoid any fragmentation from falling into cleared areas where 
quality control or sampling may be planned.  
NOTE: For basic IEDD teams the primary means of IEDD is to destroy in situ. The 
movement of IEDs is a potential course of action following appropriate neutralization 
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in line with the assessed threat and the training of the IEDD operators involved. For 
this reason, not all IEDD work sites will require a demolition area. 
• Sentry Points: Security in coordination with incident commander or site manager will 
setup the necessary sentry points. 
• Access Routes: All access routes must be clearly marked and be a minimum of three 
meters wide or as required to allow the entering and exiting of expected vehicles that 
will be on scene. 
• Stores and Equipment Area: Location where all equipment is securely stored which 
is usually part of, or adjacent to, the site CP. 
• Medical Area: A marked area on site where a qualified medic shall be located during 
IED clearance operations and where medical treatment shall be administered to a 
casualty(s) in the event of an accident. The ambulance may be located at the medical 
area and the medic shall ensure sufficient medical equipment is available at all times. 
The medical area may be co-located with the site CP or other administration areas 
with the chosen site ideally being flat, dry and shaded. Depending on the site medical 
evacuation plan one or more medical areas may be required e.g. a medic may be 
situated at one medical area and casualties may be recovered to another medical area 
for treatment to which the medic then moves. The medic shall however, always be 
situated in reach of all medical areas in which to give medical treatment to casualties 
within five minutes of being alerted of an accident. A suitable helicopter landing site 
for medical evacuation may also be required according to the prevailing medical 
support guidelines. 
• Metal Collection Pit: Pertinent metal located during clearance shall be placed in the 
metal collection areas which should be situated at a convenient location at the 
clearance site. To facilitate quality control, metal collection pits should not be located 
in areas cleared that day and shall be regularly checked by the IEDD Supervisor 
and/or appointed EOD expert to ensure that all items contained therein are free from 
explosives (FFE). 
• EO Scrap Area: All cleared EO located at the site which is FFE, shall be placed in the 
EO scrap area. A qualified EOD operator shall ensure that all items contained therein 
are FFE. The EO scrap area is to be separated from other administration areas and 
should be situated outside the working area. The dimensions of the area may vary 
according to the clearance site, to prevent spillage, special approved containers also 
can be used for this purpose. All EO removed during clearance which is FFE shall be 




• Latrine: To prevent people inadvertently straying into hazardous areas, and for 
hygiene purposes, a latrine should be designated for each clearance area. Latrines 
should be in the vicinity of the rest area or the site CP and shall be adequate for the 
number of personnel on the clearance site. 
• Detector / Locater Test Area: Each clearance site shall have a testing area to 
ascertain that the detectors / locators are serviceable, calibrated to the manufacturer’s 
standard and capable of locating the pertinent target at the required clearance depth, 
prior to operational deployment. 
• Control lane: There may be a requirement to identify a route through a clear area to 
the working area or other designated areas, e.g. direct the movement of personnel or 
vehicles. White topped or unpainted posts or rocks should be used to mark this. 
• Access Lane: A marked passage leading through a hazardous area that has been 
cleared to provide safe movement to a required point or area. 
 
6.7 IEDD Mobility Protection and Incident Response Tasks 
6.7.1 IEDD Protection Tasks 
An IEDD Team may be deployed to intervene in tasks that constitute grave, immediate or 
serious threats to life in the case of mobility protection and incident response tasks. Such 
tasks are to be prioritized in line with the terms of reference under which an IEDD 
organization operates. 
6.7.2 Composition of the IEDD Team 
The composition of the IEDD team will be in accordance with the IEDD Team Structures 
outlined in Chapter 3. For an IED Incident Response task, the team will be an advanced 
IEDD team which can operate in isolation from other IEDD teams. In addition, an 
advanced IEDD Team will always include medical support and at least two means of 
external communication along with appropriate internal communication means. Additional 
IEDD support may include as required search, security, transport and ECM support. 
6.7.3 Actions on Arrival at Task Location.  
On arrival at the task location the IEDD operator shall ensure that the EOD CP location 
selected by the Incident Commander is safe: 
• A cordon must be established and evacuation of personnel must be conducted to a 
minimum distance specified at paragraph 6.4.2;  
• Consideration should be made so that the EOD CP is free from any hazards. 




6.8 IEDD Task Appreciation 
Every IED task is unique therefore the points outlined in this chapter are guiding principles 
and present a common framework that can be applied to any IED situation. The IEDD 
operator needs to make an accurate and logical threat assessment of the situation before 
taking any positive action. 
 
6.8.1 Aim 
From arrival, the IEDD operator must remain continually aware of the aim of the task. 
 
6.8.2 Evaluating Local Factors.  
Numerous factors will contribute to the development and continual re-evaluation of an 
IEDD RSP. As each factor is considered, the IEDD operator must qualify it by asking the 
question “so what?”. The answers can be obtained through information obtained from 
observation, information provided to them, previous experience, current assessed IED 
threat picture, advice from the IEDD supervisor or questioning of the incident commander 
or clearance site manager or other witnesses. The main factors to be considered are: 
• Safety; 




• Suspect Device; 
• Environment and Terrain. 
 
6.8.3 Establish Available Courses of Action.  
The IEDD operator must consider the possible courses of action of the IED aggressor to 
plan and evaluate the different options for his own courses of action. It is important to 
consider what is the most dangerous outcome, the best outcome, and the most likely 
outcome and to mitigate the hazards associated with each appropriately. 
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6.8.4 IEDD Clearance Plan 
An IEDD clearance plan is the product of a task appreciation in which safe, effective and 
efficient courses of action involving IEDD procedures are developed in line with the 
assessed IED threat.  All IEDD plans must be in line with the IEDD philosophy and 
principles and take account of stated mandatory IEDD actions or alternatively be justified 
under exemptions to stated mandatory IEDD actions. 
Ideally IEDD plans should include more than one viable course of action (COA) with a 
priority given to their execution and be mutually supporting so that if the first COA is 
unsuccessful, then the second can be implemented and so on until the IED is disposed 
of. The IEDD plan should consider what is the most dangerous outcome, the best 
outcome and the most likely outcome and mitigate the associated hazards of each 
appropriately.  
The IEDD plan will be the basis for the IED RSP. An IEDD plan must be logically derived, 
and be consistent with the threat assessment.  
6.8.5 Communication of IEDD Clearance Plan 
Effective communications are of paramount importance for two main reasons: 
• All personnel on scene are aware and understand what is to happen and their 
actions, responsibilities and roles within; 
• As a control measure to enhance safety and coordination during task progress. 
After finalization, the complete plan should be discussed with all IEDD team member(s) 
and, if necessary, with the IEDD supervisor. The adage that ‘two heads are better than 
one’ is particularly relevant in the development of an IEDD plan.  
The IEDD team leader must brief on the proposed plan and the actions, responsibilities 
and roles within. The incident commander or clearance site manager and other 
representatives should ideally be fully briefed on what their actions are to be at each stage 
of the plan and what the possible outcome(s) of the plan could be.  
Attention should be given to deconflict communications from other specific equipment 
(Detection, ECM, etc.) to be used as part of the RSP. For ongoing communication, the 
IEDD operator must ensure that communication is maintained with the incident 
commander or clearance site manager or IEDD supervisor throughout every phase of the 
task. 
 
6.8.6 Execution of the Render Safe Procedure.  
The RSP is the execution of the finalized IEDD plan. The IEDD operator shall continually 
re-evaluate the situation and their plan throughout the task. 
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6.8.7 Post IEDD Task Activities 
On completion of the RSP the IEDD Operator shall: 
• Declare the task complete to the incident commander or clearance site manager; 
• Debrief the supporting agencies where applicable; 
• Maintain the cordon, although this may be reduced after consultation with the concerned 
agencies in line with residual hazards; 
• Inform the tasking authority of task completion details; 
• Prior to the handing over or retention of any IED components for further technical 
exploitation, an advanced IEDD operator must assess it and declare it safe to handle 
and move; 
• Complete the IED report and forward it with supporting photographs and x-rays, where 
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IED Risk Education 
7.1 What is IED Risk Education? 
The term improvised explosive device risk education (IED RE) refers to activities that 
seek to reduce the risk of death and injury from IEDs, by raising awareness and promoting 
safe behaviour. These activities include information exchange with at-risk communities, 
communication of safety messages to target groups, and support for community risk 
management.  
 
IED threat may be static (for example laid to prevent or deny use of area or property), or 
dynamic, as generally used by non-state armed groups against governmental authorities, 
security and/or peacekeeping forces, or indiscriminately against civilians. Mitigating the 
IED threat in each situation requires a specific approach and IED risk education 
messaging may vary from situation to situation.  
 
The dynamic nature of the IED threat is a key characteristic differentiating IED RE from 
traditional mine risk education. The diversity of construction, emplacement of devices and 
their use in asymmetric contexts render traditional risk education methods insufficient. It 
can be very difficult to define and educate people on specific IEDs in a similar fashion to 
landmines as IEDs can be made to look like anything, including innocuous household 
items.  IED risk education should ensure that men, women, boys and girlsin the affected 
communities are aware of the risks posed by IEDs and are encouraged to behave in a 
way that reduces the risk to people, property, and the environment. The objective is to 
reduce the risk to a level where people can live safely, and to recreate an environment 
where economic and social development can occur without being hindered or constrained 
by IED contamination and associated threats. 
 
IED risk education should be preceded by a risk assessment, a gender and diversity 
context analysis and isan integral part of operational and task level planning and 
implementation. It may be a stand-alone activity, but where possible, should be 
implemented in support of and in conjunction with other IED threat mitigation and mine 
action related activities. Programmes and projects may be implemented in situations of 
emergency, transition, or development. If done correctly, successful IED RE campaigns 
may discourage the future use of IEDs by branding their use as indiscriminate weapons. 
IED RE messages should however not be perceived as being politically motivated or lead 
to the perception that the IED RE organization is part of the conflict. IED RE can also 
support information gathering and contribute to assessing impact of IED hazard, which 





In emergencies when IEDD is not possible or has not begun or, as is becoming 
increasingly more common, in countries and areas with residual contamination, IED RE 
may form part of a school curriculum, and not be linked to other aspects of IED threat 
mitigation or mine action. It may be managed and monitored by educational authorities, 
independently of a designated IEDD authority mitigation or mine action.  
7.2 Do No Harm Approach 
A “Do No Harm” approach needs to be central to all aspects of the design and delivery of 
an IED RE programme and avoid unintended consequences as a result of the delivery of 
IED RE program, such as: 
 
• Exposing the local populace to being harmed; 
• Educating those who intend to do harm; 
• Spreading the production and use of IEDs; 
• Increasing unnecessary fears; 
• Promoting civilians to ‘clear’ IEDs themselves. 
 
7.3 Role of IED Risk Education 
IED risk education can play a significant role in IED threat mitigation, by virtue of the 
information exchanges with community members and the relationship built with affected 
communities through these activities.  Community involvement plays a crucial role in IED 
Risk Education campaigns and in IED threat mitigation overall, including in relation to the 
safety and security of IEDD operations.  
IED Risk Education has several components: 
• Communication of safety messages; information and education activities that 
seek to minimize deaths and injuries from IEDs by raising awareness of the risk 
among individuals and communities and by promoting safe behavior.  
• Data should be gathered from at-risk communities and other sources on the risks 
posed by explosive devices, dangerous areas, and the impact of these devices on 
the civilian population. Data should be used to understand better the extent of the 
IED threat and its impact, to identify groups at-risk and to support IED threat 
mitigation and other mine action elements. 
• Community liaison facilitates information exchange between authorities, IEDD 
Organizations and operators, humanitarian and development organizations and 
bodies, and affected communities.  Effective community liaison should ensure that 
community members are involved in IED threat mitigation. IED Risk Education may 
also contribute to IEDD, as well as promote community support for the process by 
gathering and disseminating information about local warning signs, identifying and 
reporting on hazardous areas and their impact on the community, informing the 
community about safety procedures to be used during clearance operations. 
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7.4 Needs, Vulnerabilities, Capacity Assessment and Information 
Management 
Communities at risk are one of the main stakeholders of IED threat mitigation. The 
purpose of an RE needs assessment is to identify, analyze and prioritize the local IED 
risks, to assess the capacities and vulnerabilities of the men, women, boys and girls in 
the affected communities, and to determine the options for conducting IED RE. Efforts to 
strengthen community capacities for RE should be an integral part of any IED RE 
programme. This may include the establishment of volunteer networks and strengthening 
of community risk management efforts.  
The process by which to gather data and assess needs should be agreed with all relevant 
stakeholders. The results should be shared with them, for example, through briefings to 
community leaders, community-based organizations, and community members. The 
information should also be used for design of IED RE messages, as the content may be 
country and area specific; i.e. threat specific.  
Regular needs assessments should be coordinated by the designated IEDD authority. It 
should review the different needs, vulnerabilities, and expectations of the affected 
communities in each IED affected region (province or district). Those conducting a needs 
assessment should be appropriately qualified or trained and gender balanced to do so.  
The data collected should determine the following:  
• target groups – both social, demographic and geographical (who is affected by 
IEDs?) Attention should be paid, in particular, on population movements into or 
through areas of risk; 
• information on IED hazards and affected areas (e.g. type of devices used, 
nature of suspected areas where such devices can be found, any markings, 
signs used, etc.);  
areas of work (by gathering data on where people are injured, where the risk is 
greatest, where risk-taking behaviour is occurring, etc.);  
• messages, and subsequently the activities, according to target groups (by assessing 
how people are injured and how and why they take risks); 
• IED Risk Education approaches and methodologies likely to induce behavioral 
change. Community input should be sought in assessing any existing local safety 
strategies; 
Channels of communication and the way target groups communicate and learn;  
institutional arrangements and partnerships for providing IED RE messages and 
emergency responses;  
 
resources available and their allocation; and  
• timeframe to achieve the project or programme objective (by gathering data on the 




7.5 IED Risk Education Messages and Message Delivery  
Safety messages are at the heart of any IED RE initiative. Developing and disseminating 
these messages and assessing their impact should be the result of a carefully planned 
strategy and process.  
All communication in IED RE should be based on a carefully planned strategy that is 
targeted to specific at-risk groups and which is socially and culturally appropriate.  The 
following elements should be included in an IED RE communication strategy:  
• risk-taking behaviours to be addressed, target groups, safety messages, type 
of contamination 
•  communication channels, and means of dissemination.  
Messages to be communicated depend on target audiences, the behaviour to be 
promoted and the factors likely to influence target audiences to adopt the desired 
behaviour. Messages or symbols should be culturally, linguistically, and socially 
appropriate. There should be positive messages, as people need to feel that they can 
take action and that by taking action they can improve their own and their families’ lives. 
A message does not need to be short, but it should be clear. All messages and suggested 
means of delivery to be used should be tested before they are finalized. Testing should 
ideally be done among the target audience to ensure that messages or materials are:  
• understandable,  
• socially acceptable,   
• relevant,   
• realistic, and   
• persuasive.  
Common messages can include; 
Preventative messages 
Avoid crowded places (that may or have been targeted with IEDs); 
Avoid public gatherings (that may or have been targeted with IEDs); 
Do not approach suspicious and/or out of place objects (instead of “do not touch” 
in other risk education lessons); 
Do not enter known IED hazard areas; 
Do not enter old military positions, derelict houses or battlefields; 
Report threat to authorities; 
Action messages;  
Report threat or event to authorities; 
Immediately leave area with IED threat; 
Inform others around you; 




7.6 General Considerations in IED Risk Education 
During the planning and implementation of IED RE, organizations should comply with the 
following principles and objectives in line with their mandate: 
Adhere to: 
• The reduction of IED tasks or IED occurrences; 
• Reducing the number of casualties in an IED task; 
• Improvement of victim safety awareness; 
• Tailored approaches and methodologies of RE for differing at-risk groups and 
regions; 
• Emphasis on the importance of gender considerations and diversity in both IED 
RE planning and implementation; 
• Flexible and fluid RE methods which correspond to unique changes as well as 
the dynamic environment;  
• Reinforce the specificity of RE in geographic region, conditions, backgrounds or 
other circumstances and the need to stress the “absence of the normal” and 
“presence of the abnormal”. 
 
7.7 IED Risk Education in Emergency Situations or During an IEDD 
Task 
 
If IED RE is done in an immediate IEDD intervention is needed, the aim is to promote 
safe behaviour among the largest number of civilians potentially at risk, particularly 
children, in the shortest possible time. For reasons of time, most of the communication 
will normally be one-way. The aim is to reach the greatest number of at-risk people in a 
few days or weeks with information about the threat posed by the explosive devices and 
basic safety messages. Population displacement or even movement are particular risk 
factors, especially in an emergency. At the end of an emergency phase, evaluation or re-
assessment may be required to establish a new/different post-emergency IED RE 
approach.  
In an emergency, messages should be general in nature. Determining the key messages 
in such cases depends on a variety of factors, such as the target audience and the type 
of IED threat in the area. Efforts should focus on raising awareness of the danger and 
stressing safe behaviour, such as recognition of potentially dangerous areas, which may 
include the following set of connected messages:   
• stay on a cleared path.  
• ask local people from diverse communities where it is safe and where it is 
dangerous.  
• avoid overgrown areas, military bases and equipment.  
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• report explosive ordnance to a responsible person or authority.  
 
7.8 Efficacy of IED Risk Education 
Messages and message delivery should be monitored by each organization as it 
implements respective projects or programmes to ensure their effectiveness. A 
monitoring system should have been established at the planning stage. This means 
assessing whether messages are:   
• reaching their target audiences;  
• being understood and accepted; and   
• being acted upon.  
This, in essence, means determining if the risk education activity is creating a change in 
the behavior and attitudes of those impacted by the IED threat.  
In determining whether there is a need for media and print materials to support IED RE, 
there should be consideration given to the difficulties of getting the right message to the 
right audience in the right language or symbol using printed materials. There may, though, 
be occasions when a project or programme deems it appropriate to develop printed 
materials (e.g. posters, leaflets, or billboards). Printed materials may, for example, be 
useful reminders when combined with other communication approaches.   
The same or different messages and images may be used for each RE product. Adapting 
materials from other contexts may be inappropriate or misleading in certain 
circumstances and should, therefore, be carefully tested before dissemination.   
As with RE messages, media and outreach materials should be tested before they are 
finalized. A focus group discussion or group/ individual interviews may be conducted to 
discuss the proposed approach. Materials should not be finalized and printed without 
field-testing them first in case changes need to be made. Similar to the points mentioned 
above about messages, materials should be checked to determine whether the designs 
are understandable, socially acceptable, relevant, attractive, and persuasive.   
As part of a project or programme-wide monitoring system, the reaction to and trust in the 
means of delivery, including any printed materials, should be regularly checked. Where 
media and materials are resulting in the wrong message being delivered they should no 
longer be used until they have been effectively revised. 
7.9 Integration of IED RE in School Curriculum 
Integrating IED RE into the school system and curriculum is a strategy primarily 
developed in countries facing a widespread IED threat. It is a method to target a very 
large number of children, and is appropriate in countries where the national government 
has accepted that IEDs are a long-term or residual problem, requiring multiple and 
sustainable solutions.  
It should also be determined whether the national or local authorities and school systems 
have the capacity and willingness to undertake such a programme. It may be that IED RE 
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is more appropriate to include as a supplementary activity in schools, rather than to 
integrate it in curricula. 
 
7.10 IED RE Responsible Authority 
The authorities, both at national and local level, have the primary responsibility for 
ensuring the safety of their constituents. They are ultimately responsible for developing 
and managing IED RE projects, within its national boundaries and responding to the 
needs and priorities of the affected communities.   
Each country will also identify the most appropriate entity to develop and deliver a national 
IED RE programme by the means most suited to their situation. In the absence of a 
national entity the United Nations may assist in this matter.  
With regard to IED risk education, specifically, refer to IMAS 2.10.  
 
7.11 IED Risk Education and Prevention Violent Extremism 
While traditional mine action interventions occur in post-conflict scenarios, it is becoming 
increasingly common that IED risk education may be required in situations subject to 
active asymmetric warfare. In these dynamic IED threat environments, stand-alone risk 
education will not be effective. Community members may be influenced by key push and 
pull factors, including structural motivators, individual incentives, and enabling factors, 
which increase their vulnerability toward engagement with violent extremist and insurgent 
groups. These non-state actors develop strategies that leverage these vulnerabilities in 
order to advance their bellicose objectives. Subsequently, prevention measures must also 
be designed to address these issues by offering positive alternatives. While IED risk 
education certainly should not attempt to address all drivers of violent conflict, risk 
education messaging will be exponentially more effective when linked to opportunities 
that not only attract and engage the audience but also create incentive for positive 
behavior. Although PVE in support of risk education is a relatively new approach, best 
practices include the following:  
 
• Specific strategy should be unique to each situation.  
• General examples of activities that will enhance RE effectiveness include vocational and 
technical training, economic, and inclusion opportunities.  
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The purpose of this chapter is to describe the Information Management (IM)54 general 
principles, objectives, and its importance in any IED threat environment for capturing 
information on identified and cleared IEDs. 
 
8.2 Introduction 
All IEDD activities use and generate information, in the form of data or knowledge that 
can be used or analyzed.  Whether in written, verbal, graphical, digital, audible or material 
formats, information is captured to support the aims of the programme and activities, and 
is vital to the planning process, as demonstrated in chapter 2.  The IEDD organization(s) 
authorized by the designated IEDD authority to conduct IEDD and other stakeholders 
need efficient IM processes and means to collect, transmit, receive, store, access, control, 
distribute and dispose this information. 
Since a considerable volume of information is expected from IEDD operations, IM 
requirements must be clearly identified and planned from the start through a flexible 
approach, allowing adaptation to changing conditions.  Every piece of information is 
processed through a cycle, where quality, reliability and accuracy are fundamental 
attributes.  This calls for a methodical structure that provides the necessary tools and 
resources. 
All personnel involved in IEDD operations benefit from information by making specific use 
of it for several purposes.  Therefore, they also share IM responsibilities, organizational 
involvement, and collaboration efforts, which in turn supports the decision-making 
process by providing timely and optimal information.   
In the IEDD context, the availability of information is critical to organizational success 
where it directly impacts the freedom of action and the security of personnel and civilians.  
For example, reporting the discovery of a new IED design is of great interest and 
relevance to all IEDD operators working in the same environment since this may require 
adjusting tactics and methods.  Employing common terminology, formats, and 
interoperable systems further enhance information exchange, streaming and 
understanding. 
Sharing information about IEDs with partners, host nation authorities and security forces 
supports important objectives, but must be carried out cautiously to avoid any undesirable 
or inappropriate use.  When considering providing information support to non-UN security 
                                            
54 The term ‘Information Management’ refers to the on-going specification of information requirements, its collection 
and analysis followed by the dissemination of relevant information to relevant stakeholders in a timely manner.  (Ref 
IMAS 05.30 - Information Management for Mine Action) 
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forces, the IEDD organization(s) must abide by the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy 
related to United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces.55 A risk 
assessment must be undertaken to guide decisions about the provision of such support 
or not.  
At all times, the IEDD organization(s) must preserve the legitimacy, credibility and 
impartiality of the United Nations. By the same measure, the designated IEDD authority 
and the United Nations must also demonstrate that the impartiality of the IEDD and 
international organizations is preserved and guaranteed.  This is achieved through 
transparency, judgement and adequate monitoring of the recipient entity’s intent and 
compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee laws.  
The IEDD organization(s) shall investigate and/or report any suspected violation resulting 
from or facilitated by the provision of information. IM within Peace Operations contexts 
should be conducted in accordance with the priorities set out by the Mission Leadership, 
including the Force Commander, where relevant, and may be dictated by United Nations 
policies and mandates. 
8.3 Objectives of Information Management 
The establishment and maintenance of adequate IM procedures and practices directly 
supports the IEDD objectives/roles (as defined under section 1.2) for safe, effective and 
efficient IEDD operations.  The overall goal of IM is to meet the information needs of those 
with organizational roles or functions.  Without proper IM implementation and support to 
IEDD operations, risks to personnel, the local population and the mission are likely to 
increase. IM directly or indirectly contributes to meeting the following objectives: 
• Conduct and update threat assessments 
• Disseminate aggressors’ tactics and methods where applicable and relevant to the 
safety of IEDD operations 
• Analyze trends 
• Standardize reporting  
• Improve IEDD procedures 
• Foster cooperation of stakeholders 
• Prepare IEDD personnel for their tasks 
• Record information and safeguard databases 
• Provide timely and controlled access to information 
• Network IEDD stakeholders and partners 
• Share IEDD best practices and lessons learned 
• Support IEDD planning, decision-making and execution for all phases of the 
peacekeeping mission life cycle 
• Track clearance and land release progress 
• Guide IEDD training plans 
• Identify IEDD capability requirements and informs capability development 
                                            
55http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/110&referer=http://www.un.org/en/sc/docu
ments/letters/2013.shtml&Lang=E   
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• Outline IEDD equipment standards for TCC 
• Preserve IED components and information 
• Contribute to IED awareness and risk education initiatives 
• Establish national IEDD policy and strategy 
• Assist capacity building programmes 
• Facilitate quality management  
• Prevent IED attacks 
• Enhance security and force protection of United Nations, host nation personnel and 
civilians 
• Inform the establishment of a common operating picture (COP) 
• Support the rule of law 
• Prioritization of areas to be cleared 
• Enable the safe return of refugees and displaced persons 
• Facilitate a quick and precise response to attacks 
 
8.4 IM Requirements 
In order to meet the challenges posed by IEDD activities, an IM structure enabling 
coordinated, integrated and timely management of information is an essential capability.  
Such a system reduces the time required for planning IEDD actions, and provides users 
with relevant data to complete their tasks effectively.   
During the planning of operations, the IEDD Organization(s) evaluates its respective 
requirements to support IM.  At the minimum, it should be composed of the following: 
 
 
Figure 8-1 IM Requirements 
8.4.1 IM Human Resources 
Any IEDD Organization should have dedicated and properly trained IM personnel, led by 
an IM Manager.  This person is generally responsible to organize information in a useful 
manner, using the available processes and equipment, and is supported by: 
 
• A System Administrator 
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• A Geographic Information System (GIS)56 Officer 
• IM technicians to maintain the different systems.  
• Applying the IM Manager’s directions, guidelines and policy, all users involved in 
IEDD activities can support IM in a meaningful manner.  
 
8.4.2 IM Processes 
These include the organizational capabilities and framework to collect, integrate and 
protect information, so that it becomes an accessible and valuable enabler to authorized 
operational and management staff.  Selected IM processes / systems:  
• Must support the effective safeguard of information, providing both digital and paper 
document structures; 
• Should consider Web-based technologies to support these objectives; 
• Should be accessible to IEDD teams and organizations; 
• Should optimize the sharing of information; 
• Request minimal training; 
• Be compatible with existing software platforms; 
• Should consider using existing infrastructure such as IMSMA; 
 
8.4.3 IM Equipment 
The physical system and tools that allow the capture, transmission and storage of 
information should have the following characteristics: 
 
• Capacities must be sufficient to handle the expected amount of IEDD information and 
their particular formats, including GIS data required to produce the expected outputs.  
• Design shall provide adequate protection against the expected environmental working 
conditions. 
• IM equipment must enable taking video and photographic data, as common 
complements to IEDD task reports and available records. 
• Conscious use of metadata to allow information to be logically archived and quickly 
found during a search within a given database.  
• IM equipment should be compatible with the different sources of data and software to 
facilitate data import and connectivity from other type of platform. 
                                            
56 The term ‘GIS’ refers to Geographic Information System. It is an organized collection of computer hardware, software, 
geographic data and personnel designed to efficiently capture, store, update, manipulate, analyze and display all forms 
of geographically referenced information. (IMAS 05.10) 
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• IM equipment should have the capacity to store & link securely large quantities of data 
and other source material (including image & video). Server usage planning should 
take this need into consideration. 
 
8.4.4 IM Prerequisites 
IMAS 05.10 stipulates the IM prerequisites for the establishment and flow of IM in a mine 
action programme (MAP).  These shall be examined when establishing an IM system to 
support IEDD operations in order to increase efficiency and avoid duplication.  IM 
prerequisites include the following: 
 
• Document Management 
• Record Management 
• Web Management  
• Human Resources 
• Equipment 
• IM Knowledge 
• GIS Management 
• Quality Management  
 
8.5 IEDD Task Reporting 
Any IEDD operation represents a substantial source of information.  Once the IED is 
identified, rendered safe, or destroyed, the IEDD team shall complete the appropriate 
reports and submit to their respective organization(s) authorised by the designated IEDD 
authority, enabling analysis to inform regional planning and to update IEDD teams of the 
local IED threat situation.  
 
All IED events within the area of responsibility shall be reported electronically through 
selected IM system as directed by the designated IEDD authority.  Reports are to be 
completed for each IEDD operation undertaken by organization(s) authorised by the 
designated IEDD authority, excluding training exercises and courses.  Reports should 
also be used for abandoned explosive ordnance and explosive remnants of war. 
 
Reporting IEDD results help keep a record of cleared infrastructures and areas, and track 
progress of a given task, as well as casualties and damage incurred.  Timeliness and 
accurate reporting are key to ensuring a well-informed IEDD community, and are 
invaluable in analyzing trends and formulating optimal subsequent Render Safe 
Procedures.  Of particular note is the need to use standard terminology, at all levels, to 
ensure the appropriate response and recording of information. The UNMAS IED Lexicon 
provides a common framework for the classification of IEDs which aids in the 





It is vital that IED reports are accurately and diligently recorded.IEDD teams should where 
possible collect material from the IED task site in order to support further analysis and be 
prepared to provide subject matter expertise and advice as and when required in regard 
to specific IEDD tasks. 
 
In addition, reports shall be supplemented with digital photography. Digital photography 
allows IEDD teams to take an unlimited number of pictures, which can be viewed, 
discarded or replaced if necessary.  Digital photography should be used at the scene of 
all events and be suitably annotated for ease of reference.  This practice provides an 
additional dimension to reports and a permanent record of tasks.  In addition, any 
radiography (X-ray) graphics, whenever they have been taken as part of the RSP, assist 
in the analysis or confirmation of electronic circuits as well as confirming IED makeup.. 
 
8.6 IEDD Task Reporting Formats 
A standardized reporting format enables the efficient dissemination of technical IED 
related information.  They also facilitate the following:  
 
• Development of IED hazard area databases  
• Development of an accurate threat picture and in overall situational awareness  
• Compilation of an archive of IEDD activity in order to support safe, effective and 
efficient best practices. 
When responding to IEDD tasks, information must be collected and disseminated in a 
timely manner, using the IEDD task report.  The IEDD task report is the formal technical 
record of an IEDD task.   
 
Following an IEDD operation and when conducting deliberate IED Area, Infrastructure 
and Urban space clearance operations, more detailed data needs to be recorded in order 
to develop technical intelligence, to confirm the aggressor’s and own Tactics and 
Methods, and to share information with partners.   
 
Annex C provides guidelines on the items to consider for inclusion in IEDD reports. IED 
reporting classifications, and their definitions, that should be recorded on IEDD reports 


















1. IEDD action which results in the successful neutralization, 
disruption or dismantling of an IED. 
2. Includes devices deliberately initiated by IEDD action where the 
aggressor’s intentions have been frustrated, for example: 
a. Majority of explosive burnt before detonation occurs. 
b. Removal of device from target so that detonation occurs in a 
place where damage is reduced to a minimum. 
3. Also includes:  
a. Fully primed devices from Finds e.g. Devices containing plain 
detonators and safety fuse. 
b. Successfully dismantled incendiaries. 
EXPLOSION A partial or complete functioning of an IED. 
FALSE 
An IED related incident that is incorrectly identified though reported 
in good faith as an IED, which is subsequently categorized as a 




An IED related incident that involves the discovery and/or recovery of 




An IED incident that involves a device fabricated to look like an IED, 
and is intended to purposely simulate one in order to elicit a 
response. 
TURN-IN 
An IED related incident where an IED or component is turned over to 
friendly forces. 
Table 8.1 IEDD Incident Classification 
 
8.7 IM Resources and Infrastructure 
IM is a fundamental and enabling capability for the conduct of IEDD operations as part of 
IED Threat Mitigation objectives58 , including in United Nations peace operation contexts.  
                                            
57 For planned IEDD operations the main classification used will be an IED.  
58 IED-TM Objectives (Secure Environment) include force protection, protection of civilians.  
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The varying Information and Communication Technology (ICT)59 capabilities (resources 
and infrastructure) of IEDD Organizations/operators, including those of peacekeeping 
units, have an impact on the effectiveness of an IM system to support  IEDD operations.  
Likewise, the availability of the host country’s telecommunications infrastructure can 
impact on the ability of data to be transferred electronically in support of the IM system. 
Notwithstanding technical limitations of available ICT infrastructure, the minimum 
requirement for IM resources in support of IEDD operations should include the following: 
 






Send/Receive voice data  
Send/Receive digital data  
Capture imagery/video  
Archive data 
Search and retrieve data  
Print data 
Table 8.2 ICT Infrastructure Minimum Requirements 
ICT systems organic to the IEDD organization(s) authorized by the designated IEDD 
authority should be compatible with and support the selected IM system, in either a 
standalone or networked configuration.  However, initial data collection on scene may 
need to be paper based with subsequent digitalization occurring at a location and facility 
where appropriate ICT infrastructure is available.  This would also apply for any other 
associated data collected on scene such as still imagery and video.  The large size of 
these files places a considerable burden on bandwidth for communication networks; and 
as such transfer may need to occur via other media / means.  
 
Large data files may require physical transfer via removable data storage devices to 
networked facilities.  In any case, if available, a priority should be given to the timely voice 
transmission of the IED report via telecommunication means, until such time as additional 
data can be provided to higher headquarters in paper or electronic format. Where 
possible, data collection at the task site should be automated via the use of tools such as 
tablets and mobile phone based software which can provide the following benefits: 
 
• To provide a web based capability where data from the system can be viewed in. 
• Easy to use, configurable dashboards that allow users to interact with the data, 
performing simple queries on the data and returning results in easy to interpret 
visualization, such as graphs and maps. 
• To reconfigure the parameters of data input. 
                                            
59 ICT is an extended term for information technology (IT) which stresses the role of unified communications and the 
integration of telecommunications (telephone lines and wireless signals), computers as well as necessary enterprise 




• To include visual and international/multi-lingual look-up of IED components60 to 
facilitate data entry. 
 
In order to ensure that data collected on scene in various formats (paper / electronic) is 
correctly uploaded into an IM system, the strict application of IEDD report control / tracking 
numbers and file naming conventions is required.  This will ensure the integrity of the 
collected data and also facilitate search functions within the IM system to provide a true 
and accurate representation of the aggressors IED activity.  Also, data (electronic or 
paper based) that has not been uploaded into the IM system should remain traceable for 
future inclusion or referencing (from other electronic database or paper filing systems). 
 
The application of a robust IEDD report tracking system within the IM system will also 
facilitate the association of related subsequent reporting for higher level analysis.  When 
this data is uploaded and geospatially associated within the GIS it becomes a powerful 
tool for staff at all levels of IEDD operations. 
 
8.8 IM Process/Cycle 
IM is performed through a cycle of organizational activities including: the acquisition of 
information from one or multiple sources, the custodianship and the distribution of that 
information to those who need it, and its ultimate disposition through archiving or deletion.  
The underlying basis for the IM process as it pertains to IEDs is a “need-to-share” 
philosophy in as broad a context as possible.  The IM cycle for landmines detailed in 
IMAS 05.10 has a similar applicability to IEDs, based upon the following principles: 
 
• Transformation.  Continued transformation of data to information and information to 
knowledge for decision-making. 
• Efficiency.  The management of data and information is done with a proactive 
approach, in which the IM staff based on their experience foresee the requirements 
and are ready to address them in a timely manner. 
• Inclusiveness.  Successful implementation of the cycle depends on the active 
involvement of operations, management and other stakeholders. 
• Quality.  Data is checked and verified for accuracy and for timeliness and organized 
for analysis. 
• Consistency.  Disaggregated data collection, in combination with agreed technical 
definitions of key terms, will ensure objective and repeatable results to analytical 
queries.  This will enable the formulation of informal decisions that are transparent and 
accountable. 
• Sharing.  Information is disseminated to the stakeholders, within and outside the 
IEDD community, in a standardized way and in appropriate formats.  Sharing 
                                            
60 Based on the UNMAS IED Lexicon 
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information with other stakeholders will encourage them to further participate in 
planning, implementation and follow-up process.  
 
The IM cycle is a four-staged process as follows: 
 
• Information needs assessment.  The analysis of information should involve 
recurring assessment and discussion with each of the principal stakeholders. 
• Data collection.  The data collection phase identifies where and how to gather the 
required data, and how to validate it. It should be designed to meet the intended use 
of the data, and consideration should be given to ethical principles such as maintaining 
respect for confidentiality and privacy. This stage includes the quality management of 
the data to ensure any subsequent analysis is based on accurate facts. 
• Data analysis.  Objective and repeatable data analysis relies on there being IM 
policies and standards that reduce the subjectivity and increase the consistency of the 
output information.  
• Information dissemination.  Information dissemination involves the distribution of 
information to internal and external users so that it can be readily and easily used by 
stakeholders.  
 
Figure 8-2 - Stages of the IM Cycle 
In order to ensure technical accuracy is maintained, reports shall be submitted in 
accordance with operating procedures as directed by the IEDD organization.  
The IM system is a key enabler in supporting the transfer of information and data as part 












Figure 8-3 – IM on the IED Threat Assessment Process 
 
The IM system when correctly enabled with human resources, processes and 
equipment can facilitate the timely and efficient collection, transfer and analysis of IED 
related data and information. Figure 8-3 highlights the role that IM plays in obtaining 
accurate IED threat assessments on all levels. 
8.9 Information Management Responsibilities  
8.9.1 Designated IEDD authority 
The designated IEDD authority should: 
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• Develop and implement IM policy, standards and regulations for the management of 
information. These standards and regulations should be consistent with United 
Nations IEDD Standards, and other relevant national standards; 
• Establish IM systems that allow effective, efficient and timely transfers of data and 
information between the organization(s) authorized by the designated IEDD authority, 
donors, relevant national bodies, and other stakeholders; 
• Ensure that IM sections within the organization(s) authorized by the designated IEDD 
authority have appropriately qualified personnel, equipment and training; 
• Ensure that the IM section of the programme has developed clear and appropriate 
operating procedures for IM; 
• Ensure that all organization(s) authorized by the designated IEDD authority 
information gathering activities are coordinated to avoid duplication of effort, so 
maximizing the use of resources and minimizing survey fatigue. 
8.9.2 IEDD Organization(s)  
The IEDD organization authorized by the designated IEDD authority should: 
• Develop programme or country-wide IM operating procedures that clearly define the 
type, format and frequency of the information requirement in accordance with the 
national standards; 
• Establish at least one IM section with qualified personnel, and equipment in 
accordance with the prerequisites of the national standards; 
• Provide training to operational and IM personnel of organization authorized covering 
IM; 
• Have a proactive role in all IM activities; 
• Provide proposals and suggestions for the amendment of the national IEDD for IM. 
• Work for decreased dependency on particular staff members by transferring 
knowledge to other organizations authorized by the designated IEDD authority; 
• Ensure a streamlined data and information flow by applying the agreed policies and 
by utilizing existing IM systems, standards, guidelines, procedures and routines; 
• Implement data quality management procedures at all stages of the IM cycle; 
• Be able to identify possible IM shortcomings in the organization authorized by the 
designated IEDD authority and notify the relevant operational or management staff in 
due time; 
• Utilize the existing IM capacity within the IEDD programme in order to plan, implement 
and follow up on operational activities; 
• Participate in quality management procedures throughout the entire IM cycle. 
• Ensure the involvement and training of IM staff in operational activities. 
• Provide feedback, verification and correction of information whenever they notice 





IEDD Operator Competencies 
Appendix 1 
Basic IEDD Operator Competencies 
 
Pre-requisite: IMAS EOD level 1 
 
1. KNOWLEDGE BASE  
 
1.1 IEDD Generic Theory  
1.1.1 IEDD Philosophy - Basic  
1.1.2 IEDD Principles - Basic  
1.1.3 IEDD Mandatory Actions - Basic  
1.1.4 IEDD Operator’s responsibilities - Basic  
1.1.5 IEDD command structure - Basic  
1.1.6 IEDD safe waiting periods (soak times) – Basic  
1.1.7 Understanding Open Area IED environments - Basic  
1.1.8 Applicable laws and rules (Area of operations specific, National, International and 
UN) - Basic  
 
1.2 IEDD Design Theory  
1.2.1 IED components – Basic  
1.2.2 Electronic circuits – Basic  
1.2.3 IED categories – Basic  
1.2.4 IED method of employment – Basic  
1.2.5 IED method of emplacement – Basic  
1.2.6 IED indicators – Basic  
1.2.7 IED categories - Victim Operated (VO) IEDD Operation in Open Areas  
 




1.3.1 Prepare IEDD Protective Equipment  
1.3.2 Employ IEDD Protective Equipment  
1.3.3 Maintain IEDD Protective Equipment  
1.3.4 Prepare demolitions charges & equipment for manual deployment  
1.3.5 Employ demolitions charges & equipment during manual approaches  
1.3.6 Maintain demolitions equipment  
1.3.7 Prepare detection equipment  
1.3.8 Employ detection equipment  
1.3.9 Maintain detection equipment  
1.3.10 Prepare Basic Hook & Line61 
1.3.11 Employ Basic Hook & Line  
1.3.12 Maintain Basic Hook & Line 
 
1.4 IEDD Task Conduct Theory  
1.4.1 IEDD in Open Area task conduct chronology – Basic  
 
2.    EQUIPEMENT SKILLS AND DRILLS PRACTICAL 
 
2.1        Gather and prepare IEDD Detection Equipment Practical 
2.1.1    Individuals must be able to explain the environment in which the task will take   
place 
2.1.2    Individuals must be able to explain and demonstrate how to effectively inspect, 
test and prepare equipment 
2.1.3    Individuals must be able to explain the characteristics and hazards of the 
equipment in use 
2.1.4   Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to effectively test the 
serviceability of the equipment, reporting any defective equipment through the 
appropriate channels 
 
2.2       Operate and employ IEDD Detection Equipment Practical 
2.2.1    Individuals must be able to explain the capabilities, limitations and employment of 
equipment in use 
2.2.2    Individuals must be able to explain how to operate the equipment correctly 
                                            
61 Basic Hook & Line is comprised of a hook and rope, designed for the Basic Operator to remotely pull IED 
components that were not destroyed during the detonation of the VOIED main charge. It is intended to 
avoid having the Basic Operator become targetable through manually moving IED components that could 




2.2.3    Individuals must be able to explain the importance of operating the equipment 
correctly and the consequences of not doing 
2.2.4    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to make necessary adjustment 
to the equipment in use (metal detector, etc.) 
 
2.3       Maintain IEDD Equipment and stores Practical 
2.3.1  Individuals must be able to explain the equipment’s capabilities and acceptable 
limits of deviation - Basic 
2.3.2  Individuals must be able to explain operational requirements and organizational 
procedures - Basic 
2.3.3   Individuals must be able to explain how to report defective equipment - Basic 
2.3.4  Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to carry out regular routine 
maintenance checks in accordance with the servicing schedule - Basic 
2.3.5   Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to maintain all equipment within 
the specified levels - Basic 
2.3.6  Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to comply with operational 
requirements and organizational procedures – Basic 
 
3. IEDD ACTIVITIES PRACTICAL - IEDD Task Conduct Practical 
3.1.1 Individuals must be able to explain VOIED in open area considerations 
3.1.2 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to search for, detect, locate 
and destroy VOIEDs in open areas 
3.1.3 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to use basic hook and line 
(grapnel hook and pulling line) in the semi-remote movement of items 
 
4. POST TASK ACTIVITIES PRACTICAL - Return Activities Practical 
4.1.1    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to re-pack IEDD equipment; 
4.1.2  Individuals must be able to explain post-task equipment maintenance and 
consumable replenishment 



















IEDD Assistant Competencies 
Pre-requisite: IMAS EOD level 2 and IEDD Basic Operator Accredited. 
 
1.    KNOWLEDGE BASE 
1.1       IEDD Generic Theory 
1.1.1    IEDD Philosophy - Intermediate 
1.1.2    IEDD Principals - Intermediate 
1.1.3    IEDD Mandatory Actions - Intermediate  
1.1.4    IEDD Operator’s responsibilities - Intermediate 
1.1.5    IEDD command structure - Intermediate 
1.1.6    IEDD safe waiting periods (soak times) - Intermediate 
1.1.7    Applicable laws and rules (Deployment specific, National, International and UN) 
– Intermediate 
 
1.2  IEDD Design Theory 
1.2.1    IED components – Intermediate 
1.2.2    Electronic circuits – Intermediate 
1.2.3    IED categories – Intermediate 
1.2.4    IED method of employment – Intermediate 
1.2.5    IED method of emplacement – Intermediate 
1.2.6    IED indicators - Intermediate 
 
1.3       RF Threats Theory 
1.3.1    RF spectrums – generic 
1.3.2    ECM principles – generic 
 
1.4       Prepare, Employ and Maintain IEDD tools and equipment Theory 
1.4.1    Prepare IEDD Protective Equipment 
1.4.2    Maintain IEDD Protective Equipment 
1.4.3    Prepare IEDD Disruptors for manual approach loading drill 
1.4.4    Prepare IEDD Disruptors for remote approach loading drill 
1.4.5    Maintain IEDD Disruptors 
1.4.6    Prepare demolitions accessories for manual approach loading drills 
1.4.7    Maintain demolitions accessories 
1.4.8    Prepare access & manipulation equipment (Hook & Line, etc.) 
1.4.9    Prepare detection equipment 
1.4.10   Maintain detection equipment 
1.4.11   Prepare identification equipment 
1.4.12   Maintain identification equipment 
1.4.13   Prepare ECM equipment 
1.4.14   Maintain ECM equipment 
1.4.15   Prepare X-Ray equipment 
1.4.16   Maintain X-Ray equipment 
1.4.17   Prepare photographic/video equipment 
1.4.18   Employ photographic/video equipment 
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1.4.19   Maintain photographic/video equipment 
1.5       Prepare and Employ ROV Theory 
1.5.1    Use and limitations of ROVs with regards to terrain, obstacles and range 
1.5.2    Prepare ROV tools and accessories 
1.5.3    Employ ROV tools and accessories 
1.5.4    Maintain ROVs 
 
1.6        Home Made Explosives (HME) Theory 
1.6.1    Clandestine lab types 
1.6.2    HME types – generic 
1.6.3    HME use in IEDs – generic 
1.6.4    HME precursors – generic 
1.6.5    HME handling, storage and transport – generic 
1.6.6    HME PPE requirements – generic 
1.6.7    HME disposal – generic 
 
1.7        IEDD Task Conduct Theory 
1.7.1    Typical IEDD task conduct chronology – generic 
1.7.2    Arrival drills (5s & 20s) 
1.7.3    ICP setup – generic 
 
1.8        IED Component gathering and recording Theory 
1.8.1    Reasons for Component gathering and recording 
1.8.2    Types of components and information 
1.8.3    Scene/information preservation & collection Generic 
1.8.4    Prepare IED Component gathering equipment 
1.8.5    Use IED Component gathering equipment 
1.8.6    Maintain IED Component gathering equipment 
1.8.7    IED Component gathering procedures generic 
1.8.8    Task photography/videography generic 
1.8.9    Safety considerations 
 
1.9        Post Blast Theory 
1.9.1    Reasons for Post blast analysis 
1.9.2    Safety considerations 
 
1.10       IED Task Reporting Theory 
1.10.1    Reasons for IED task reporting 
1.10.2    Terminology and Lexicon 
1.10.3    Reporting format and content 
1.10.4    Visual attachments (X-Ray, photo, video, diagrams) 
1.10.5    Report sub-deployment 
2.    EQUIPEMENT SKILLS AND DRILLS PRACTICAL 
 
2.1       Gather and prepare IEDD Equipment Practical 
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2.1.1    Individuals must be able to effectively explain the environment in which the task 
will take place 
2.1.2    Individuals must be able to explain and demonstrate how to effectively inspect, 
test and prepare equipment 
2.1.3   Individuals must be able to explain acceptable tolerances of accuracy of the 
equipment 
2.1.4  Individuals must be able to explain the characteristics and hazards of the 
equipment in use 
2.1.5    Individuals must be able to explain operational requirements and organizational 
procedures 
2.1.6    Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability to safely and efficiently load 
disruptors in the manual configuration 
2.1.7    Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability to safely and efficiently prepare 
explosive tools in the manual configuration 
2.1.8   Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability to safely and efficiently load 
disruptors on the ROV 
2.1.9    Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability to safely and efficiently prepare 
explosive tools on the ROV 
2.1.10 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to effectively test the 
serviceability of the equipment, reporting any defective equipment through the 
appropriate channels 
2.1.11  Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to prepare the equipment 
correctly for use, IAW team leader’s specifications 
2.1.12 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to meet operational 
requirements and their own organizational procedures 
 
2.2       Operate and employ IEDD Equipment Practical 
2.2.1    Individuals must be able to explain the capabilities, limitations and employment of 
equipment in use 
2.2.2    Individuals must be able to explain how to operate the equipment correctly 
2.2.3    Individuals must be able to explain the importance of operating the equipment 
correctly and the consequences of not doing 
2.2.4    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to operate the equipment 
correctly according to the manufacturer’s instructions 
2.2.5    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to effectively challenge obvious 
inaccuracies or inconsistencies of information 
2.2.6    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to make necessary adjustment 
to the equipment in use (metal detector, etc.) 
2.2.7    Individuals must be able to explain the reasoning for employing Electronic Counter 
Measures (ECM) 
2.2.8    Individuals must be able to explain the safety implications of using ECM 
2.2.9    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to safely decontaminate or 
destroy equipment after use if necessary 
2.2.10   Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability to safely and efficiently operate 
the ROVs in all terrain and weather conditions 
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2.2.11   Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability to safely and efficiently deploy 
disruptors and explosive tools with the ROVs, as directed by the team leader 
2.2.12   Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability to safely and efficiently perform 
tasks with the ROVs, as directed by the team leader 
2.2.13   Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability to dress the level 3 or 4 (IEDD) 
operator in his PPE 
2.2.14   Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to safely acquire X-Ray images 
(take an X-Ray) 
2.2.15   Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to retrieve/download X-Ray 
images 
2.2.16   Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to read X-Ray images 
2.2.17   Individuals must be able to explain why an X-Ray reading may be incorrect and 
how to deal with it 
 
2.3       Maintain IEDD Equipment and stores Practical 
2.3.1    Individuals must be able to explain the requirements of the servicing schedule 
2.3.2    Individuals must be able to explain the equipment’s capabilities and acceptable 
limits of deviation 
2.3.3    Individuals must be able to explain operational requirements and organizational 
procedures 
2.3.4    Individuals must be able to explain how to report defective equipment 
2.3.5   Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to carry out regular routine 
maintenance checks in accordance with the servicing schedule 
2.3.6   Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to report defective equipment 
and organise its repair or replacement 
2.3.7  Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to monitor consumables 
continuously and arrange for their replenishment 
2.3.8    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to maintain all equipment within 
the specified levels 
2.3.9   Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to comply with operational 
requirements and organizational procedures 
 
3. IEDD Activities Practical 
3.1       Pre-Deployment Activities Practical 
3.1.1   Individuals must be able to explain the typical chronology of an IEDD task 
3.1.2  Individuals must be able to explain the importance of intelligence in the pre-
deployment phase 
3.1.3    Individuals must be able to explain final pre-deployment equipment preparations 





3.2       Arrival Drills Practical 
3.2.1  Individuals must be able to explain typical Arrival Drills, in line with operating 
procedures based on local environment (permissive, etc.) 
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3.2.2   Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability to conduct Arrival Drills, in line 
with operating procedures based on local environment 
3.2.3  Individuals must be able to explain a typical ICP setup 
3.2.4  Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability to execute a typical ICP setup 
3.2.5  Individuals must be able to explain ICP related safety hazards 
 
3.3       Generic IEDD Deployment Conduct Practical 
3.3.1    Individuals must be able to explain IEDD mandatory actions 
3.3.2    Individuals must be able to explain IEDD safe waiting periods (soak times) 
3.3.3   Individuals must be able to explain the safety considerations for the cordon and 
team when taking positive actions on the IED 
3.3.4    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to prepare the ROV to the team 
leader’s specifications 
3.3.5    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to deploy the ROV as specified 
by the team leader 
3.3.6    Individuals must be able to explain remote secondary device search requirements 
3.3.7  Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to conduct efficient remote 
secondary device search as directed by team leader 
3.3.8    Individuals must be able to explain the requirements for manual approaches 
3.3.9   Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to prepare IEDD tool & 
equipment for manual approach to the team leader’s specifications 
3.3.10   Individuals must be able to explain when a task scene is explosively safe 
3.3.11   Individuals must be able to explain requirements to X-Ray IED components 
 
3.4        HME Practical 
3.4.1    Individuals must be able to explain HME types and safety considerations 
3.4.2    Individuals must be able to explain the requirements for PPE 
3.4.3  Individuals must be able to explain HME handling, packaging and transport 
procedures 
 
3.5        Component Gathering and Recording Practical 
3.5.1    Individuals must be able to explain why Component gathering and recording is 
necessary 
3.5.2    Individuals must be able to explain Component preservation and collection 
3.5.3    Individuals must be able to explain types of Components and information 
3.5.4    Individuals must be able to explain scene/information preservation and collection 
techniques and considerations 
3.5.5    Individuals must be able to explain the use of Component gathering and recording 
equipment 
3.5.6    Individuals must be able to explain how much of the explosives of each type must 
be retained for analysis 
3.5.7   Individuals must be able to explain the safety considerations when conducting 
Component gathering and recording 
3.5.8    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to assist the IEDD team leader 
with Component gathering and recording 
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3.5.9  Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to preserve and collect 
Components and information 
3.5.10   Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to photograph/videotape task 
scene and components 
3.5.11   Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to make a sketch of the task 
scene 
3.5.12  Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to segregate and package 
energetic and inert components to be retained for analysis 
3.5.13  Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to gather and record 
components while respecting all safety considerations 
 
3.6        Return Activities Practical 
3.6.1    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to re-pack the IEDD equipment 
for return trip 
 
3.7        Actions on Emergencies Practical 
3.7.1    Individuals must be able to explain actions to be taken during medical emergencies 
3.7.2    Individuals must be able to explain actions to be taken should team safety be 
jeopardised by aggressor activities 
3.7.3    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to retrieve a casualty 
3.7.4    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to provide First Aid 
3.7.5    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to organize and execute a 
casualty evacuation 
3.7.6    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to take appropriate actions as 
per deployment operating procedures should team safety be jeopardised by 
aggressor activities 
 
4      POST TASK ACTIVITIES 
4.1       Reporting Practical 
4.1.1    Individuals must be able to explain why IEDD reports are necessary 
4.1.2    Individuals must be able to explain which information is to be included in the IEDD 
report 
4.1.3    Individuals must be able to assist in completing IEDD reports 
4.1.4    Individuals must be able to explain IEDD report sub deployment chain 
 
4.2       Equipment related tasks Practical 
4.2.1  Individuals must be able to explain post-task equipment maintenance and 
consumable replenishment 
4.2.2    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to conduct post-task equipment 
maintenance 
4.2.3    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to conduct post-task supply 





Intermediate IEDD Operator Competencies 
Pre-requisite: IMAS EOD level 3 and IEDD Basic Operator Accredited. 
 
1.      KNOWLEDGE BASE 
 
1.1       IEDD Generic Theory 
1.1.1    IEDD Philosophy - Advanced 
1.1.2    IEDD Principals - Advanced 
1.1.3    IEDD Mandatory Actions - Advanced 
1.1.4    IEDD Operator’s responsibilities - Advanced 
1.1.5    IEDD command structure - Advanced 
1.1.6    IEDD safe waiting periods (soak times) - Advanced 
1.1.7    Forensic (component gathering and recording) protocols - Advanced 
1.1.8    Understanding Rural IED environments - Advanced 
1.1.9    Understanding Urban IED environments - Advanced 
1.1.10   Understanding threat actors - Advanced 
1.1.11   Applicable laws and rules (Deployment specific, National, International and UN) 
Detailed 
 
1.2       IEDD Design Theory 
1.2.1    IED components - Advanced 
1.2.2    Electronic circuits - Advanced 
1.2.3    IED categories - Time IEDD Operation 
1.2.4    IED categories - Command IEDD Operation 
1.2.5    IED categories - Victim Operated (VO) IEDD Operation 
 
1.2.6    IED method of employment – Advanced 
1.2.7    IED method of emplacement – Advanced 
1.2.8    Find Operations 
 
1.3       RF Threats Theory 
1.3.1    RF spectrums – detailed 
1.3.2    ECM principles – detailed 
 
1.4       Employment of IEDD Tools and Equipment Theory 
1.4.1    Employ IEDD Protective Equipment 
1.4.2    Employ IEDD Disruptors during manual approach 
1.4.3    Employ IEDD Disruptors during remote approach 
1.4.4    Employ demolitions accessories during manual approaches 
1.4.5    Employ access & manipulation equipment (Hook & Line, etc.) 
1.4.6    Employ detection equipment 
1.4.7    Employ identification equipment 
1.4.8    Employ ECM equipment 
1.4.9    Employ X-Ray equipment 
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1.5       Employment of ROV Theory 
1.5.1    Use and limitations of ROVs with regard to IED design and emplacement 
 
1.6      Home Made Explosives (HME) Theory 
1.6.1    HME Types Detailed 
1.6.2    HME use in IEDs – detailed 
1.6.3    HME precursors – detailed 
1.6.4    HME handling and de-sensitising – detailed 
1.6.5    HME storage and transport (small quantities) – detailed62 
1.6.6    HME PPE requirements – detailed 
1.6.7    HME disposal (small quantities) 
 
1.7       IEDD Task Conduct Theory 
1.7.1    IEDD task conduct chronology – detailed 
1.7.2    ICP setup and safety considerations – detailed 
1.7.3    Applying questioning techniques 
1.7.4    Interpret IED related intelligence 
1.7.5    Conducting IED Threat Assessment 
1.7.6    Cordon placement and evacuation distances with regards to assessed IED size 
and emplacement 
1.7.7    Security considerations and cordon employment – detailed 
1.7.8  Disruption tool or demolition accessory selection with regards to IED size, 
construction, emplacement and desired effect 
 
1.8       IED Component Gathering and Recording Theory 
1.8.1    Scene/information preservation & collection Detailed 
1.8.2    IED Component gathering procedures detailed 
1.8.3    Task photography/videography detailed 
1.8.4    Safety considerations 
 
2       EQUIPMENT 
2.1        Manage IEDD Equipment and Stores Practical 
2.1.1    Individuals must be able to explain the equipment management system for their 
organization 
2.1.2    Individuals must be able to explain the correct use of equipment, operational 
requirements and organizational procedures 
2.1.3    Individuals must be able to explain the importance of ensuring a simple and 
effective logistics supply chain 
2.1.4    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to carry out regular 
inspections of the servicing log for all equipment in use 
2.1.5    Individuals must be able to explain the reasoning for using ECM and the second 
order and possible legal consequences of using such equipment 
 
                                            
62 Small and Large HME quantities need to be defined. A possibility is to state that the deployment operating 
procedures will define those quantities. 
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3       IEDD ACTIVITIES PRACTICAL 
 
3.1       Pre-deployment Practical 
3.1.1    Individuals must be able to explain the pre-deployment briefing process 
3.1.2    Individuals must be able to explain the deployment planning process 
3.1.3   Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability to brief their team prior to a 
deployment 
3.1.4    Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability to plan a movement phase to 
deployment location 
3.1.5   Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability to use intelligence in the 
planning process 
3.1.6    Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability to analyse intelligence material 
 
3.2       Arrival Drills Practical 
3.2.1    Individuals must be able to justify the reasoning in defining the location and type 
of ICP setup 
3.2.2    Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability in defining the size, location & 
special requirements of cordon and evacuation area 
3.2.3  Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability in coordinating cordon 
employment and specifications with the OSC 
 
3.3       Threat Assessment Practical 
3.3.1    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to identify and gather the 
relevant information (questioning technique) from the OSC and witnesses 
3.3.2    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to use information that is 
complete, valid, accurate and reliable 
3.3.3    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to use simple analysis tools to 
conduct the Threat Assessment 
3.3.4    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to justify their decisions 
3.3.5  Individuals must be able to explain the reasoning in defining remnant IEDs 
compared with those from an ongoing IED campaign 
3.3.6   Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to adjust the cordon & 
evacuation in relation to their Threat Assessment 
 
 
3.4       Generic IEDD Deployment Conduct Practical 
3.4.1    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to follow and adjust Primary 
safe waiting periods (primary soak times) 
3.4.2    Individuals must be able to explain how to employ the ROVs IAW assessed threat 
3.4.3   Individuals must be able to explain disruption/neutralization tool/technique 
selection and emplacement WRT IED 
3.4.4 Individuals must be able to explain the expected results of selected 
disruption/neutralization 
3.4.5    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to remotely disrupt/neutralise 
the IED in a safe & adequate manner, and confirming disruption remotely 
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3.4.6    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to coordinate with the OSC to 
ensure cordon safety when taking positive actions on the IED 
3.4.7    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to follow and adjust Secondary 
safe waiting periods (secondary soak times) after taking positive actions on the 
IED 
3.4.8 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to plan tasks for manual 
approaches 
3.4.9    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to execute planned tasks during 
manual approaches 
3.4.10  Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to manually place 
disruptors/tools in a safe and adequate manner 
3.4.11   Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to manually confirm 
disruption/neutralisation 
3.4.12   Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to make the scene explosively 
safe through explosive component separation & segregation as well as a manual 
secondary device search 
3.4.13   Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to safely and efficiently X-Ray 
IED components 
3.4.14   Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to analyse X-Ray images 
3.4.15 Individuals must be able to explain requirements to dispose of explosive 
components not retained for analysis 
3.4.16   Final declaration to On Scene Commander that area cleared of all detected IEDs 
 
3.5       Time IEDD Conduct Specific Practical 
3.5.1    Individuals must be able to explain Time IED considerations 
3.5.2    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to keep cordon safe until the 
Time threat has been neutralized 
 
3.6       Command IEDD Conduct Specific Practical 
3.6.1    Individuals must be able to explain Command IED considerations 
3.6.2    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to coordinate deployment of the 
cordon to be effective 
3.6.3    Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to employ ECM in a safe and 
efficient manner 
 
3.7       Victim Operated (VO) IEDD Conduct Specific Practical 
3.7.1 Individuals must be able to explain VOIED considerations; 
3.7.2 Individuals must be able to explain how to employ ROVs in a VOIED environment; 
3.7.3 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to search for, identify and 
neutralise VOIEDs; 
3.7.4 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to employ semi-remote (hook 
& line) methods to access VOIEDs; 
3.7.5 Individuals must be able to explain and demonstrate how to render safe specific 
VOIEDs assessed as a threat in a give area of operations e.g. postal devices. 
 
3.8 HME – practical 
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3.8.1 Individuals must be able to explain HME precursors 
3.8.2 Individuals must be able to explain HME fabrication 
3.8.3 Individuals must be able to explain HME handling and de-sensitising 
3.8.4 Individuals must be able to explain HME storage small quantities 
3.8.5 Individuals must be able to explain HME storage small quantities 
3.8.6  Individuals must be able to explain HME disposal small quantities 
3.8.7 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to identify HME 
3.8.8 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to identify HME precursors 
3.8.9 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to determine HME fabrication 
techniques 
3.8.10   Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to de-sensitise and handle 
HME 
3.8.11   Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to package and transport small 
HME quantities 
3.8.12   Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to dispose of small HME 
quantities 
 
3.9 Component Gathering and Recording Practical 
3.9.1 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to perform and control the 
preservation and collection of Components and information 
 
3.10 Return Activities Practical 
3.10.1 Individuals must be able to explain return trip planning considerations 
3.10.2 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to plan and coordinate the return 
trip with supporting agencies 
3.10.3 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to execute the return trip, and 
adjust should unforeseen events modify the plan 
 
4 POST DEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES PRACTICAL 
4.1 Reporting Practical 
4.1.1 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to accurately complete IEDD 
reports 
4.1.2 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to submit IEDD reports through 
proper channels 
4.1.3 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to debrief supervisor on non-
routine/new IED devices, components, use/placement, aggressor Tactics and 
Methods or events 
 
4.2 Equipment - practical 
4.2.1 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to ensure team personnel, 






Advanced IEDD Operator Competencies 
Pre-requisite: IMAS EOD level 3, Intermediate IEDD Operator Accredited. 
 
1. KNOWLEDGE BASE 
1.1 IEDD Generic – Theory 
1.1.1 Providing Mobility Protection 
1.1.2 Providing Task Response 
1.1.3 Conducting Dismounted Operations 
1.1.4 Conducting Infrastructure Clearance 
1.1.5 identifying possible future threats 
 
1.2 IEDD Design – Theory 
1.2.1    Suicide Initiated IEDD Operation 
1.2.2    Projected Weapons in IEDs 
1.2.3    Vehicle Borne (VB) IEDD Operation 
1.2.4  Vehicle search and clearance principles – advanced 
1.2.5    Dismounted IEDD Operation 
1.2.6    Post blast clearance 
 
1.3 RF Threats - Theory 
1.3.1 RF spectrums - advanced 
1.3.2 ECM principles - advanced 
1.3.3 ECM equipment needs assessment 
1.3.4 ECM equipment acquisition 
 
1.4 Home Made Explosives (HME) - Theory 
1.4.1 Clandestine lab types 
1.4.2 HME types - advanced 
1.4.3 HME understanding the chemistry and fabrication - advanced 
1.4.4 HME precursors - advanced 
1.4.5 HME storage and transport (large quantities) – detailed 
1.4.6 HME disposal (large quantities) 
 
1.5      Post Blast Theory 
1.5.1    Conduct of Post blast analysis 
1.5.2    Estimation of Explosive Quantities 
1.5.3    Explosive damage patterns 
 
1.6 Management - Theory 
1.6.1 Multiple team tasking and coordination 
1.6.2 Personnel Management and Administration 
1.6.3 Personnel Morale and Welfare 
1.6.4 Equipment Management and Administration 
1.6.5 Equipment Needs Assessments and Acquisition  
1.6.6 Inter-agency interactions 
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1.6.7 Understanding all related applicable laws and rules (Deployment specific, National, 




2.1 Manage IEDD Equipment and Stores Practical 
2.1.1 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to monitor defects through a 
defect reporting schedule 
2.1.2 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to manage the consumption and 
order of consumables through the organization’s logistic system 
2.1.3 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to ensure all personnel comply 
with operational requirements and organizational procedures 
2.1.4 Individuals must be able to explain the reasoning for using ECM and the second 
order and possible legal consequences of using such equipment 
 
3 IEDD ACTIVITIES PRACTICAL 
 
3.1 Pre-deployment Activities Practical 
3.1.1 Individuals must be able to explain the planning process involved in deploying 
multiple teams 
3.1.2 Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability to gather and brief on 
intelligence material 
 
3.2 Advanced IEDD Conduct Practical 
3.2.1     Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability to conduct IED Task 
Responses 
3.2.2     Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability to conduct Mobility Protection 
3.2.3     Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability to conduct Manual Disposal 
RSPs 
 
3.3 HME Practical 
3.3.1 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability give instructions on how to 
package and transport large HME quantities 
3.3.2 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to dispose of large HME 
quantities 
3.3.3    Individuals must be able to demonstrate the ability to manage teams during the 
mitigation of HME Factories 
 
3.4 VB IEDD conduct specific - practical 
3.4.1 Individuals must be able to explain VB IED considerations 
3.4.2 Individuals must be able to explain VB IED safety distances 
3.4.3 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to employ ROVs in searching 
for, accessing and disrupting/neutralising VB IEDs 
3.4.4 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to employ semi-remote (hook 
& line) methods to access VB IEDs 
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3.4.5 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to manually search for and 
place disruptors/explosive tools to VB IEDs 
3.4.6 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to prove the vehicle to be 
completely explosively safe 
 
3.5 Projected IEDD conduct specific - practical 
3.5.1 Individuals must be able to explain Projected IED considerations 
3.5.2 Individuals must be able to explain Projected IED cordon considerations 
3.5.3 Individuals must be able to explain evacuation Projected IED considerations 
3.5.4 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to disrupt/neutralise the IED 
without exposing the cordon /civilians to undue risk 
 
3.6 Suicide Initiated IEDD conduct specific - practical 
3.6.1 Individuals must be able to explain Suicide Initiated IEDD considerations 
3.6.2 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to RSP suicide initiated VB 
IEDs 
3.6.3 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to RSP suicide initiated PB 
IEDs 
 
3.7 Dismounted IEDD conduct specific - practical 
3.7.1 Individuals must be able to explain Suicide Initiated IEDD considerations 
3.7.2 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to select required equipment 
to conduct Dismounted IEDD tasks 
3.7.3 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to RSP IEDs in a dismounted 
environment 
3.7.4 Individuals must be able to explain Dismounted IEDD safety considerations 
 
3.8 Post Blast Conduct Specific Practical 
3.8.1 Individuals must be able to explain Post Blast considerations 
3.8.2 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to conduct a crater analysis  
3.8.3 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to conduct an estimation of the 
explosive quantity used 
3.8.4 Individuals must be able to demonstrate an ability to conduct an assessment of 
the damage caused 





4 IEDD MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING PRACTICAL 
Individuals must be able to:  
 
4.1 Explain the considerations when tasking multiple IEDD teams 
4.2 Demonstrate an ability to plan multiple IEDD team deployments and 
employments 
4.3 Demonstrate an ability to coordinate IEDD teams and supporting assets (force 
protection, medical support, etc.) 
4.4 Demonstrate an ability to coordinate and manage inter-agency interactions 
4.5 Demonstrate an ability to manage and monitor multiple IEDD team activities 
while ongoing 
4.6 Demonstrate an ability to provide sound advice to operators when IEDs or 
situations outside the normal scope of operations are encountered 
4.7 Demonstrate an ability to perform IEDD task quality assurance 
4.8 Demonstrate an ability to vet and analyse IEDD reports 
4.9 Demonstrate an ability to establish and maintain a lessons learned process 
4.10 Demonstrate an ability to disseminate lessons learned, and ensure they are 
assimilated into Tactics and Methods  
4.11 Demonstrate an ability to assess the validity of Tactics and Methods and adjust 
as needed 
4.12 Demonstrate an ability to administer periodic IEDD refresher training 
4.13 Demonstrate an ability to evaluate IEDD member/team performances 
4.14 Demonstrate an ability to conduct personnel Management and Administration 
4.15 Demonstrate an ability to ensure and foster personnel Morale and Welfare 
4.16 Demonstrate an ability to oversee that equipment maintenance is conducted 
within schedule 
4.17 Demonstrate an ability to conduct equipment Assessment Needs and 
Acquisition 
4.18 Demonstrate the ability to ensure applicable laws, rules/regulations (deployment 







EOD Unit Critical Equipment Requirements 
This annex provides a breakdown of the minimum equipment deemed to be essential in 
order for a basic, intermediate and advanced IEDD teams as well as support teams to 
have a safe, effective and efficient capability. These critical equipment requirements are 
broken down as follows: 
• Basic IEDD Team – Appendix 1 
• Intermediate IEDD Team – Appendix 2 
• Advanced IEDD Team – Appendix 3 
• Support Team – Appendix 4 
The equipment listed is deemed the minimum equipment needed to safely, efficiently and 
effectively undertake the tasks that the stated team or cell is expected to be able to 
complete. An IEDD organization can provide equipment in addition to or to a higher 
specific than those listed in this annex, in line with the TOR between the IEDD 
Organization and the designated IEDD authority. Only specialist equipment is mentioned 
in the attached appendices with the generic administrative and communications and 
information technology support equipment required not listed. All IEDD teams are 
expected to have all equipment listed in appendix 1 in addition to the equipment listed in 







Basic IEDD Team Equipment 
This appendix sets out the critical equipment63 requirements of a basic IEDD team. The 
equipment listed is deemed the minimum equipment needed to safely, efficiently and 
effectively undertake the tasks that the stated team is expected to be able to complete64. 
The designated IEDD authority retains the right to insist on equipment in addition to or to 
a higher specific than those listed herein. Similarly, an IEDD organization may choose to 
provide equipment in addition to or to a higher specific than listed herein, in line with the 
agreement between the IEDD organization and the designated IEDD authority. Only 
specialist IEDD equipment is mentioned in the attached annexes with the generic 
administrative and communications and information technology support equipment 
required by the IEDD organization and IEDD support elements not listed. This team will 
not operate in isolation but with IEDD required external support and always under the 
direction of an IEDD supervisor on scene. They will only undertake IEDD on IEDs on 
which they have been qualified for. If the IED exceeds the qualification of the team 
members, the IEDD supervisor should take over. They may only operate in IED threat 
environments that have been assessed as being permissive in line with the designated 
IEDD authority terms of reference in relation to security threat assessments. A basic IEDD 
team will at a minimum consist of two basic operators. A basic IEDD team critical 
equipment is: 
• Medical Equipment: 
o Individual First Aid Kit (IFAK) for each team member65; 
o Team medical kit66; 
• Personal Protective Equipment (PPE); 
o The designated IEDD authority may state the level of IEDD PPE to be worn by 
IEDD operators when undertaking certain IEDD tasks which may for example state 
the protection levels in line with IMAS 10.30 and associated references or in line 
with US National Institute of Justice (NIJ) standards.  
o PPE requirements should also consider the security requirements for the mission 
area. 
o As a minimum, the following protective measures must be considered; Eye 
protection; Head protection; Body protection; Hearing protection; Hand protection 
• Explosive Stores and Associated Equipment 
o Appropriate means of explosive train initiation in line with prevailing national 
legislative restrictions, mandates and weapon embargoes. List for non-electric, 
NONEL / Shocktube and Electrical initiation are provided: 
                                            
63 Minimum equipment deemed to be essential for an IEDD capability to be effective, efficient & safe. 
64 In line with the IEDD team categories and roles provided in Chapter 3 of these Standards. 
65 As per the UN MSD / DSS packing list. 






• Non-metallic knife; 
• Burning fuse; 
• Igniters; 
• Non-electric initiators;67 




• Non-metallic knife; 
• Shocktube; 
• Shocktube Igniters; 
• Shocktube initiators;68 
• Main charges 
Electric initiation: 
• Exploder with batteries 
including spares and 
chargers as required; 
• Firing cable; 
• Electric detonators; 
• Main charges. 
 
• Protective works equipment: 
• Optical Equipment: 
• Tools: 
o Grapnel hook; 
o Pulling rope / line; 
o Hand held metal detector with appropriate sensitivity to EO threat in area of 
operations69; 
o Manual demining tool kit. 
• Consumables 
• Reporting, Recording and Reference Material: 
o IED Report Format; 
o Aide Memoire for Explosive Ordnance for the area of operations if available; 
o IED Identification guide for Area of Operations – if required by designated IEDD 
authority; 
• Any additional IEDD equipment stated as necessary by the designated IEDD authority 
in line with the assessed IED threat picture.  
                                            
67 An initiator whose functioning is initiated by non-electric means and includes inter alia igniferous or flash 
detonators / initiators. 
68 An initiator whose functioning is initiated by NONEL / Shocktube means. 




Intermediate IEDD Team Equipment 
This annex sets out the critical equipment70 requirements of an intermediate IEDD team. 
The equipment listed is deemed the minimum equipment needed to safely, efficiently and 
effectively undertake the tasks that an intermediate IEDD team is expected to be able to 
complete71. The designated IEDD authority retains the right to insist on equipment in 
addition to or to a higher specific than those listed herein. Similarly, an IEDD organization 
may choose to provide equipment in addition to or to a higher specific than listed herein, 
in line with the agreement between the IEDD organization and the designated IEDD 
authority. Only specialist IEDD equipment is mentioned herein this annex with the generic 
administrative and communications and information technology support equipment 
required by the IEDD organization and IEDD support elements not listed.  
 
All intermediate IEDD teams are expected to have access to all the IEDD critical 
equipment listed for basic IEDD teams as per these Standards. This team will not operate 
in isolation but with IEDD required external support and always under the direction of an 
IEDD supervisor on scene. An Intermediate team will have organic ROV and may have 
ECM72 support in location for use if required, as determined by the IED threat 
assessment. Similarly, they will also have access to digital x-ray equipment which will be 
on scene but may be held rearward with other IEDD team support assets. Each 
intermediate IEDD team does not need to have its own ECM or digital x-ray but must 
have easy access to it. ECM must be available to be brought to the required site of 
requirement promptly if an RCIED threat is to be mitigated and is line with the 
requirements set out by the designated IEDD authority. Similarly, portable digital x-ray 
equipment must be available to be brought forward to its site of requirement. 
  
Intermediate IEDD teams will be certified to undertake IEDD on all IEDs with the IEDD 
supervisor to be on call for technical support, advice and assistance. They may operate 
in IED threat environments that have been assessed as being permissive or semi-
permissive in line with the designated IEDD authority terms of reference in relation to 
security threat assessments. An intermediate IEDD team will at a minimum consist of two 
persons one IEDD assistant and one intermediate IEDD operator. 
 
  
                                            
70 Minimum equipment deemed to be essential for an IEDD capability to be effective, efficient & safe. 
71 In line with the IEDD team categories and roles provided in Chapter 3 of these Standards. 
72 See paragraph 5.6 of this chapter for ECM considerations. 
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The critical equipment of an intermediate IEDD team is: 
• Critical equipment of a basic IEDD team. 
• EO component recovery kits. 
• Disruptor set complete in line with the IED threat.73 
• Water bottles of various volume e.g. 0.5l, 1.0l and 2.0l etc. 
• EOD tool Toolkit.74 
• EOD Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) with the following capabilities: 
i. Disruptor deployable; 
ii. Suitable to the terrain in the mission area; 
iii. Remote optical capability; 
iv. Wireless and hardwire75 deployable. 
• Dedicated vehicle – with protection level in line with the assessed threat. 
• Portable digital x-ray;76 
• Personal dosimeters with capability to read exposure levels; 
• EOD bomb suit;77 
• Hook And Line (HAL) kit to include at least two pulling ropes; 
• ECM assets;78 
• Any additional IEDD equipment stated as necessary by the designated IEDD 
authority in line with the assessed IED threat picture.  
                                            
73 Determined in line with threat assessment as to the nature of IED threat faced in the area of operations. 
74 Contents as per the Designated IEDD authorities packing list requirements. 
75 Depending on ECM compatibility if in use. 
76 Each intermediate IEDD team does not need to have its own but must have easy access to it, which can be brought 
to the required site of requirement promptly. 
77 designated IEDD authority may state the level of IEDD PPE to be worn by IEDD operators when undertaking certain 
IEDD tasks which may for example state the protection levels in line with IMAS standards or in line with US National 
Institute of Justice (NIJ) standards. PPE requirements should also consider the security requirements for the mission 
area. 




Advanced IEDD Team Equipment 
This annex sets out the critical equipment79 requirements of an advanced IEDD team. 
The equipment listed is deemed the minimum equipment needed to safely, efficiently and 
effectively undertake the tasks that the stated team is expected to be able to complete80. 
The designated IEDD authority retains the right to insist on equipment in addition to or to 
a higher specific than those listed herein. Similarly, an IEDD organization may choose to 
provide equipment in addition to or to a higher specific than listed herein, in line with the 
agreement between the IEDD organization and the designated IEDD authority. Only 
specialist IEDD equipment is mentioned in the attached annexes with the generic 
administrative and communications and information technology support equipment 
required by the IEDD organization and IEDD support elements not listed.  
 
All advanced IEDD teams are expected to have access to all the IEDD critical equipment 
listed for basic AND intermediate IEDD teams as per these Standards. This team may 
operate as an IEDD team in isolation but with the required external support such as 
security and communications and may ECM81 provided if required. They may operate in 
IED threat environments that have been assessed as being up to and including non-
permissive in line with the designated IEDD authority terms of reference in relation to 
security threat assessments and in such situations, are required to have the appropriate 
security support in line with the assessed threat. 
 
The critical equipment of an advanced IEDD team is the ability to generate light equipment 
scales82 provided the capability is effective, efficient and safe in line with the IEDD teams 
training and qualifications. 
 
  
                                            
79 Minimum equipment deemed to be essential for an IEDD capability to be effective, efficient & safe. 
80 In line with the IEDD team categories and roles provided in Chapter 3 of these Standards. 
81 See paragraph 5.6 of this chapter for ECM considerations. 
82 The term “light’ is used in relation to the equipment scales that an advanced IEDD team is deployed with in 
comparison to what they would typically be deployed with if fully equipped. Light Scales as it is sometimes referred to 
may be required due to mobility requirements e.g. on foot or due to equipment deficiencies in a time of conflict, hostility 




Support Team Equipment 
Upon drafting the statement of requirements for prospective IEDD organizations, the 
designated IEDD authority must consider the capability and associated requirements for 
the following six aspects of IEDD support: 
• Communications – both internally externally from site to HQ and elsewhere. As a 




• Search – threat driven for example the decision to include GPR83 or buried wire 
detectors should be in line with the requirement assessed as part of the IED threat 
picture. May include explosive detection dogs. 
• Security of the IEDD and support personnel to, at and from the site of the IEDD task. 










                                            
83 Ground Penetrating Radar; required when directed by the designated IEDD authority after the need is identified due 




IEDD Task Reporting Format Guidelines 
The following is an outline of the possible headings that may be included in an IEDD 
Report.  It is broken down into 7 sections, with heading provided under each which can 
be used, removed or expanded upon as the threat and the selected information 
management system requires. In the case that more than one IED of the same type is 
associated with the same IEDD task, one IEDD report may be used with the number of 
IEDs involved mentioned. 
1. General Information 
1.1. IM ID 
1.2. IED ID 
1.3. Field ID 
1.4. Organization authorized by the designated IEDD authority 
1.5. Date of Report (DD/MM/YYYY Format) 
1.6. Organization Name 
1.7. Reported By (Name, Unit, Team) 
 
2. Verification Information 
2.1. Verified By (Organization and Person plus role) 
2.2. Date of Verification (DD/MM/YYYY Format) 
 
3. Task Information 
3.1. IEDD Area Type (Should not be able to change this field but allows the system 
when using a common IEDD reporting system to discriminate between different 
IEDD activities) 
3.2. Date of Task (DD/MM/YYYY Format) 
3.3. Time (of task) (xxxxhrs Format) 
3.4. Type of task (Drop down menu as per table 8-1.  Note that Cache and Find are 
considered the same) 
3.5. If task type is Explosion, IED or Find: Complex Attack / Single IED / Multiple IED 
/ Unknown 
3.6. Total number of devices in task 
3.7. Description of task (Before, during and after) 
3.8. Assessed Target of Attack (Drop down menu with options for types / factors 
being tracked and required to be analyzed with an option for Other.  In the case 
“other” is chosen, a field is available to specify the other not included at present 
in the drop-down menu) 
3.8.1. Other 
3.9. Information Source (Drop down menu with options for types / factors being 
tracked and required to be analyzed with an option for Other.  In the case “other” 
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is chosen, a field is available to specify the other not included at present in the 
drop-down menu) 
3.9.1. Other 
3.10. Casualties (Multi-field menu matching the options in the assessed target of 
attack with two fields for each casualty group allowing killed and injured to be 
entered. In the casualty fields for “other” a description field should be provided) 
3.11. Animal Casualties Yes / No 
3.11.1. Number of Animal casualties 
3.12. Vehicles Damaged Yes / No 
3.12.1. Number of Vehicles Damaged 
3.12.2. Description of Vehicles (A description of the level of vehicle damage 
can be included, which should ideally be in reference to a common 
damage scale in use) 
 
4. Tactical Details 
4.1. Nearest Town (Details here should be systematic in relation to how the area of 
operations are divided. For example, the following fields may be included: 
Sector, Area of Responsibility, Province, District, City/Area) 
4.2. Coordinates of task location 
4.2.1.  System Lat/long Or UTM 
4.2.2.  Fixed by GPS / Map / DGPS 
4.2.3.  Latitude Degree decimal (xx.xxxxxx) – WGS84 
4.2.4.  Longitude Degree decimal (xx.xxxxxx) – WGS84 
4.3. Nearest Reference Point 
4.4. Task Area (Area information should be a two field drop down menu option 
reflecting task area information that the system wishes to track and analyse, e.g. 
options may include Static, Route, Unknown, Not Applicable.  If Static the 
second field will allow the further options such as; In/Near Tea Shop, At/Near 
Borehole, In/Near Governmental Building, In/Near Military Installation, In/Near 
Residential Building, Under Tree/Forest, On/Near Coastline, On/Near 
Riverbank, Other, Agricultural Land, Unknown If Route is selected the options 
may be; Urban, Rural, MSR) 
4.4.1. Other (Such as who controls the area where the IED was laid) 
4.5. Vulnerable Point (Possible options to be tracked in terms of VP being used in 
Attacks include: Previous attack sites, Approach to friendly locations, Current 
and previously occupied positions, Entry and exit points, Culverts, River 
Crossing Points & Bridges, Intersections and junctions, Sharp turns, Isolated 
choke points, Slopes – both uphill and downhill) 
4.6. Vulnerable Area (Consideration in terms of the characteristics of the area in 
which the IED task took place which may include: Soft ground, Previously used 
tracks and patrol routes, Linear features, Interior of buildings, Canalised routes, 
Extended long stretches of road, Tactically important areas, High ground 
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dominated areas, Escape routes into and out of areas, Successive VPs in close 
proximity, Exit or entry of areas of urban / rural interfaces) 
4.7. Why Here 
4.8. Why Now 
4.9. Why in This Way 
4.10. Desired Outcome 
4.11. Actual Outcome 
4.12. Method of Emplacement (Possible Drop-down options including Buried/Vehicle/ 
Attached/Hand-emplaced/Person borne/ Other/Unknown) 
4.12.1. Other 
If Attached or Hand Emplaced or Vehicle Bourne (Field to allow further details for these 
three methods of emplacement such as: Attached: Elevated / Under vehicle / Other. Hand 
Emplaced: Elevated / Concealed / Unconcealed. Vehicle: VBIED / SVBIED) 
4.13. Other 
 
5. Technical Details 
5.1. Power Source 
5.2. Initiator(s) 
5.2.1. Number present 
5.2.2. Initiator Type: Military / Commercial / Improvised 
5.3. Energetic Material(s): High Explosive / Propellant / Pyrotechnic Composition / 
Unknown 
5.3.1. Source: Military / Commercial / Improvised 
5.3.2. If Military: Military Ordnance (MILORD) / Bulk / Harvested 
5.3.3. Other 
5.4. Container description 
5.5. Enhancements: Directional / Fragmentation / Incendiary / CBR / Unknown 
5.5.1. Additional Information (For additional information for enhancements 
the following are options; Directional: Platter Charge / EFP / Shaped 
Charge /Unknown; Fragmentation: Omni-directional / claymore / DFC 
/ DFFC; Incendiary: Liquid / Solid / unknown; CBR: Chemical / 
biological / radiological) 
5.6. Switches  
5.6.1. Arming Present: Yes / No 
5.6.1.1. If Present Describe 
5.6.2. Firing Switch Type: Command / Timed / Victim Operated / Hybrid / 
Unknown (Hybrid firing switch refers to an IED with a combined or 
separate dual firing circuit such as a command IED with a backup 
victim operated firing switch) 
5.6.2.1. Further Details (Further details of firing switch should ideally 
be drop-down options fields with common IED firing 
switches in the AO or region and which need to be tracked 
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and analysed. The option of “Other” should always be 
available with an associated description field to allow further 
details to be provided to allow new and emerging switch 
details to be captured. Non-exhaustive examples of the 
further details that can be provided include: Command: 
CWIED / CPIED / PCIED / RCIED; Timed: Mechanical / 
Electronic / Burning Fuse / Evaporation / Pneumatic 
Release; Victim Operated: Pressure Plate / Tripwire / 
Pressure Release / PIR / Anti-cut (collapsing circuit) / 
Movement (trembler)) 
5.6.2.1.1. Other 
5.6.2.1.2. Additional Information (The author of an IED 
report should be afforded every opportunity to 
provide as much on firing switch(es) in use in 
an IED and for this reason the opportunity to 
provide such “additional information” should be 
provided to them) 
 
6. Render Safe Procedure Details 
6.1. Was the Device Subject to an RSP? 
6.2. Additional relevant and shareable information on RSP success/failure. 
6.3. Has this type of device been encountered previously? Yes / No 
6.3.1. If Yes, associated Report number 
6.4. Has there been an task at this location previously? Yes / No 
6.4.1. If Yes, associated Report number 
6.5. Time Spent on RSP 
6.6. Operational Equipment used 
6.7. Were items collected form the scene? Yes / No 
6.7.1. If Yes, who retained the recovered items; 
6.7.2. List of items recovered (The information for list recovered items 
should be several fields to allow the recording of Description of 
item, Bag No. and Remarks for each item recovered) 
 
7. After Action Review 
7.1. After Action EODCC Comments (What worked, what didn’t work, 
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Lexicon of Abbreviations 
2IC /EO Second in Command / Executive Officer 
AFV Armoured Fighting Vehicle 
AO Area of Operations 
AOG Armed Opposition Group 
AP Amended Protocol 
ASM Ammunition Security Management 
AST Advanced Search Team 
AXO Abandoned Explosive Ordnance 
BAC Battlefield Area Clearance 
BCMD Biological and Chemical Munitions Disposal 
C2 Command and Control 
CBR Chemical, Biological and Radiological 
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 
CCW Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
CEA Captured Enemy Ammunition 
CIMIC Civil Military Cooperation 
CMD Conventional Munition Disposal 
COA Courses of Action 
COE Contingent Owned Equipment 
COMMEX Commercial (grade) Explosives 
COP Common Operating Picture 
CP Checkpoint 
CREW Counter Radio-controlled Electronic Warfare 
DCOS Deputy Chief Of Staff 
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation & Rehabilitation 
DECS Doctrine, Equipment, Competencies & Structure 
DFC Directional Fragmentation Charge 
DFFC Directionally Focused Fragmentation Charge 
DFS Department of Field Services 
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
DSS Department of Safety and Security 
DtD Defeat the Device 
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ECM Electronic Countermeasures 
EDD Explosive Detection Dogs 
EFP Explosively Formed Projectiles 
EHR  Explosive Hazard Reduction 
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
EODCC Explosive Ordnance Disposal Coordination Cell 
EOR Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance 
ERW Explosive Remnants of War 
ESI Explosive Scene Investigation 
EW Electronic Warfare 
FFE Free From Explosives 
FHQ Force Headquarters 
FP Force Protection 
GPS Global Positioning System 
HAL Hook And Line 
HE High Explosive(s) 
HET Heavy Equipment Transport 
HHD Hand Held Detector 
HME Home Made Explosives 
HN Host Nation 
HNSF Host Nation Security Force(s) 
HoMC Head of Military Component 
IAW In Accordance With 
ICP Incident Control Point 
ICT Information and Communication Technology 
IDD Improvised Dispersal Device 
IED Improvised Explosive Device 
IEDD Improvised Explosive Device Disposal 
IED-TM Improvised Explosive Device Threat Mitigation  
IFAK Individual First Aid Kit 
IKM Information Knowledge Management 
IM Information Management 
IMAS International Mine Action Standards 
IMSMA Information Management System for Mine Action 
IMTC Integrated Mission Training Cells 
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INGO International Non-Governmental Organization 
IPD Identify Process Dispose 
IR Incident Report 
IT Information Technology 
KAPB Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices and Beliefs 
KLE Key Leader Engagement 
KSA Knowledge, Skills and Attitude 
LI Lessons Identified 
LL Lessons Learned 
LO Liaison Officer 
LOO Lines Of Operation 
LRF Laser Range Finder 
MA  Mine Action 
MAC Mine Action Centre 
MANPADS Man Portable Aid Defence System(s) 
MAP Mine Action Programme 
MBT Mine Ban Treaty 
MHE Manual Handling Equipment 
MILEX Military (grade) Explosives 
MILSPEC Military Specification 
MNT Manual Neutralisation Techniques 
MO Modus Operandi 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
MP Military Police 
MRE Mine Risk Education 
MSR Main Supply Route 
NEQ Net Explosive Quantity 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization(s) 
NIJ National Institute of Justice 
NTSG National Technical Standard Guidelines  
NWD Nuclear Weapon Disposal 
OJT On the Job Training 
OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
OSC On Scene Commander 
PC Platter Charge 
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PDV Pre-deployment Visit(s) 
PEF Performance Evaluation Form 
PoC Protection of Civilians 
POL Petrol, Oil and Lubricant 
PPE Personal Protective Equipment 
PSSM Physical Stockpile Security Management 
PwK People with Knowledge 
QA Quality Assurance 
RCIED Radio / Remote Controlled Improvised Explosive Device  
RCV Remote Controlled Vehicle 
ROE Rules Of Engagement 
ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle 
RSIED Road Side IED 
RSP Render Safe Procedure 
RST Route Search Team 
SA Staff Assistant 
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons 
SC Shaped Charge 
SF Special Forces 
SI Serious Injury(s) 
SMART 
Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-
based 
SO Staff Officer 
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement 
SOMA Status of Mission Agreement 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
SOR Statement of Requirements 
SRSG Senior Representative of the Secretary General 
SSR Security Sector Reform 
SUR Statement of Unit Requirements 
TBI Traumatic Brain Injury(s) 
TCC Troop Contributing Country(s) 
TL Team Leader 
TMP Training Management Plan 
TNA Training Needs Analysis 
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TOP Tactical Operating Procedure 
TPSA Tape Pressure Sensitive Adhesive 
TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 
U2 Intelligence Branch 
U3 Operations Branch 
U5 Planning Branch 
U6 Communication and Information Systems Brach  
U7 Training and Education Branch 
U9 CIMIC Branch 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UN United Nations 
UNCT United Nations Country Team 
UNIBAM United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual 
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service 
UNOE United Nations Owned Equipment 
USA Unit Search Advisor 
UST Unit Search Team 
UXO Unexploded Explosive Ordnance 
VA Vulnerable Area 
VBIED Vehicle Bourne Improvised Explosive Device  
VIP Very Important Person 
VOIED Victim Operated Improvised Explosive Device 
VOS Victim Operated Switch 
VP Vulnerable Point 
VSI Very Serious Injury(s) 
WAM Weapons and Ammunition Management 
WG Working Group 
WIT Weapons Intelligence Team(s) 
WRT With Respect To 






Glossary of Terms 
The following terms are defined as utilized in these standards. Terms are defined to 
provide clarity and prevent misunderstanding for those reading these standards. While 
the majority of terms are used in relation to IEDD activities, broader EOD terms are 
also defined in order to provide clarity and context when necessary. This glossary of 
terms is intended to facilitate the appropriate, accurate, clear, concise and consistent 
use of terminology. 
Abandoned Explosive Ordnance(AXO). Conventional EO that has not been used 
during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed 
conflict, and which is no longer under control of the party that left it behind or dumped 
it. AXO may or may not have been primed, fuzed, armed or otherwise prepared for 
use. 
Access Procedures. Those actions taken to facilitate freedom of movement to the 
location of an item of EO necessary for subsequent EOD procedures. 
Aggressor. Term used to describe any person or group of persons or organization 
that has the intent and capacity to inflict physical violence. 
Aggressor Capability. Classification of the ability or potential ability of an aggressor 
to achieve their desired aims when assessed under their doctrine, equipment, 
competencies and structure. 
Aggressor Intent. The desired aim or purpose that any person or group of persons 
or organization are trying to achieve through the use or threatened use of physical 
violence. 
Aggressor Tactics and Methods. The typical techniques and courses of actions that 
an aggressor utilize in the use or threatened use of physical violence to achieve their 
intent. 
All Reasonable Effort. Describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level of 
effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or 
suspicion of IEDs. “All reasonable effort” has been applied when the commitment of 
additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results 
expected. 
Anti-handling Device. A device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked 
to, attached or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made 
to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine. 
Source: Mine Ban Convention 
Area Evaluation. An assessment of local environmental and macro levels factors that 
influence or contribute to potential threats related to an EOD incident to inform the 
incident threat assessment. 
Area of Operations (AO). An area of operations refers to a geographical space on 
the earth that is defined by a designated IEDD authority to be under the responsibility 




Area Level IED Threat Assessment. The processes of an IEDD organization 
examining the IED threat for a given geographical area under their responsibility in line 
with the terms of reference provided to them by the designated IEDD authority. Area 
level IED threat assessment is informed from the regional IED threat picture produced 
by the national level IED threat assessment as well as scene level IED incident reports. 
Area level IED threat assessments produce incident briefing packs & local threat 
picture products for IEDD teams they control and provide area IED analysis products 
to the national IEDD threat assessment. 
Area Level IEDD Planning. Planning done by a IEDD Organization prior to the 
deployment of its IEDD capabilities to a given designed geographical area of 
responsibility. 
Assets.  A term referring to equipment, vehicles, buildings or materiel. 
Attachment Method. The method of attachment of an IED to a target e.g. a vehicle, 
or anchor point should be characterized as Tied, Adhesive, Magnetic or Mechanical. 
Battlefield Area Clearance (BAC). Systematic and controlled clearance of hazardous 
areas where the hazards are known not to include mines. 
Biological and Chemical Munitions Disposal (BCMD). Any EOD operation 
conducted on conventional munitions containing either biological or chemical agents 
or the recovery of other containers containing toxic substances. 
Booby-trap. Any device or material which is designed, constructed or adapted to kill 
or injure, and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an 
apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act.  
Source: CCW – AP II 
NOTE: the term boobytrap is used by many involved in EOD to refer to refer to both: 
1. Conventional anti-handling devices which can be used in association with mines 
or as clandestine devices. 
2. Improvised explosive devices which utilize a victim operated firing switch more 
commonly referred to as VOIED. 
From an EOD perspective, there is a difference between an anti-handling device, that 
has a level of quality assurance associated with its manufacture, and the switch used 
in a VOIED which owing to the improvised nature of the device or part thereof has a 
lower certainty of reliability in construction and method of function. For this reason, 
boobytrap is taken as a non-technical generic term, with the preferred terms of anti-
handling device and VOIED the preferred technical terms. Not all persons qualified to 
dispose or render safe anti-handling devices are IEDD qualified which is a requirement 
to be qualified to dispose of or render safe VOIED. 
Capability. The ability of an organization or entity to achieve a stated ability from the 
collective contribution of assets and the competent84 to safely, effectively and 
efficiently operate them. 
Capabilities of IEDD personnel. The capabilities of IEDD personnel refer the 
knowledge, skillsets, attitude and competencies that personnel are certified as being 
qualified with, in conjunction with the equipment and support available to them to 
effectively, efficiently and safely respond to an IED incident. 
                                            
84 The competency of personnel is considered to be combination of knowledge, skills and attitude of 
personnel in regard to a stated activity.  
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Clandestine Devices. Clandestine devices are EO items which are specifically 
designed for concealed emplacement or appear like an innocuous item which 
functions when a person carries out an apparently harmless act. They utilize anti-
handling devices or other conventional firing mechanisms in conjunction with a 
conventional initiator and main charge. The term military boobytrap has been used in 
reference to clandestine devices in the past. 
NOTE: They do not refer to anti-handling devices or other firing mechanisms fitted to 
ERW or other EO being used in a manner not in their intended design role which are 
considered to be IEDs. 
Clearance. Procedures to ensure the removal and / or destruction of all explosive 
ordnance hazards from a specified area to an agreed standard. 
Conventional Explosive Ordnance. All munitions containing explosives. This 
includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket 
and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; demolition 
charges, pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated 
devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine; and all similar or related items or 
components explosive in nature. 
Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD). Any EOD operation conducted on 
conventional munitions. 
Critical Equipment. Minimum equipment deemed to be essential in order for an IEDD 
capability to be effective, efficient and safe. 
Delivery Method. An IED incident should be characterized if the IED was to be 
delivered by some means to its intended target. i.e. it is a non-static IED. Such delivery 
methods include:  Vehicle borne (VB); Animal borne; Waterborne; Airborne; Person – 
proxy or suicide; Projected – Indirect/direct. 
Demining / Humanitarian Demining. Activities which lead to the removal of mine and 
ERW hazards, including technical survey, mapping, clearance, marking, post-
clearance documentation, community mine action liaison and the handover of cleared 
land. Demining may be carried out by different types of organizations, such as NGOs, 
commercial companies, national mine action teams or military units. Demining may be 
emergency-based or developmental. 
Note the following in IMAS standards and guides in relation to demining: 
• Mine and ERW clearance is considered to be just one part of the demining 
process; 
• Demining is considered to be one component of mine action; 
• The terms demining and humanitarian demining are interchangeable. 
Source: IMAS 04.10 
Designated IEDD authority. The national entity with responsibility for the conduct and 
standards by which IEDD is conducted in a defined geographical area. It is the national 
responsibility to designate a suitable entity to fulfil this role. In the case that no suitable 
functioning national mechanism exists, the UN may advise / propose a suitable entity 
to act as the designated authority. 
Destroy in Situ. The destruction of any item of ordnance by explosives without moving 





Detection Procedures. Those actions taken by any means to discover the presence 
of an item or substance of potential EO significance. 
Device Orientation. When an IED is emplaced to specifically attack some part of a 
target e.g. underside/side/top, the device orientation should be characterized 
appropriately. When an IED intended purpose is anti-personnel, it is typical not to 
include device orientation in its tactical characterization. 
Diagnostic Procedures. A collective term used in EOD that refers to both 
identification and evaluation procedures. 
Do No Harm Approach.  
The approach to be taken in all aspects of the design and delivery of an IED RE 
program., relating to unintended consequences as a result of the delivery of such a 
program, which includes: 
a) Exposing the local populace to being harmed; 
b) Educating those who intend to do harm; 
c) Spreading the production and use of IEDs; 
d) Increasing unnecessary fears; 
e) Promoting civilians to ‘clear’ IEDs themselves. 
Safe, Effective and Efficient. 
The characteristics that all IEDD capabilities should have at all times in that the 
associated risk is assessed as tolerable, it achieves a desired outcome or end state 
within acceptable time, financial, personnel and other resource constraints.  
Electronic Counter-Measures (ECM). The equipment, techniques and specialists 
within IEDD to temporarily inhibit or mitigate the threat posed by RCIEDs. 
Emplacement Location. When statically employed IED emplacement should be 
characterized as Subsurface, Surface or Elevated. 
Environmental Factors. In area evaluation, terrain, vegetation, weather, altitude, 
access and other local physical and meteorological influences that need to be 
considered in how they can impact an EOD incident. 
Explosion. A type of IED incident in which involves the uncontrolled initiation or 
functioning of an IED. This type of incident also includes a partial explosion termed 'a 
partial' where only a part of the explosive train has functioned, in which case it should 
be expected that varying amounts of explosive or potentially dangerous items will be 
in situ. 
Explosive Ordnance (EO). All munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or 
fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs and 
warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms 
ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and 
dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; 
clandestine and improvised explosive devices (IEDs); and all similar or related items 
or components explosive in nature.85 
Source: IMAS 04.10, 2nd Ed, 01 Jan 03, Amd 7, Aug 14, Glossary of Mine Action 
                                            
85 Other definitions include demolition charges. 
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Evaluation Procedures. Those actions taken to analyze the results obtained from 
EOD identification procedures to assess the likely mode of action it’s and associated 
hazards along with those in the locality. 
Explosive Hazard. An explosive hazard is any hazard containing an explosive 
component. All explosive hazards encountered can be broken down into the 
categories: Mines, ERW, IEDs and components and precursor chemicals thereof. 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). The term EOD is a collective one that includes 
the procedures of detection, location, access, identification86, evaluation2, hazard 
mitigation, render safe, recording and recovery and final disposal used in the disposal 
of items of Explosive Ordnance (EO) or any hazardous material associated with an 
EOD incident. 
EOD Procedures. The collective term referring to the following procedures, intended 
to result in the final elimination of an item of explosive ordnance; detection; location87, 
access, identification, evaluation, hazard mitigation, rendering safe, component 
recording and recovery and final disposal. 
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). Refers to Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and 
Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO). 
Source: CCW Protocol V 
External IEDD Support. Refers to support which is non-organic to the IEDD team and 
needs to be provided from other elements. This support typically includes 
communications, medical, security, transport, search, ECM assets and situational 
awareness support. 
Final Disposal. The action of elimination (complete destruction) of explosive 
ordnance hazards by EOD personnel. Final disposal may be achieved as part of the 
rendering safe of an item or EO or be separate actions taken after it has been rendered 
safe. 
Hazard Mitigation Procedures. Application of control measures intended to reduce 
the likelihood of the initiation of an item of EO and / or the consequences of such an 
initiation. 
Identification Procedures. Those actions taken to establish the make-up and 
characteristics of an item of EO. 
Improvised. In the context of EOD, improvised is taken to refer to the design, 
construction and or placement of an item of EO or component thereof. Such items of 
EO or components thereof are made from materials available at hand and have one 
or more of the following characteristics: 
• Not subject to quality control during manufacture; 
• Use components not in their original design role; 
• Employed in a manner that was not intended in its design. 
 
                                            
86 Some definitions of EOD have the EOD procedures of identification and evaluation under the 
combined heading of diagnosis. 
87 Some definitions have the procedure of uncovering after accessing and before identification, 
however; for this definition uncovering is taken to be one method of locating the item of EO. 
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Improvised Explosive Device. A device placed or fabricated in an improvised 
manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary 
chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate 
military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components. 
IED Aggressor. Any person or group of persons or organization that has the intent 
and / or capacity to inflict or threaten physical violence through the use or threatened 
use of IEDs. 
IED Awareness. A comprehensive set of IED theory presentations and practical 
lessons, which may include a written and or practical assessments, with the intent to 
provide or increase the knowledge of recipients in relation to IEDs, their threat and 
basic threat mitigation measures. 
IED Clearance. Clearance of IEDs refers to tasks or actions to ensure the removal 
and/or the destruction of all IED hazards from a specified area to an agreed standard. 
IED Disposal (IEDD). The collective term referring to the following EOD procedures, 
intended to result in the final elimination of an IED; detection, location, access, 
identification, evaluation, hazard mitigation, rendering safe, component recording and 
recovery and final disposal. 
IEDD Organization. The entity that is permitted by the designated IEDD authority to 
undertake IEDD in line with agreed terms of reference written in line with the contents 
of the IEDD standards. 
IEDD Clearance Plan.  An IEDD clearance plan is the product of an incident 
appreciation in which safe, effective and efficient courses of action involving EOD 
procedures are developed in line with the assessed EO threat.  All IEDD plans should 
have three COAs with a priority given to their execution and be mutually supporting in 
that if the first COA is unsuccessful the second can be used and so on until the IED is 
disposed of. The plan should consider what is the most dangerous outcome, the best 
outcome and the most likely outcome and mitigate the associated hazards of each 
appropriately. All IEDD Plans must be in line with the IEDD philosophy and principles. 
IEDD Planning. IEDD planning refers to the processes of examining the IED threat 
for a given IED threat environment and determining the most appropriate IEDD 
capability that is required to address or mitigate the assessed threat. IEDD planning 
takes place on three levels of National Level, Area Level and Scene Level. 
IEDD Policy. The strategic plan of the designated IEDD authority or in their absence 
the UN for a given country in relation to how IEDD activities are to be conducted by 
IEDD organizations. This policy will include detail on primacy of action within national 
security frameworks, authority to act, organizational structures and priorities and 
principles. It will outline the roles the different IEDD organizations may have. 
IEDD Protective Equipment. Garments and equipment designed to protect an IEDD 
operator from the blast, fragmentation and thermal effects resulting from the 
unintentional initiation of an IED or another item of explosive ordnance. 
IEDD Staff. Qualified IEDD personnel with appropriate technical experience and 
competencies coupled with the appropriate managerial skills to advise or lead UN 
Staff, designated IEDD authority and IEDD organizations involved in IEDD. It is the 
responsibility of the designated IEDD authority to determine what is a suitable and 
accepted as an experience. 
 
141 
IEDD Tasking Authority. A designated entity which provides operational control, 
planning, and administrative services related to a IEDD organization that is 
undertaking IEDD operations in a designated geographical area of responsibility. 
These cells receive notification of IEDD incidents, provide scheduling and control of 
IEDD teams and coordinate the completion of incident reports for onward passage to 
the designated IEDD authority. 
IED Reporting Classifications.  
Classification DEFINITION 
IED 
4. IEDD action which results in the successful neutralization, 
disruption or dismantling of an IED. 
5. Includes devices deliberately initiated by IEDD action where 
the aggressor’s intentions have been frustrated, for example: 
a. Majority of explosive burnt before detonation occurs. 
b. Removal of device from target so that detonation occurs 
in a place where damage is reduced to a minimum. 
6. Also includes:  
a. Fully primed devices from Finds e.g. Devices containing 
plain detonators and safety fuse. 
b. Successfully dismantled incendiaries. 
NOTE: For planned IEDD operations the main classification 
used will be an IED. 
Explosion A partial or complete functioning of an IED. 
False 
An IED related incident that is incorrectly identified though 
reported in good faith as an IED, which is subsequently 
categorized as a false alarm after positive Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal (EOD) action. 
Find / Cache 
An IED related incident that involves the discovery and/or 
recovery of an IED not yet emplaced or employed, IED 
components, and/or IED paraphernalia. 
Hoax 
An IED incident that involves a device fabricated to look like an 
IED, and is intended to purposely simulate one in order to elicit 
a response. 
Turn-in An IED related incident where an IED or component is turned 
over to friendly forces. 
 
IED Incident Response. Procedures to ensure the removal and / or destruction of all 
IEDs and associated hazards which are located or detected not as part of an on-going 
planned IEDD operation but is reported or turned-in by another party after their 
discovery. IED incident response can only be undertaken by advanced IEDD teams 
and may be conducted in all types of operating environment including non-permissive 
environments as part emergency based IEDD. 
IED Neutralization. Rendering safe of IEDs through the application of special EOD 
methods and tools to provide for the interruption of functions or separation of essential 
components to prevent an unacceptable functioning of the device, with an emphasis 




IED Risk Education. Activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury and casualties 
from IED by raising awareness of men, women and children in accordance with their 
different vulnerabilities, roles and needs, and promoting behavioural change including 
public information dissemination, education and training, and community IEDD liaison. 
IED Threat Assessment. The processes of examining the IED threat for a given IED 
threat environment and determining the most appropriate IEDD capability that is 
required to address the assessed threat. 
IED Threat Environment. A geographical designation, with in which there is the 
confirmed or assessed presence of IEDs. 
IED Threat Picture. An assessment of the potential use of IEDs in a defined 
geographical area by a stated IED aggressor or aggressor(s) against a stated entity in 
terms of the technical complexity and tactical sophistication along with the 
aggressor(s) intent, capabilities and opportunities along with local factors. 
IED Threat Mitigation (IED-TM). A whole of UN approach which focuses on the 
application of physical, procedural and training responses which can collectively be 
applied to mitigate the threats posed and consequences of IED attacks. 
Information Management. The term ‘Information Management’ refers to the on-going 
specification of information requirements, its collection and analysis followed by the 
dissemination of relevant information to relevant stakeholders in a timely manner.   
Source: IMAS 05.30 - Information Management for Mine Action 
Infrastructure and Urban Space IED Clearance. Procedures to ensure the removal 
and / or destruction of all IEDs and associated hazards from buildings, structures, 
facilities and their immediate surrounding spaces. Building and infrastructure IED 
clearance is not conducted in non-permissive operating environments. It may be 
conducted in permissive operating environments as part of developmental based 
IEDD or in semi-permissive operating environments as part of emergency based IEDD 
and is only undertaken by intermediate or advanced IEDD teams. 
Intended Purpose. Immediate and direct goals or objectives of an IED attack.  Such 
objectives include: Anti-Infrastructure; Anti-Vehicle; Anti-Armour; Anti-Maritime; Anti-
Air; Anti-Personnel (AP); TTP identification; Obstacle creation; Obstacle removal / 
Breeching. 
Intent. The desired aim or purpose that an act is carried out with through prior thought 
and planning. 
Internal Support. Refers to support which is organic to the IEDD team and is covered 
in the IEDD equipment chapter. Internal IEDD support includes IEDD equipment life 
cycle management which is required for IEDD equipment to remain serviceable and 
safe for use from purchase to disposal or end of life. 
Lessons Learned. People, things and activities related to the act of learning from 
experience to achieve improvements 
Local Factors. Those environmental and macro level factors that are identified as a 
result of an area evaluation undertaken as part of an EOD incident appreciation. 
Local Environmental Factors. The local environmental factors within area 
evaluation, refer to terrain, infrastructure, vegetation, weather, altitude, access and 
other local physical and meteorological influences that need to be considered in how 
they can impact an IED incident.    
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Location Procedures. Those actions within an EOD task which results in determining 
the presence and position of an item or EO. 
Macro Level Factors. In area evaluation, higher level local influences that need to be 
considered and how they can impact an IED incident. They set the incident in context 
with regards to the background situation and make an appreciation of how such factors 
can also influence potential threats. Typical macro level factors include socio-
economic picture, political and security context, factions / groups, culture and on-going 
and recent IED activity. 
Manual Actions. Steps carried out by an EOD operator in person as part of EOD 
procedures in close proximity to an item of EO or suspect item. 
Manual Approach. An approach by an EOD operator into the estimated danger area 
circumference of an item of EO or suspect object, before or after neutralization. 
Mobility Protection IEDD. Mobility protection IEDD refers to procedures to ensure 
the clearance of all IEDs and associated hazards obstructing the movement through 
or past a given location or area. Mobility protection IEDD can only be undertaken by 
advanced IEDD teams and may be conducted in all types of operating environment 
including non-permissive environments. 
Modus Operandi. Method of operation; style of handling things.  
National Level IED Threat Assessment. The processes of the designated IEDD 
authority examining the IED threat for the geographical area under their responsibility 
to determine the national IED threat picture and associated IEDD capabilities required 
by the IEDD organizations they will deploy to designated areas of responsibility. The 
national threat picture is informed by all source IED information fusion and the 
provision of IED analysis products by IEDD organizations under its control. 
National Level IEDD Planning. Higher level planning to assess the present and 
potential future explosive hazard threats in a given country including in the wider 
region. 
Net Explosives Quantity (NEQ). The total explosives contents of an ammunition, 
unless it has been determined that the effective quantity is significantly different from 
the actual quantity. It does not include such substances as white phosphorus, war 
gases or smoke and incendiary compositions unless these substances contribute 
significantly to the dominant source of potential harm of the hazard division concerned. 
One Person Risk. A principle which requires that only one operator be within the 
assessed danger area of an IED during any part of a render safe procedure. 
Open Area IED Clearance. Procedures to ensure the removal and / or destruction of 
all IEDs and associated hazards from a specified area to an agreed standard. 
Opportunity. The assessment of the chances of a set of circumstances that makes it 
possible for an aggressor to carry out an attack. 
Other Devices. Manually-emplaced munitions and devices including improvised 
explosive devices designed to kill, injure or damage and which are actuated manually, 
by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time.  
Source: CCW – AP II 
Permissive, Semi-Permissive and Non-Permissive Operating Environments. A 
categorization of the operating environment in which IEDD operations are undertaken 
to allow for the appropriate planning and resource allocation of security assets as well 
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and the appropriate TTPs to be utilized to mitigate the assessed threat. When 
assessing the operating environment in this manner, it is always considered in terms 
of the threat facing the IEDD personnel. 
• Permissive refers to an operational environment, typically in peacetime, where 
there is support from the local population. 
• Semi-permissive refers to operations in a potentially hostile environment where 
the support from the local population cannot be depended upon. 
• Non-Permissive refers to a hostile environment where adversaries and / or 
unsupportive local population pose a continuous threat. 
Positive EOD Action. Any action taken during an EOD task which has the potential 
to influence or alter the state of the firing switch or mechanism of an item of explosive 
ordnance. 
Pre-deployment Training. All activities that aim to impart the knowledge, skills and 
attitude (KSA) deemed necessary to complete assigned tasks in a safe, effective and 
efficient manner prior to becoming operational.  
Projected IED. IEDs involving improvised projected mortars, rocket assisted mortars 
and free flight rockets. 
Protection. Protection is understood as all measures and means employed to 
minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment during operations posed 
by any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational 
effectiveness. 
Recording and Recovery Procedures. Those actions taken to document and 
retrieve items of EO or components thereof that are in an acceptable state of safety. 
These procedures including the reporting of EOD incidents. 
Remote Actions. Remote actions are those that can be carried out without the need 
for the operator to approach or be in close proximity to the IED. The use of a ROV 
fitted with injectors is an example of a remote action. 
Remote Control. Control by commands from a distance.  
Source: CCW – AP II 
Render Safe Procedures (RSP). The application of special EOD methods and tools 
to provide for the interruption of functions or separation of essential components to 
prevent an unacceptable detonation. 
Source: IMAS Glossary 
Risk. Combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that 
harm. 
Risk Analysis. A process which evaluates the likelihood of the assessed threat 
impacting an organization and the severity of the consequences of those threats. 
Safe Waiting Periods. Safe waiting periods are waiting times which an EOD operator 
must allow to elapse, prior to making a manual approach. The times are mandatory 
and cover both the primary and secondary safe waiting periods. 
Note: the term soak time is used in some EOD communities to refer to safe waiting 
periods. 
Scene Level IED Threat Assessment. The processes of an IEDD team or number of 
teams examining in the field the IED threat for a given area or IED task. It can involve 
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deliberate planning in the case of area IED clearance and urban space clearance, be 
completely dynamic planning as in the case of mobility protection or IED incident 
response, but all IED tasks require in-going dynamic threat assessments throughout 
their execution. Scene level IED threat assessment is informed by area level planning 
and it in turn informs area level planning through the reports of IED incidents it 
undertakes. 
Scene Level IEDD Planning. Scene level IEDD planning is the planning associated 
with individual IEDD tasks which are typically bounded in terms of space or time. It 
can involve preplanned tasks in the case of IED area clearance or urban space and 
infrastructure clearance, or it can involve dynamic planning as in the case of mobility 
protection or IED incident response. Scene level planning is informed by area level 
planning, and it in turn informs area level planning through IED incidents reports.  
Scene Threat Assessment. An assessment of an IED task from information gathered 
through observation, map analysis, witnesses, surveys and all other means allowing 
an area evaluation in support of a threat assessment leading to threat integration from 
which possible courses of action are identified as part of a safe, effective and efficient 
IEDD plan. 
Secondary Hazards. Secondary hazards are other hazards present at the scene of 
an EOD task which are not directly a consequence of the EO item but a hazard due to 
its proximity to the EO item within the danger area of the EO item. Examples of 
secondary hazards include fuel sources, dangerous chemical or radiological 
substances, electrical supplies, glass fronted buildings, unstable buildings, rubble or 
other ground as well as biological hazards. 
Semi-remote Actions. Steps carried out by an EOD operator requiring an approach 
into the estimated danger area circumference of an item of EO or suspect object to 
place or fit a weapon or tool. The tool or weapon is then operated remotely. 
Skill Fade. Signs of regressing KSA may be identified/observed through routine 
monitoring, inspections, or as a result of a task while performing tasks. 
Status Of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Status Of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) are 
bilateral or multilateral treaties that define the legal position of military forces deployed 
by one or more states or by an international organization in the territory of another 
state with the latter's consent. 
 
Status Of Mission Agreement (SOMA). Status Of Mission Agreements (SOMAs) are 
bilateral or multilateral treaties that define the legal position of uniformed (military and 
police) and civilian personnel deployed by one or more states or by an international 
organization in the territory of another state with the latter's consent. 
Sustainment. The provision, replacement and rotation of personnel in organizational 
structures along with the associated materiel with the necessary means and facilities, 
to fully meet operational demands.  
Task Appreciation. An assessment of an EOD task from information gathered 
through observation, map analysis, witnesses, surveys and all other means allowing 
an area evaluation in support of a threat assessment leading to threat integration from 




Threat Assessment. Evaluation of the likely intent and capabilities of an aggressor 
along with local factors, involved or potentially involved in an EOD incident. 
Threat Integration. The process of combining aggressor intent and aggressor 
capability with local factors to identify those areas and activities that, when observed, 
will confirm or deny the aggressor’s likely chosen course of action. This will inform the 
IEDD operator of critical points and weaknesses within the situation or incident which 
may be exploited for use in the developing a safe, effective and efficient COAs to deny 
the aggressor of their intent. 
Unexploded Explosive Ordnance (UXO). EO that has been primed, fuzed, armed or 
otherwise prepared for use or used. It may have been fired, dropped, launched or 
projected yet remains unexploded either through malfunction or design or for any other 
reason.  
Source: IMAS 
Victim Operated IED (VOIED). An IED with a firing switch that is activated by the 
actions of an unsuspecting individual, relying on the victim to carry out some form of 
action that will cause it to function. 
Vulnerable Area (VA). Areas where the ground lends itself to IED or small arms light 
weapons attack. 
Vulnerable Point (VP).  Specific points where it is particularly advantageous for an 
aggressor to position an ambush, using either IEDs, SALW, or both.  VP are typically 
characterized by prominent or restrictive feature or choke point on the ground. Several 
factors pertaining to aggressor capability, intent and local factor use will contribute to 
the vulnerability of a specific point.  
 
 
